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In recent years, several related developments have altered our understanding of 
consciousness and the mind, including the increasing role of technology in the 
environment, advances in cognitive science, neuroscience and artificial intelligence, 
and the rise to cultural prominence of third culture texts, non-fiction which explains 
advances in science and technology to a non-specialist audience. Narrationism, a 
position grounded in cognitive science but that defines the conscious mind as a form 
of narrative has emerged as a result. Several authors of contemporary British fiction 
have responded to each of these shifts. However, what links the work of four of these 
authors – Tom McCarthy, Ian McEwan, Will Self and Ali Smith - is not narrationism, 
but a rejection of it in favour of a close attention to consciousness. This thesis reads 
two novels each by these four authors, with a focus on the influence of ideas 
originating in cognitive science via third culture texts. The thesis argues that the 
influence of cognitive science on the contemporary British novel is expressed in a set 
of formal innovations that together form the basis of a model of an alternative to the 
computational and narrational models, grounded in the operations of consciousness 
and of extended, technological prostheses. Building on interdisciplinary research, it 
argues that the mind can be understood in terms of the operations of four distinct 
‘technical systems’, each of which is derived from an aspect of cognitive science, 
linked with a of technology, and expressed in the novel through a particular formal 
innovation, each of which forms the basis of one chapter. The thesis begins by 
surveying the use of metaphors for the mind in its primary text, and ends by developing 
these metaphors, along with the four technical systems, into a new alternative 
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understanding of the mind which combines the insights of cognitive science and those 
of literary fiction. 
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Introduction 
What man, through his science and technology, has produced in this world, where 
he first appeared as a frail animal organism […] all this not only sounds like a 
fairy-tale, but actually fulfills all – no, most, fairy-tale wishes. […] Long ago he 
formed an ideal conception of omnipotence and omniscience, which he embodied 
in his gods, attributing to them whatever seemed beyond the reach of his desires – 
or was forbidden him. We may say, then, that these gods were cultural ideals. Man 
has now come close to reaching these ideals and almost become a god himself. 
[…] Man has become, so to speak, a god with artificial limbs. 
- Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents (1930)  
 
This thesis takes its title from a passage in Sigmund Freud’s Civilization and its 
Discontents (1930)1. The prosthetic god Freud describes is ‘quite impressive when he 
dons all his auxiliary organs, but they have not become part of him and still give him 
a good deal of trouble on occasion’2. Some cultural critics and philosophers use this 
passage as a measure of how our relation to technology has changed over the course 
of the twentieth century, arguing that the novelty of this claim has worn off. According 
to Hal Foster, the view that the human body and the industrial machine ‘could only 
conjoin ecstatically or torturously, and the machine could only be a “magnificent” 
extension of the body or a “troubled” constriction of it […] might strike us as almost 
quaint’3. Alex Goody argues that the twentieth century has revealed technology’s 
‘profound fusion with the human’; it has become impossible ‘to maintain an absolute 
distinction between the organic expressions of human nature and the technological 
processes, forms and devices which recorded and communicated these expressions as 
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culture’4. Robert Pepperell and Michael Punt exemplify this shift in saying that 
technology is ‘neither autonomous nor external to human consciousness’ and is ‘better 
understood as an actualisation of thought that transcends our ‘immaterial’ 
consciousness’5. Technology should therefore be understood as forming part of a 
prosthetic mind. Sebastian Groes defines the ‘Age of the Prosthetic Mind’ as an 
‘immersive, oceanic feeling whereby the mind extends out into, and connects with, 
the world’6. This is not to be understood as a threat to a natural form of subjectivity, 
or to the self-contained unity of the human body, but, rather, as an opportunity: 
‘although we may sometimes feel we are losing solid ground beneath our feet, 
outsourcing our minds to digital prostheses […] results in an increasingly accurate 
reflection of how consciousness and memory work’7. The increased role of technology 
in cognition reveals to us what Roger Bartra calls our ‘genetically inherited incapacity 
to live as other animals do – naturally, biologically’8. This lack is filled in by culture, 
a ‘strange prosthesis that completes and substitutes activities that the brain cannot 
perform except with the help of these external symbolic replacement networks’9. In 
externalising and altering different aspects of consciousness and cognition, new 
technologies reveal the existence and operation of other prosthetics that form part of 
the mind. 
 The novel is one such prosthetic. Maryanne Wolf explains that the ‘reading 
brain is part of highly successful two-way dynamics. Reading can be learned only 
because of the brain’s plastic design, and when reading takes place, that individual 
brain is forever changed, both physiologically and intellectually’10. Much of ‘how we 
think and what we think about is based on insights and associations generated from 
what we read’11. The ‘dynamic interaction between text and life experiences is 
bidirectional: we bring our life experiences to the text, and the text changes our 
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experience of life’12. Lisa Zunshine argues that literary narrative influences our theory 
of mind, an ‘evolved cognitive capacity enabling both our interaction with each other 
and our ability to make sense of fiction’13. Our interpretation of what someone is 
thinking at any one time emerges from the interaction of our theory of mind and 
‘historically contingent ways of describing and interpreting behaviour and mental 
states’14. She cautions that the words ‘theory in Theory of Mind and reading in mind-
reading are potentially misleading because they seem to imply that we attribute states 
of mind intentionally and consciously’15. In fact, it might ‘be difficult for us to 
appreciate at this point just how much mind-reading takes place on the level 
inaccessible to our consciousness.’16 This includes what N. Katherine Hayles calls the 
‘technological nonconscious’, the level at which cognitive processes interpenetrate 
technological artefacts17. Human cognition ‘increasingly takes place within 
environments where human behaviour is entrained by intelligent machines’ through 
‘somatic responses, haptic feedback, gestural interactions, and a wide variety of other 
cognitive activities that are habitual and repetitive and that therefore fall below the 
threshold of conscious awareness’18.  It follows that these environments partially 
determine mind-reading. The influence runs both ways: each revision of the narrative 
through which we explain individual behaviour affects the culture within which 
technological artefacts and networks are produced and put to work. The trouble 
technology occasionally entails does not lie in any existential threat to a natural, 
human way of life or of thought. Neither does it consist of obstacles to be overcome 
on the path to a final transcendence of human limitations. It is our fundamental and 
final condition, a continuous process of conflict, negotiation and dialogue. 
 This process of dialogue leads to the emergence of what John Johnston calls 
‘technical systems’, assemblages which form when ‘a technical evolution stabilizes 
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around a point of equilibrium concretized by a particular technology’19. As Johnston 
argues, and as I will demonstrate in the next section of this introduction, the 
dominant technical system is concretized by the computer. The computer’s 
‘transformative power has left almost no sector of the Western world – in industry, 
communications, the sciences, medical and military technology, art, the 
entertainment industry, and consumer society – untouched’20. Far from functioning 
as a ‘mere tool’, the computer ‘functions as a new type of abstract machine that can 
be actualized in a number of different computational assemblages’ comprised of ‘a 
material computational device set up or programmed to process information in 
specific ways together with a specific discourse that explains and evaluates its 
function, purpose, and significance’21. This discourse includes the computational 
model of the mind, which has formed the basis of contemporary cognitive science 
since its development alongside that of the physical computer in the mid-twentieth 
century. The effects of this equilibrium, founded on an assumed equivalence 
between the mind and the computer, linger on. The subject of this thesis is the point 
at which the alteration of psychological concepts by this technical system have 
become so widespread as to be open to adoption, refinement and subversion by the 
broader culture, including literature. As well as engaging with this influence, 
literature has also begun to respond to recent developments within cognitive science 
which question some of its founding assumptions, some of which have been 
influenced by work in the humanities. This may prove to be the point at which this 
equilibrium breaks down, allowing for the emergence of a new and wholly different 
way of understanding the mind. In this thesis I investigate how mainstream British 
fiction can be situated within this dialogue, how novelists have been directly or 
indirectly influenced by work in cognitive science, how they adapted its terms and 
ideas into a particular metaphorical register and set of formal innovations, and how 
their work might contribute to an emerging model of the mind.  
As I will show, this emerging model is characterized by its widening of the 
boundaries of the mind beyond those of the brain. In response, my thesis aims at 
widening the scope of existing work on the relationship between cognitive science 
and literature, which has tended to centre on the brain. In Genes, Cells and Brains: 
The Promethean Promises of the New Biology (2012), Hilary Rose and Steven Rose 
note the description of the 1990s and 2000s as the ‘Decade of the Brain’ and 
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neuroscience’s ‘Decade of the Mind’, respectively22. By the millennium, ‘publishers’ 
lists were awash with books proclaiming neuroessentialism’23. The endeavour to 
explain of human thought and behaviour through reference to the brain was showing 
cracks by 2011, a year in which mental and nervous diseases were being diagnosed 
at record levels’ even as ‘the largest pharmaceutical companies researching, 
developing and marketing psychotropic drugs declared that they were withdrawing 
from the field’24. This was also the period of the spread of the ‘neuro-enthusiasms’ in 
the humanities: ‘[a]rt, literary and music critics – and indeed artists, novelists and 
musicians – offer to decode the popularity of artworks, music and novels in terms of 
how they resonate with particular brain structures’25. The response to cognitive 
science in literary studies can be broadly divided into two strands. Firstly, there is 
cognitive literary studies, or cognitive literary science. This involves, at its best, an 
interdisciplinary dialogue, developing new ideas and perspectives with implications 
for our understanding of literature and the mind26. A second strand focuses on texts 
which have used distinct forms and styles to respond to advances in the study of the 
mind, particularly Modernist texts and examples of the emerging genre of the 
‘neuronovel’, which responds to recent neuroscience in its subject matter27. Jason 
Tougaw’s The Elusive Brain: Literary Experiments in the Age of Neuroscience 
(2017) maps the emergence of ‘[b]rain memoirs and so-called neuronovels’ as 
distinct genres made up of texts which ‘conceive the physical brain as central to the 
stories they tell […] translating neurobiological theories into literary experiments’28. 
I draw on both of these approaches, but my work is distinct in several ways. While 
some of the novels I look at could be called ‘neuronovels’, not all of them take the 
brain as their subject matter. In defining his approach to the neuronovels, Tougaw 
adapts Charles B. Harris’s term ‘neurological realism’29. He uses the term to suggest 
a formal approach, through which a realist style and narrative structure incorporate 
elements drawn from neuroscience. The use of the brain as a dominant reference 
point and aspect of the subject matter complements a formal questioning of 
narrative. The prime example is Richard Powers’s The Echo Maker (2006). 
According to Tougaw, this genre complements a broadly accepted position in the 
neurosciences according to which thought, memory and perception operate as a kind 
of unified narrative. As I will argue later on in this introduction, this position 
predates the emergence of neuroscience, and should be understood as a symptom of 
the basic limitations of the computational model of the mind. By contrast, I argue in 
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this thesis that the British novels I examine are characterized by a rejection of 
narrative as a means of understanding the self. This rejection derives partly from 
neuroscience, but also from the broader influence of cognitive science on popular 
science writing and basic psychological terms, the lingering influence of Freud, 
engagement with various European philosophers and critics, and from J.G Ballard’s 
formal response to the relation between technology and the body. This particular 
mixture of influences distinguishes these writers from (mainly American) 
neurological realists while also expanding the reach of the approach proposed by 
Tougaw.  
 In widening the scope of my corpus beyond that of previous work on the 
relationship between cognitive science and the mind, I am emphasizing the wider 
context in which neuroscience emerged and operates. As Rose and Rose argue 
neuroessentialism does not derive solely from advances in brain-scanning. It relies 
on two ‘enabling technologies’: ‘genomics and informatics, one approaching the 
brain from below, the other from above’30. Furthermore, neuroscience ‘does not exist 
as a single science in the way that genomics does’; even when ‘ostensibly studying 
the same subject, such as memory, cognitive psychologists, molecular biologists and 
brain imagers have few points of contact, working with different understandings of 
the phenomenon they study even when using the same words’31. The attempt to 
establish neuroscience as a unified and comprehensive body of knowledge relies on 
the assumption of a neuroscientific subject, which carries its own limitations: ‘A 
fundamental methodological problem for the neurosciences is that the unit of 
analysis is individual, yet humans are social animals with brains that have evolved to 
enable their owners to survive in complex social environments, not to solve abstract 
problems’32. This point is central to neurological realism as Tougaw defines it. The 
neuronovels he looks at challenge neuroessentialism by ‘foregrounding the 
strangeness of every brain and the elusiveness of the brain, body, world through 
which identity seems to emerge – in ways that dethrone simplistic myths about 
“cerebral subjectivity” and neurotypicality’, allowing for a ‘productive cultural 
dialogue about what it means to be an organism’33. My thesis aims at developing this 
approach by situating neuroessentialism in its broader context: the progress of 
cognitive science and of the relationship between minds and digital technologies 
since the mid-twentieth century. At the same time, I want to extend the reach of this 
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approach to texts which share some features and reference points with the 
neuronovel without necessarily taking the brain as their subject matter. To do so, I 
look at the work of four contemporary British novelists, focusing on two of their 
respective texts: Tom McCarthy’s Remainder (2005) and C (2010), Ian McEwan’s 
The Child in Time (1989) and Saturday (2005), Will Self’s The Book of Dave (2006) 
and Umbrella (2012), and Ali Smith’s The Accidental (2005) and How to Be Both 
(2014). Each work was published at around the period in which neuroessentialism 
assumed its cultural dominance. Many of them refer to neuroscientific findings. 
Tougaw defines two of them, Saturday and Remainder, as neuronovels, while the 
plot of Umbrella draws heavily on Oliver Sacks’ influential ‘brain memoir’ 
Awakenings (1973). Nonetheless, they are united less through a shared critique of 
narrative as the basis of consciousness. As I will explain later on in the introduction, 
each of these novels is influenced partly by Ballard, and that influence determines 
their focus on the relation between humans and technology. I argue that this 
influence, and their shared attention to this relation, determines their use of a similar 
form. This emphasis on the relation between humans and technology rather than the 
brain has allow me to use these novels to look at the ongoing influence of cognitive 
science and the computational model, as well as to read these works in relation to 
emerging critiques of neuroessentialism. 
I have taken these texts as indicative of British literature’s relation to 
neuroessentialism during the two decades of its dominance. Each of these works 
responds to a culture in which a sense of cognition as extending beyond the 
individual has become heightened through the role of technology and through the 
spread of recent ideas from cognitive science, neuroscience and philosophy of mind. 
I argue that a set of (broadly) similar formal innovations developed by these writers 
can be read as an incorporation of influences from these disciplines. While these 
incorporations draw on different sources, for different purposes, the resulting texts 
all share a conception of consciousness as characterised by a constant process of 
disruption and revision. This thesis explores the process through which technical 
systems stabilize and particular models of the mind assume their authoritative 
position operates, by showing how a similar set of formal techniques and shared 
terms emerges within a body of literature through various lines of influence. It 
investigates how literary texts both reflect and contribute to the evolution and 
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breakdown of technical systems by probing their limitations and questioning their 
assumptions. It uses those individual literary techniques as a way of mapping the 
separate components of a psychological model. Finally, it asks whether this body of 
literature can form the basis of an alternative model of the mind. I argue that my 
primary texts take the process of disruption and revision that accompanies the 
ongoing interaction of the mind and technology as the basis of consciousness and of 
selfhood. I use the term ‘prosthetic mind’ to define cognition as embodied in the 
looping interactions of processes, material objects, and technologies which extend 
beyond the individual body. Each of these novels depicts the prosthetic mind. 
This model of selfhood contrasts with ‘narrationism’, a position in the 
cognitive sciences according to which narration is the basis of the conscious self. This 
concept has been particularly influential within ‘third culture’ texts, popular science 
writing grounded in cognitive science. In this introduction, I will start by briefly 
explaining the context of contemporary narrationism as it relates to cognitive science. 
I will then show how the writers of my primary texts can be characterised by their 
critical relation to narrative. I argue that this critical view of narrative results partly 
from their representations of technology and partly from their critical engagement via 
third culture writing and with ideas derived from cognitive science. I will then give an 
overview of ideas from the cognitive sciences that have influenced these novels, and 
how these ideas undermine the narrationist model. 
 
Leaking Systems 
The technology that has had the greatest impact on the human mind in the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries has been the computer. The computer’s 
‘transformative power has left almost no sector of the Western world – in industry, 
communications, the sciences, medical and military technology, art, the entertainment 
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industry, and consumer society – untouched’34. Far from functioning as a ‘mere tool’, 
the computer ‘functions as a new type of abstract machine that can be actualized in a 
number of different computational assemblages’ comprised of ‘a material 
computational device set up or programmed to process information in specific ways 
together with a specific discourse that explains and evaluates its function, purpose, 
and significance’35. This discourse extends to the ‘claim that the universe is generated 
through computational processes running on a vast computational mechanism 
underlying all of physical reality’ that Hayles terms the ‘Computational Universe’36. 
The Computational Universe functions simultaneously as ‘means and as metaphor’, 
entangled ‘through feedback loops that connect culturally potent metaphors with 
social constructions of reality’37. These loops also connect literary and cultural 
narratives with material computational technologies and individual theory of mind. 
Theory of mind is particularly significant here, because one of the inaugural moments 
of the Computational Universe grants it a central importance.  
In ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’ (1950), Alan Turing addresses the 
question of whether machines can think through a thought experiment, the ‘imitation 
game’, whereby whether a machine can think depends on whether an interrogator, 
interacting with that machine and another human through typewritten questions and 
answers, can determine which is which38. Turing predicted that ‘in about fifty years’ 
time it will be possible to programme computers [to play] the imitation game so well 
that an average interrogator will not have more than 70 per cent chance of making the 
right identification after five minutes of questioning’39. He also predicts that ‘at the 
end of the century the use of words and general educated opinion will have altered so 
much that one will be able to speak of machines thinking without expecting to be 
contradicted’40. Given these developments, the original question of whether machines 
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can think is ‘too meaningless to deserve discussion’41. If we think computers can think, 
then they can.  
Daniel C. Dennett wrote in 1996 that Turing had ‘already been proven right 
about his last prophecy’, pointing out that the ‘use of words and general educated 
opinion’ had already altered to the point that ‘one can speak of machines thinking 
without expecting to be contradicted […] even if, as many today believe, no machine 
will ever succeed in passing the Turing Test, almost no one today would claim that the 
very idea is inconceivable’42. This shift is largely down to Turing’s own influence on 
both material technology and scientific and philosophical approaches to the mind. In 
‘On Computable Numbers, With an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem’ (1937) 
Turing proposed – again, as a thought experiment – the universal computing machine. 
The Turing machine, as it is now known, acted as a model for the von Neumann 
machine, the ‘fundamental architecture for computation’43. The spread of computers 
based on this design have reshaped the environment. Hayles claims that the material 
set-up of the imitation game results in an ‘erasure of embodiment’ through which 
intelligence ‘becomes a property of the formal manipulation of symbols rather than 
enaction in the human life-world’44. The computer has now altered the human life-
world in a way that entrenches this shift. 
Another sign of the general acceptance of Turing’s ideas is that we take the 
term ‘cognitive science’ – originally used to describe a specialised discipline in which 
thought consisted of the formal manipulation of symbols – to mean the study of the 
mind in general. According to Howard Gardner, cognitive science was ‘officially 
recognized around 1956’, and explicitly organised around the metaphor of the mind 
as a computer45. As Gardner explains 
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While not all cognitive scientists make the computer central to their daily work, 
nearly all have been strongly influenced by it. The computer serves, in the first 
place, as an “existence-proof”: if a man-made machine can be said to reason, 
have goals, revise its behavior, transform information, and the like, human 
beings certainly deserve to be characterized in the same way. […] In addition 
to serving as a model of human thought, the computer also serves as a valuable 
tool to cognitive scientific work: most cognitive scientists use it to analyse their 
data, and an increasing number attempt to simulate cognitive processes on it.46 
Cognitive science is predicated on the belief that in order to study cognition it is 
necessary to ‘posit a separate level of analysis which can be called the “level of 
representation”’: ‘symbols, rules, images - the stuff of representation which is found 
between input and output’47. Despite changes in the discipline, this model has 
persisted. Writing in 2005, Paul Thagard describes the central hypothesis of cognitive 
science as the claim that ‘[t]hinking can best be understood in terms of representational 
structures in the mind and computational procedures that operate on those 
structures’48. However, Gardner notes that the ‘rigorous application of methods and 
models drawn from the computational realm has helped scientists to understand the 
ways in which human beings are not very much like these prototypical computers’49. 
The kind of ‘systematic, logical, rational view of human cognition that pervaded the 
early literature of cognitive science does not adequately describe much of human 
thought and behaviour’50. He calls this the computational paradox. According to Andy 
Clark, the mind that emerges in contemporary cognitive science is better understood 
as a ‘constitutively leaky system’51. This system resists ‘any single level of analysis, 
such as the level of computation or of physical dynamics’ as well as ‘any single 
disciplinary perspective, such as that of philosophy, neuroscience, cultural and 
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technological studies, artificial intelligence, or cognitive psychology’52. It is also leaky 
‘in the sense that many crucial features and properties depend precisely on the 
interactions between events and processes occurring at different levels of organization 
and on different time scales’53. Patricia Waugh points out that in contemporary 
cognitive science mind ‘emerges as a distributed entity across body, consciousness, 
and world, rather than residing – in the more familiar Cartesian picture – in a location 
‘inside’ […] or ‘outside’, standing over a world implicitly alien to it’54. The emerging 
‘4e’ conception of the mind, of which Clark is one of the most influential proponents, 
is organised around ‘some combination of the ideas that mental processes are (1) 
embodied, (2) embedded, (3) enacted, and (4) extended’55. The advances in 
neuroscience made possible by new technologies have also demonstrated the extent to 
which the brain itself is not like a computer. Surveying these advances, Cornelius Bork 
remarks that ‘it is already hard to reconstruct how it was that the computer so easily 
assumed the role of central metaphor in brain research over such a long period of time’ 
and that maybe ‘one day we will look back on the computer as the most convenient 
and common form of misunderstanding the brain in modern history’56. As I will show, 
the influence of these developments is gradually displacing the metaphor of the mind 
as a computer. However, the computational metaphor persists by virtue of having 
reshaped theory of mind for its own purposes, and of the provisional balance it has 
established between this variation of theory of mind and the contemporary 
technological environment. 
The reach of the computational metaphor has allowed Dennett to attempt to 
salvage the computational model of the mind in the form of what Clark calls 
‘narrationism’57. Dennett’s argument, in Consciousness Explained (1991), proceeds 
from the assumption that human thought is inherently computational:  
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We know there is something at least remotely like a von Neumann machine in 
the brain, because we know we have conscious minds “by introspection” and 
the minds we thereby discover are at least this much like von Neumann 
machines: They were the inspiration for von Neumann machines!’58  
Computers are not ‘giant electronic brains’, as they were first described, but ‘giant 
electronic minds, electronic imitations – severe simplifications – of what William 
James dubbed the stream of consciousness, the meandering sequence of conscious 
mental contents famously depicted by James Joyce in his novels’59. The ‘architecture 
of the brain, in contrast, is massively parallel, with millions of simultaneously active 
channels of operation’60. Clark summarises Dennett’s solution as the ‘narrative twist’:  
Our extraordinary immersion in a sea of culture and language […] creates, in 
the human brain, a new kind of cognitive organization – a new “virtual 
machine” […] which allows us to make cognitive objects of our own thought 
processes and to weave a kind of ongoing narrative (about who we are, and 
what we are doing, and why we are doing it) that artificially “fixes” the 
cognitive contents.61 
On this account, ‘human-style conscious awareness requires an extra layer of 
judgment rooted in a culturally inculcated capacity to spin a privileged report or 
narrative’62. The conscious mind is a product of the individual’s own theory of mind, 
applied to their own experience, perception and actions, unifying them by reference to 
the self, which Dennett defines elsewhere as an ‘an abstract object, a theorist’s 
fiction.’63  
It is worth keeping in mind here that Dennett’s narrationism is grounded in 
computational science, and explicitly framed as a way of reconciling the 
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computational model of the mind as a von Neumann machine with a growing body of 
evidence that the brain is not computational in itself. This point tends to be overlooked 
in discussions of this and other variants of narrationism in favour of the more general 
idea that, as Dennett puts it, our ‘fundamental tactic of self-protection, self-control, 
and self-definition is not spinning webs or building dams, but telling stories, and more 
particularly concocting and controlling the story we tell others – and ourselves – about 
who we are’64. The acceptance of this idea, and the glossing over of its more 
contentious theoretical supports, derives from the importance placed on narrative in 
contemporary culture. Galen Strawson notes ‘widespread agreement that human 
beings typically see or live or experience their lives as a narrative or story of some 
sort, or at least a collection of stories’65. He calls this the ‘psychological Narrativity 
thesis’66. This is often coupled with the ‘ethical Narrativity thesis’, according to which 
‘experiencing or conceiving one’s life as a narrative is a good thing; a richly Narrative 
outlook is essential to a well-lived life, to full or true personhood’67. Narrativity 
sustains the computational model of the mind in the face of challenges from within 
and outside the discipline. In doing so, it relies on the ongoing suspicion of 
consciousness inaugurated by Freud. However, to define ourselves as primarily 
narrational we must ignore a great deal of non-narrational conscious experience.  
While the novel is used as a reference point to support versions of the 
narrativity thesis – for example, in Dennett’s references to Joyce - it can also be 
understood as a form inherently opposed to singular narrative. M. M. Bakhtin defines 
the novel as a whole as a ‘phenomenon multiform in style and variform in speech and 
voice. In it the investigator is confronted with several heterogeneous stylistic unities, 
often located on different linguistic levels and subject to different stylistic controls’68.  
These heterogeneous stylistic unities ‘combine to form a structured artistic system, 
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and are subordinated to the higher stylistic unity of the work as a whole, a unity that 
cannot be identified with any single one of the unities subordinated to it’69. The novel 
can then ‘be defined as a diversity of social speech types (sometimes even diversity of 
languages) and a diversity of individual voices, artistically organized’70. Not only is 
the novel suited to critiquing narrationism and the narrativity thesis, it is also able to 
incorporate the discourses through which these positions are articulated in order to do 
so. 
As I will show, the use of metaphors for the mind and basic psychological 
terms in my primary texts reflects the influence of cognitive science. This historical 
aspect is important. Given the influence of technology on models of the mind, I don’t 
believe it to be sufficient to read a novel’s depiction of thought by reference to some 
model of the mind without addressing the context in which both were developed. As 
I’ve argued above, cognitive science and narrationism emerged from a wider 
technological context, which they have also affected. Hayles has argued that the 
significance of the technological nonconscious in determining the contents of 
consciousness must be reflected in contemporary literature71. In responding to this 
context, these texts also exert an influence on it. In my thesis I have identified the 
sources of the formal innovations of my primary texts in work on the mind in other 
disciplines. The resulting texts are not illustrative examples to be used in 
understanding psychological concepts; they are interventions in the bidirectional 
process through which those concepts emerge and are refined. In this sense, my work 
aligns with cognitive literary studies, although I have stressed clear lines of influence 
over similarity, and I have not approached the deep level of engagement with recent 
scientific texts used by some proponents. The best examples of cognitive literary 
studies are focused, ignoring meta-dialogues about the relation between the two 
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disciplines. I reopen this meta-dialogue, but ground it in a critique of narrative. In 
order to do so, I have selected a corpus that criticises narrative and narrationism. While 
several contemporary British authors have engaged with the findings of cognitive 
science, I have chosen to focus on a relatively small sample of these. I have done this 
so as to be able to show how aspects of individual texts fit into the broader 
development of the writer’s work as a whole, and to trace lines of influence. I have 
chosen writers who have engaged with cognitive science, who have developed this 
engagement into formal innovations, and who have also displayed a degree of 
scepticism towards narrativity. For each of these writers, this scepticism has a 
particular reference point: the work of J.G. Ballard. 
 
Dehumanised and Utterly Comprehensible 
In her introduction to a collection of essays on Ballard, Jeannette Baxter quotes the 
Collins English Dictionary’s definition of ‘Ballardian’ as ‘resembling or suggestive 
of the conditions described in Ballard’s novels & stories, esp. dystopian modernity, 
bleak manmade landscapes & the psychological effects of technological, social and 
environmental developments.’72  As Baxter argues, this inclusion indicates the extent 
to which J.G Ballard’s work continues to assert its relevance. A particular passage by 
Ballard has become a reference point for three of the writers of my primary texts, a 
way of defining and justifying their ambivalent relation to narrative. In his introduction 
to Crash (1973), Ballard wrote that we now ‘live inside an enormous novel’, a world 
‘ruled by fictions of every kind – mass-merchandizing, advertising, politics conducted 
as a branch of advertising, the pre-empting of any original response to experience by 
the television screen’73. The external world, ‘reality, however confusing and 
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uncertain’, and the ‘inner world of our minds […] the realm of fantasy and 
imagination’, have shifted places74. These points are fundamental to McCarthy, Smith 
and Self. They are also relevant to McEwan. 
In a 1994 interview with Ballard, Self brings up this passage by way of defining 
his own interest in the ‘decoupling of the literary enterprise from the relationship of 
individual characters to social change’75. As Self puts it, Ballard went on to argue that 
the ‘nineteenth-century novelist could move in and out of the individual psyche to 
show its relationship to society’76.  Freud, according to Self, is in this context ‘the great 
deconstructive novelist because he made it impossible for other writers to undertake 
that project’77. Toby Litt argues that despite Ballard’s ‘insistence upon the 
parapsychological’, he ‘has no interest in the Freudian subconscious as such’; to 
understand Ballard’s novels, the reader must take ‘the external world inhabited by his 
characters as their subconscious’ and see ‘sublimation as being replaced by 
efflorescence, by architecture’78. In an essay on London published in 1999, Self sets 
out a model of urban consciousness that fits this description. Self claims that ‘[w]hen 
you grow up in a great city […] your sense of it is at first straightforwardly crazy – 
like a film with appalling continuity’79. This is followed by ‘integration, the 
coalescence of the two hundred billion neurones that will comprise the city-brain [….] 
the city is filled in with narratives, which have been extruded like psychic mastic into 
its fissures’80. This tendency to create narratives is the defining feature of urban 
consciousness: ‘Any object the eye pursues becomes a story, another track scored in 
time. Any person is a potential Medusa, Gorgon-headed with writhing, serpentine 
tales.’81 Consciousness in broader terms is itself ‘simply another story, another string 
of metaphors’82. The essay links a broad version of narrationism with a recognisably 
Ballardian model of the city as a vast nonconscious. 
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In the same essay, Self discusses giving a lift to a young schizophrenic man 
who told him that the London A-Z is ‘a plan of a city – it hasn’t been built yet’83. This 
incident looms large in Self’s The Book of Dave, in which the titular cabbie’s 
breakdown leads him to the same conclusion. The novel makes use of a modified form 
of free-indirect style, alternating third-person narration with italicised first-person 
interjections. The first-person speaker gradually develops a separate agency, an 
amalgam of trauma, social control and drugs revealing prophecy to Dave. Self 
develops this technique in Umbrella, which opens with a sequence in which the 
protagonist Zack Busner reflects on a split within his own consciousness, between his 
awareness of those around him, and a dominant narrating voice: ‘None of them is real 
– nor remotely credible, not compared to this: Along comes Zachary … the me-voice, 
the voice about me, in me, that’s me-ier than me.’84 Busner’s treatment of post-
encephalitic patients with L-Dopa is based partly on Sacks’s account of administering 
the same treatment in Awakenings. Describing a meeting with Sacks, Self mentions 
discussing the ‘narratological view of human identity, which at times he’d advocated’; 
Sacks ‘said now that if impending mortality taught anything, it was that life was not a 
story we tell to ourselves’85. Reviewing a volume of Sacks’s memoirs a few months 
earlier, Self describes him as ‘a strong supporter of the “narrativity” theory of the 
human subject’, noting that he himself thinks ‘it’s only the social being that is narrated 
– to ourselves we are always “such stuff as dreams are made of”’86. This is partly due 
to the influence of technology. In an essay published in 2016, Self links anxieties over 
the declining readership of novels and the effects of digital technology with ‘an 
increase in the number of scientific studies of narrative forms and our cognitive 
responses to them’87. He finds ‘much of this research – which marries arty anxiety 
with techno-assuredness – to be self-serving, reflecting an ability to win the grants 
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available for modish interdisciplinary studies, rather than some new physical paradigm 
with which to explain highly complex mental phenomena’88. He is drawn instead to 
work on the relations between memory, location, and narration89. He also professes 
his belief that ‘each successive knowledge technology’ – including the printing press 
– ‘brings with it a different form of human being’, and notes that our era is ‘also replete 
with the mental illnesses occasioned by such technologies’90. He addresses these 
points in Umbrella. 
What Self foregrounds through his stylistic innovations is the idea that while 
we may constantly be narrating our own experience, this narration does not structure 
the entirety of consciousness, and nor does it necessarily have to be understood as the 
basis of our self. In responding to culture, technology, and changes in our physical 
environment, this narration could even be understood as a form of intrusion of the 
outside environment into inner space. Smith makes this point in an interview on her 
work: ‘We are constantly, I think, as human beings, narrating things to ourselves, even 
though we don’t actually understand or hear that as specific voice’91. What interests 
her is the question of where this voice comes from: ‘Do we make the voice up or does 
the voice impinge on us?’92 In The Accidental, Smith depicts the four members of the 
Smart family by giving them each a distinctive voice. These voices mediate between 
separate aspects of their environment. Each character draws on a distinctive area of 
cultural knowledge, repeating and refining fragments of it, while relying on a 
particular form of technology – a computer, a camera, or literature - to stand between 
them and the world. They all respond to Amber, a mysterious woman who inveigles 
her way into their home, by defining her in terms of their own memories, fears and 
fantasies. Amber – as a real person, and not as a projection – asserts her presence 
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through the contradictions and inconsistencies in and between the separate narratives 
in which she is depicted. 
 Amber defines herself, in short monologues throughout the novel, as a kind of 
embodiment of cinema. Visual narrative is central to Smith’s work, particularly 
through the paradox it presents according to which even what is seen is overwritten 
by language. In Artful (2012), Smith quotes Ballard’s introduction to Crash while 
discussing fiction and time 93. The novel, as she puts is, is ‘bound to and helplessly 
interested in society and social hierarchy, social worlds; and society is always attached 
to, in debt to, made by and revealed by the trappings of its time.’94 The novel is also 
‘bound to be linear’95. Its linearity is not a reflection of human consciousness, but of 
adult consciousness within a particular society. Smith argues that adults ‘tell ourselves 
those fixed stories about ourselves […] we do tend to go, ‘Well, this is the person that 
I am, and this is what made me the person that I am.’ There’s always, always a sense 
of third-person narrative about adults.’96 In The Accidental ‘the kids were written in 
the present tense, because they’re in the present tense, and the adults were written in 
the past, because in the present they’re already experiencing the past’97. How to Be 
Both is structured so as to emphasise this limitation as it applies to written narrative. 
The novel consists of two halves, each centred on a different protagonist. There are 
two editions of the novel, with two orderings of these two halves. As Smith puts it, 
‘whatever way you read this book, you’re stuck with it. There are two ways to read 
this novel, but you’ll end up reading one of them.’98 The opening of one half of the 
novel brings up the notion of the book as a form of technology through which the child 
assumes an adult, third-person narrative consciousness. Teenage protagonist George 
begins by describing her immediate experience and her memories of her mother in the 
present tense, before trying to impose structure: 
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 Consider it for a moment, yes, why don’t you, her mother says. 
 No she doesn’t say. 
 Her mother said. 
Because if all things really did happen simultaneously it’d be like reading a 
book but one in which all the lines of the text have been overprinted, like each 
page is actually two pages but with one superimposed on the other to make it 
unreadable.99 
Smith counters this perspective through a focus on the spatial aspects of literature and 
narrative. Form, as she puts it in Artful, is ‘always environmental’, and always present 
as an environment100. She describes How to Be Both as a kind of fresco101. The use of 
a visual medium is important. Building on The Accidental’s concern with how cultural 
narratives structure visual perception, How to Be Both foregrounds a converse 
perspective, according to which narrative responds to what is seen. Characters find 
their understandings of themselves altered by what they look at.  
 Mark Rowlands argues that while proponents of the cognitive model, such as 
Dennett, claim to have undermined Cartesian dualism, they replicate many of its 
assumptions. The Cartesian conception of the mind has two aspects, ‘the claim that 
the mind is a nonphysical thing’ and ‘the idea that the mind is something that exists 
inside the head’102. What Rowlands calls ‘Cartesian cognitive science’ is grounded in 
‘a theoretical apparatus of mental representations and operations performed on those 
representations’103. Mental representations are ‘typically regarded either as brain states 
or higher-order functional properties realized by brain states’104. Since ‘mental 
representations are things that are to be found in the brain, and only in the brain, their 
manipulation and transformation are also processes that occur in the brain’105. 
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Cognitive processes are brain processes. Smith’s and Self’s Ballardian critique of 
narrationism entails an implicit rejection of this perspective. The mind is not a 
bounded area but an intersection between the operations of various processes 
operating across the boundaries of the body and environment. As shorthand for the 
shift in perspective required to articulate this point, McCarthy has proposed, with his 
collaborator Simon Critchley, replacing ‘the notion of the individual with that of the 
‘dividual’ – a subject always-already ruptured, networked, given over to 
contingency’106. McCarthy and Critchley define the subject as constituted by its 
relation to technology and to its environment, as well as to a formless, abject real 
beyond structure and interpretation107. The two part ways in their concern with the 
latter relation. In Infinitely Demanding: Ethics of Commitment, Politics of Resistance 
(2007), Critchley puts forward a theory of the ethical subject as a dividual, a ‘split 
subject divided between itself and a demand that it cannot meet, a demand that makes 
it the subject that it is, but which it cannot entirely fulfil’108. This demand is 
experienced as an affect that calls the narrative of the self into question. McCarthy’s 
fiction, on the other hand, has been characterised first of all by its refusal of affect, of 
the psychological interiority which would frame affect, and of the kind of authentic 
relation to the other that affect might express. As Waugh points out, Remainder uses 
a ‘dissociated, affectively flattened narrator with a digital range of feeling: on or off, 
neutral or tingling’109. This tingling registers the success of the narrator’s compulsive 
‘re-enactments’ of memories or fantasies, funded by compensation for a traumatic 
head injury caused by ‘something falling from the sky. Technology. Parts, bits.’110 The 
structure of the novel and its depiction of its narrator is informed by research into the 
experiences of post-traumatic patients, as well as Freud’s work on traumatic 
compulsion and the death-drive. By rejecting psychological interiority, McCarthy 
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relocates traumatic processes within a wider environment. His narrator’s re-
enactments alter the environment, interacting with the narrator and each other to 
produce further compulsions. The narrator’s self-narrative, such as it is, is determined 
entirely by the language of contemporary capitalism and of a complementary medical 
psychiatry, as well as the terms of his legal settlement. These cultural narratives 
intersect with physical processes in the environment, guiding the narrator’s behaviour. 
 These two aspects of Remainder – a rejection of affect and an interest in re-
enactment rather than event – draw on Ballard’s influence. McCarthy begins a piece 
on realism in the novel, ‘Writing Machines’ (2014), by quoting the passage from 
Crash’s introduction111. What McCarthy sees as important here is that Ballard ‘doesn’t 
tell us that novelists should ‘discover’ or ‘intuit’ or ‘reveal’ reality: they must invent 
it. Reality isn’t there yet; it has to be brought forth or produced; and this is the duty 
and stake of writing.’112 Realism is, according to McCarthy, a ‘literary convention – 
no more no less – and is therefore as laden with artifice as any other literary 
convention’113. The real, meanwhile, is ‘an event, something that would involve the 
violent rupture of the form and procedure of the work itself’114. C uses a self-
consciously realist form to depict another affectless protagonist obsessed with a real 
beyond conscious perception. The sensory overload that accompanies the early 
twentieth-century technologies the novel depicts cannot be fully subsumed within 
language. McCarthy describes C as ‘like a fake 19th century novel’ adding that he 
wanted ‘to use that realist mode as a main frame or Trojan horse to smuggle in much 
more modernist and avant-garde preoccupations, but in a way that would be 
legible’115. In doing so, he aligns the limitations of form with those of consciousness, 
questioning how both are constructed and what they can express. The real is present, 
but narrative’s inability to accurately reflect it has a shaping effect on that reality.  
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 In conversation with Critchley, McCarthy describes contemporary pop 
neuroscience as a reductive narrative in itself. He one-ups Critchley’s claim that you 
‘can say any sort of stupid weird shit on the radio about biology or neuroscience, and 
people will just lap it up’ by calling neuroscience, or ‘the idea that you can transfer 
neuroscience to the cultural arena’, one of ‘the biggest follies of our era […] It’s a 
category mistake. We don’t think in our brains, we think in language and culture.’116 
Critchley’s description of people who ‘want to believe that there is some other place, 
not necessarily God, but some deterministic narrative where we end up with some 
picture of the brain or some picture of the living organism where everything finally 
will be in place’117 suits Henry Perowne, protagonist of McEwan’s Saturday. 
Operating on a brain, Perowne echoes recent books on consciousness: ‘the secret will 
be revealed – over decades, as long as the scientists and the institutions remain in 
place, the explanations will refine themselves into an irrefutable truth about 
consciousness. […] That’s the only kind of faith he has.’118 Perowne has no interest in 
fiction. Earlier on in the novel, he puts himself forward as ‘living proof’ that his 
daughter Daisy’s notion, that ‘people can’t ‘live’ without stories, is simply not true.’119 
Over the course of the novel Perowne develops a form of understanding that does not 
rely on stories, one which can be understood in the same Ballardian terms as I’ve used 
above.  
Unlike the other authors, McEwan has deliberately moved away from the 
influence of Ballard, along with Kafka and Freud, on his early short stories and 
novellas, towards a realist form influenced by popular science writers. In Daniel 
Zalewski’s reading, The Child in Time hints at a ‘split in McEwan’s mind’ in 
responding to the discoveries of theoretical physics, and the work of physicist David 
Bohm on the mind, through a form of magical realism120. Quantum mechanics is 
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according to Carlo Rovelli the discovery of three features of the world: ‘Granularity', 
‘Indeterminacy’, and ‘Relationality’121. It teaches us ‘not to think about the world in 
terms of ‘things’ which are in this or that state but in terms of ‘processes’ instead’122. 
A process is ‘the passage from one interaction to another. The properties of ‘things’ 
manifest themselves in a granular manner only in the moment of interaction […] in 
relation to other things. They cannot be predicted in an unequivocal way but only in a 
probabilistic one.’123 A further implication proposed by Stephen Hawking and 
Leonard Mlodinow is ‘model-dependent realism’124. This view is based on the idea 
that if two ‘physical theories or models accurately predict the same events, we are free 
to use whichever model is most convenient’125. Don Ross and James Ladyman have 
argued that a picture of the world as reducible to ‘the types of ultimate causal relations 
that prevail among the basic types of little things […] finds absolutely no 
corresponding image in contemporary fundamental physics’126. The Computational 
Universe is also a metaphor, based on a spatial frame of reference particular to the 
human sensory apparatus. In The Child in Time, McEwan uses Bohm’s work as a 
reference point for a model of consciousness that reflects these ideas. 
In Zalewski’s summary, the shift in McEwan’s fiction reflects a more general 
one in psychology: ‘like many scientists of his generation, he has shifted his 
intellectual allegiances. At first, he studied perversity; now he studies normality. His 
first god was Freud. Now it is Darwin.’127 The style of his later work does however 
bear traces of his earlier engagement with Ballard, an aspect which complements his 
references to ideas from cognitive science which do not quite fit narrationism. This 
can be seen in comparing a passage from Saturday to his early short story ‘Two 
Fragments: Saturday and Sunday, March 199-’ (1978), which depicts another Henry 
making his way through central London. In a particularly Ballardian sequence, he 
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dreams of driving a car: ‘I found I knew the controls perfectly, of course, I had always 
known. […] The afternoon was warm, the traffic around me swift and agile, the 
landscape dehumanized and utterly comprehensible. Place names were illuminated on 
clinical road signs.’128 Henry walks from his bed into central London past Euston, 
going South on the Tottenham Court Road: ‘Everywhere it was the same, people came 
out of their cold houses and huddled round fires. Some groups I passed stood in 
silence, staring into the flames; it was too early yet to go to sleep.’129 Saturday’s Henry 
could have this scene in mind as he makes his way to the same street, reflecting that 
‘if the present dispensation is wiped out now, the future will look back on us as gods 
[…] blessed by supermarket cornucopias, torrents of accessible information, warm 
clothes that weigh nothing, extended lifespans, wondrous machines.’130 The Henry of 
‘Two Fragments’ argues with a lover who scavenges for remnants of this age: 
‘Collecting these things and setting them out like this amounts to self-love. Without a 
telephone system telephones are worthless junk.’131 The point to be made about 
technology is that it is neither a force in itself, a malign influence, or a collection of 
benevolent items, but a factor within an extended material network that also includes 
its users and the cultural ideals through which they seek to understand their place 
within it. The fetishisation of wondrous machines might lead us to overlook this point. 
Dennett has warned that the danger is not ‘that machines more intelligent than we are 
will usurp our role as captains of our destinies, but that we will over-estimate the 
comprehension of our latest thinking tools, prematurely ceding authority to them far 
beyond their competence’132. We might do so through having become ‘overcivilized’, 
through becoming overdependent on technology133. One of the effects of the 
contemporary technological nonconscious is a heightening of its complexity 
accompanied by technologies and cultural ideals giving a sense, either real or false, of 
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a greater possibility of understanding. The landscape grows more and more 
dehumanised and comprehensible.  
This effect is mitigated by the potential for insights into thought granted by 
breakdowns in the proper functioning of that environment. As Saturday’s Henry 
drives, the complex task of controlling his car and navigating his urban environment 
has become second-nature to the extent that he becomes wrapped up in increasingly 
abstract introspection, thinking or sensing ‘without unwrapping the thought into 
syntax and words’, so that ‘when a flash of red streaks in across his left peripheral 
vision, like a shape on his retina in a bout of insomnia, it already has the quality of an 
idea, a new idea, unexpected and dangerous, but entirely his, and not of the world 
beyond himself’134. In this thesis, I take the implications of cognitive science to be that 
the individual’s environment can be said to be a part of their mind and self. Setting 
aside Ballard, a car-crash represents at least a momentary breakdown in the relation 
between the individual and their material and sociocultural environment. In this thesis, 
I argue that such moments of breakdown are articulated within the novels I am looking 
at through a focus on a distinctly non-narrative form of consciousness, revealing the 
extent of the indivlidual’s integration with technology and language at the point at 
which this integration is threatened.  
 
Three Cultures 
The critique of narrative to be found in these novels is partly due to a tradition of 
literary engagement with the technological nonconscious. It is also partly due to the 
influence of cognitive science itself. By ‘cognitive science’ I mean cognitive science 
as it has been presented to a wider public. The texts I refer to are, with a few 
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exceptions, popular science, written for a non-specialist audience. John Brockman 
calls this wave of popular science writing the ‘third culture’, which ‘consists of those 
scientists and other thinkers in the empirical world who, through their work and 
expository writing, are taking the place of the traditional intellectual in rendering 
visible the deeper meanings of our lives, redefining who and what we are’135. 
Cognitive science looms large here. Kevin Kelly calls the third culture ‘a pop culture 
based in technology, for technology’136. Technologies generate ‘a supernova of slang 
and idioms swelling the English language’, tools for new research, and a mixture of 
both, ‘a theory that throws off data, or data with a built-in theory’137. In the third 
culture, ‘the way to settle the question of how the mind works is to build a working 
mind’138. This reflects the centrality of material technology to cognitive science. 
Gardner argues that the rise of cognitive science in the 1950s was ‘a complex matter, 
reflecting changes in the Zeitgeist, new methods in allied sciences, and the enhanced 
legitimacy of concepts like intention, purpose, goal, and problem solving now that 
“mere” mechanical gadgets could lay claim to these processes’139. The legitimation of 
such concepts allowed for an alternative to behaviorism, the previously dominant 
paradigm in psychology, which rejected any description of mental processes in favour 
of stimulus-response models. As Douwe Draaisma puts it, ‘[t]hanks to the computer, 
terms like mind and consciousness returned to the vocabulary of the psychologist’140. 
The use of physical technologies, combined with the use of complementary theory, 
was crucial: ‘The fact that, by working through a formal programme without human 
intervention, machines executed tasks previously associated with thought […] had a 
psychological effect that the computational principles themselves could never 
achieve.’141 The reach of these models has also been widened by equivalences between 
cognitive science and evolutionary theory. Dennett argues that Darwin’s discoveries 
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can be understood as demonstrating the fundamental role of algorithmic processes in 
nature142. As I’ll discuss, the evolutionary psychology developed by writers such as 
Steven Pinker draws on Turing as much as on Darwin. Theories of computational 
processes, and the physical computer itself, have allowed for a completely new 
vocabulary for talking about consciousness, the mind, and life itself. The third culture 
responds to these changes.  
 Slavoj Žižek makes three points about the third culture. First, ‘we are dealing 
not with scientists themselves but (although they are often the same individuals) with 
authors who address a large segment of the public’143.  Secondly, ‘we are dealing not 
with a homogenized field but with a rhizomic multitude connected through “family 
resemblances”, within which authors are often engaged in violent polemics but where 
interdisciplinary connections flourish (between evolutionary biology and cognitive 
sciences, etc.)’144. Thirdly, ‘as a rule, authors active in this domain are sustained by a 
missionary zeal, by a shared awareness that they all participate in a unique shift of the 
global paradigm of knowledge’145. These kinds of arguments are usually framed by 
reference to C.P. Snow’s 1959 lecture ‘The Two Cultures’, which addresses mutual 
ignorance between the sciences and the humanities. The term ‘third culture’ implies 
that this problem has been circumvented in the replacement of humanities and social 
science scholars by scientists as leading public intellectuals. Given the influence the 
lecture continues to exert, it is worth re-examining its argument. Like Turing, Snow 
rests his argument partly on a prediction. Unlike Turing, Snow has been proven wrong 
in his claim that ‘the disparity between the rich and the poor’ would not survive ‘to 
the year 2000’.146 Thomas Piketty’s best-selling Capital in the Twenty-First Century 
(2013) argues that lessening inequality in the post-war period in which Snow was 
writing was an effect of the war itself, and that the long-term trend was towards 
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increased inequality. Introducing a new edition of F.R. Leavis’s vitriolic response to 
Snow’s lecture, Two Cultures?: The Significance of C.P. Snow (2013), Stefan Collini 
argues that Leavis’s central target was the ‘axiomatic status accorded to economic 
prosperity as the exclusive or overriding goal of all social action and policy’, and that 
‘the relevance or urgency of analysing this dynamic and contesting this status can 
hardly be said to have diminished’ fifty years later147. Indeed, Picketty makes a similar 
point when arguing that ‘[e]conomic and technological rationality at times has nothing 
to do with democratic rationality’, and that the latter does not naturally follow on from 
the former two, as has been assumed148. Evgeny Morozov calls the ideology in which 
this assumption is grounded ‘technological solutionism’. On this view, the question of 
the good life is taken to have either been dealt with, or left to the individual; technology 
is simply a tool with which to achieve it. As Morozov argues, this kind of rhetoric 
stems from the defeat of philosophy by ‘psychology, neuroscience, economics (of the 
rational-choice variety), and their various combinations, like behavioural 
economics’149. He cites Martha C. Nussbaum’s concept of the ‘narrative imagination’ 
as a model for the role of the humanities in this context. Citizens, Nussbaum argues, 
‘cannot relate well to the complex world around them by factual knowledge and logic 
alone’, and therefore depend on the narrative imagination150. E.O. Wilson makes a 
similar argument from the perspective of the other culture: ‘Thanks to science and 
technology, access to factual knowledge of all kinds is rising exponentially while 
dropping in unit cost […] The world henceforth will be run by synthesizers, people 
able to put together the right information at the right time.’151 The third culture’s self-
justification relies on a form of the ethical narrativity thesis. Its widespread adoption 
of a form of the psychological narrativity thesis, however, often stands in the way of 
it developing the kind of nuanced relation to narrative required. Defining the self as a 
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‘fiction’ can involve naturalising a conventional model of selfhood, explaining its 
contradictions by reference to the inherent limitations of the mind. As Morozov 
argues, this complements technological solutionism. The ‘narrative imagination’ can 
be contrasted with the ‘somewhat oxymoronic “numeric imagination,” which can be 
defined as the predisposition to seek out quantitative and linear [causal] explanations 
that have little respect for the complexity of the actual human world’152. Where 
‘narrative imagination’ is self-reflexive, ‘painfully aware that in order to account for 
the world, it also needs to account for the observer’, the  numeric imagination ‘believes 
in objective, firm accounts of reality out there; these accounts are timeless and never 
expire’153. In responding to developments in cognitive science, third culture texts 
attempt to understand human behaviour in terms of such objective accounts of reality. 
At the same time, they are limited in this attempt through their generally uncritical 
position in relation to a conventional model of selfhood and an associated ideal of 
human and technological progress.  
 
Alternatives to Narrative 
In this thesis, I show how the authors of my primary texts have been influenced by 
ideas derived from cognitive science via third culture texts. In combining this 
influence with a critical view of narrative, these writers depict the conscious self in 
terms of the operations of various technical systems. I have structured my thesis 
around four such technical systems. Each originates in a two-way transfer of the kind 
described by Raymond Tallis. First, ‘a term most usually applied to human beings is 
transferred to machines’154. This ‘begins as a consciously metaphorical or specialist 
use but the special, restricted, basis for the anthropomorphic language is soon 
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forgotten: the metaphorical clothes in which thinking is wrapped become its skin.’155 
These machines ‘described in human terms are then offered as models for minds 
(described in slightly machine-like terms)’156. Tallis outlines this process to critique 
it. I believe, however, that by understanding machines as externalisations of aspects 
of the human cognitive processes we can reach a better understanding of the mind. 
The first technical system I refer to is the intentional stance. This is Dennett’s 
adaptation of theory of mind or folk psychology, which expands on the version of 
theory of mind Turing developed in ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’. The 
second is prosthetics. These are the technologies which make up the perceptual system 
in Freud’s model. The third is the meme. The term ‘memes’ was coined by Richard 
Dawkins, to describe units of information which recreate themselves, like genes or 
like computer viruses of the mind, and developed by Dennett157. The fourth is 
homeostasis. This term originates in biology, but its meaning has shifted through its 
adoption by the discipline of cybernetics. Each of the concepts have been developed 
in third culture texts and adapted by the writers I look at. In their original context, they 
have been used to support a broad third culture consensus linked to narrationism. In 
of themselves, however, they each undermine psychological narrationism. The formal 
techniques used by the authors of my primary texts do the same, adapting the novel 




The Intentional Stance 
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I take Freud as my starting point for this reappraisal of cognitive science. As Dennett 
argues, Freud’s work represented the first major challenge to the dominant model of 
the mind since John Locke:  
For John Locke and many subsequent thinkers, nothing was more essential to 
the mind than consciousness […] To discern what went on in one’s mind one 
just “looked” – one “introspected” – and the limits of what one thereby found 
were the very boundaries of the mind. […] The influence of this view had been 
so great that when Freud initially hypothesized the existence of unconscious 
mental processes, his proposal met widely with stark denial and 
incomprehension.158 
Dennett claims that ‘Freud’s expansion of the bounds of the thinkable […] paved the 
way for the more recent developments of “cognitive” experimental psychology’159. In 
‘The Unconscious’ (1915), Freud defines psychoanalysis as an extension of theory of 
mind: 
Consciousness makes each of us aware only of his own states of mind; that 
other people, too, possess a consciousness is an inference which we draw by 
analogy from their observable utterances and actions, in order to make this 
behaviour of theirs intelligible to us. […] Psycho-analysis demands nothing 
more than that we should apply this process of inference to ourselves also […] 
all the acts and manifestations which I notice in myself and do not known how 
to link up with the rest of my mental life must be judged as if they belonged to 
someone else.160 
Dennett calls this anthropomorphism a ‘crutch’, by means of which one could ‘cling 
to at least a pale version of the Lockean creed by imagining that these “unconscious” 
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thoughts, desires, and schemes belonged to other selves within the psyche’161. He 
claims that the innovation of the cognitive model lies in its having dispensed with this 
crutch. His own model of the mind derives from Turing’s revision of theory of mind. 
He describes this as a shift from the ‘anthropomorphism’ of folk psychology to the 
‘rational-agentism’ of what he calls the ‘intentional stance’162. Dennett defines folk 
psychology as a ‘rationalistic calculus of interpretation and prediction – an idealizing, 
abstract instrumentalistic interpretation method that has evolved because it works and 
works because we have evolved’163. To understand other entities as ‘rational agents 
or intentional systems’ permits us ‘to think about them at a still higher level of 
abstraction, ignoring the details of just how they manage to store the information they 
“believe” and how they manage to “figure out” what to do, based on what they 
“believe” and “want”.’164. Dennett asserts that the ‘intentional patterns discernible in 
the activities of intelligent creatures’ have an objective reality, but cautions that it is 
important to recognise the ‘incompleteness and imperfections in the patterns […] the 
intentional strategy works as well as it does, which is not perfectly.’165 He argues that 
‘it is the myth of our rational agenthood that structures and organises our attributions 
of belief and desire to others and that regulates our own deliberations and 
investigations’166. As I’ve argued above, applying the intentional stance – making use 
of theory of mind, mind-reading, or narrating – has an active, shaping effect. This is 
partly due to its inability to fully describe what it is applied to. The shift from to 






   
 
Extended Mind Theory (EMT) poses a major challenge to the myth of rational 
agenthood and to Cartesian cognitive science in general. EMT, as proposed by Clark 
and David Chalmers in ‘The Extended Mind’ (1995), begins with the claim that if the 
mind is taken to be the material substrate of cognitive processes, there is no reason to 
limit it to the brain, central nervous system, or body. Clark and Chalmers argue that, 
in some cases, ‘the human organism is linked with an external entity in a two-way 
interaction, creating a coupled system that can be seen as a cognitive system in its own 
right’167. Clark notes that the ‘ancient seepage’ of the human mind and material objects 
‘has been gathering momentum with the advent of texts, PCs, coevolving software 
agents, and user-adaptive home and office devices’168. One of the most significant 
external entities linked with the mind is language. In this respect, EMT develops 
Dennett’s model. Where Dennett ‘places most of his bets on the radically internally 
transformative power of our encounters with language and ends up with a story that 
seems more developmental than genuinely hybrid’, from the perspective of EMT 
‘words and sentences remain potent real-world structures encountered and used by a 
basically (though this is obviously too crude) pattern-completing brain’169.  
These ideas were also explored by Freud. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 
Freud begins by considering ‘a living organism in its most simplified possible form as 
an undifferentiated vesicle of a substance that is susceptible to stimulation’170. This 
‘little fragment of living substance is suspended in the middle of an external world 
charged with the most powerful energies; and it would be killed by the stimulation 
emanating from these if it were not provided with a protective shield against 
stimuli’171. The outer layer hardens into a shield through which ‘the energies of the 
external world are able to pass into the underlying layers, which have remained living, 
with only a fragment of their original intensity’172. In a short piece from 1925, ‘A Note 
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Upon the Mystic-Writing Pad’, Freud adopts the titular technology as metaphor for 
memory. In using the Mystic-Writing Pad, ‘one writes upon the celluloid portion of 
the covering-sheet which rests upon the wax slab’173. The celluloid ‘thus acts as a 
protective sheath for the waxed paper, to keep off injurious effects from without. The 
celluloid is a "protective shield against stimuli"; the layer which actually receives the 
stimuli is the paper.’174 Freud links this to his description of the perceptual apparatus 
in Beyond the Pleasure Principle: ‘the perceptive apparatus of our mind consists of 
two layers, of an external protective shield against stimuli whose task it is to diminish 
the strength of excitations coming in, and of a surface behind it which receives the 
stimuli.’175 The Pad ‘provides not only a receptive surface that can be used over and 
over again, like a slate, but also permanent traces of what has been written, like an 
ordinary paper pad: it solves the problem of combining the two functions by dividing 
them between two separate but interrelated component parts or systems.’176 The mind 
is made up of a set of interrelated components which define themselves in relation to 
the environment. Given the reliance of these components on such external structures 
as language, we can add to this that the mind is made up of prosthetics. 
 
Memes 
Concluding ‘The Extended Mind’, Clark and Chalmers consider the question: ‘What, 
finally, of the self? Does the extended mind imply an extended self? It seems so. Most 
of us already accept that the self outstrips the boundaries of consciousness’177.  That 
most people accept this is part of the legacy of Freud’s work. Reviewing claims 
‘concerning extended physical bases for the conscious mind’178, Clark concludes that 
‘the case for ECM [Extended Conscious Mind] is at best unproven and that the 
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machinery of conscious experience is (probably) all in the head/CNS [Central Nervous 
System]’179. In Natural-Born Cyborgs (2003), Clark adapts Dennett’s narrationism so 
as to fit EMT180. The idea that the conscious self is in some sense a story functions 
here as an implicit argument that there are limits to our ability to apprehend the actual 
operations of the mind.  
Reading an early case study of Freud’s, Steven Marcus identifies an 
implication ‘that a coherent story is in some manner connected with mental life […] 
On this reading, human life is, ideally, a connected and coherent story, with all the 
details in explanatory place.’181 Jason Tougaw locates Freud’s work in relation to the 
shared origins of the novel and the medical case history. On this reading, the novel 
and the case history ‘give narrative form to subjectivity, by examining in concrete and 
sometimes excruciating detail the overdetermined, often ineffable, relationships 
between physiology and consciousness’182. In ‘The Unconscious’, the same essay in 
which he equates psychoanalysis with theory of mind, Freud identifies consciousness 
with language. Conscious presentation of an object consists of ‘the thing plus the 
presentation of the word alone’ while the unconscious presentation consists of ‘the 
presentation of the thing alone’183. The association of the word with the thing alters 
perception. In Consciousness Explained, Dennett argues that ‘the most accessible or 
available words and phrases’ can ‘actually change the content of the experience’184. 
He compares this to Freud’s description of the preconscious in The Ego and the Id 
(1923): ‘The question, ‘How does a thing become conscious?’ would be more 
advantageously stated: ‘How does a thing become preconscious?’, and the answer 
would be: ‘Through becoming connected with the word-presentations corresponding 
to it.’185 This connection alters both the thing and the word. Žižek has situated Dennett 
in relation to Freud, arguing that Dennett’s ‘key achievement is to demonstrate how 
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we literally “see” concepts and judgments […] the very content that we see – inclusive 
of its direct physical properties – is the result of the previous judgment.’186 Language 
is a prosthetic which determines the contents of consciousness, reacting to external 
stimuli. 
Dennett’s emphasis on language as the distinguishing feature of human 
consciousness informs his definition of the conscious self as a ‘highly replicated 
meme-complex’187. Dennett describes memes as ‘cultural recipes’; they ‘depend on 
one physical medium or another for their continued existence […] but they can leap 
around from medium to medium, being translated from language to language, from 
language to diagram, from diagram to rehearsed practice, and so forth.’188 Memes as 
defined in this way are analogous to words and phrases: ‘Words are basically 
information packets of some sort, recipes for using one’s vocal apparatus and ears (or 
hands and eyes) – and brains – in quite specific ways […] memes are the same sort of 
thing – information packets or recipes.’189 The concept of memes allows for a way of 
understanding language not only as a prosthetic but a set of prosthetics, with different 
ones operating in the mind from moment to moment, transferring from individual to 
individual. This position differentiates Dennett from other thinkers influenced by 
cognitive science, such as Pinker, who argues, from an evolutionary perspective, that 
language maps onto mental representations without altering them.  
Dennett has said that Julian Jaynes’s emphasis on language was an influence 
on his own work.190 References to Jaynes’s work can be found throughout Dennett’s 
work191. Taking Jaynes’s influence into account is useful in understanding Dennett’s 
discussion of ‘intentional objects’, the objects created in perception by the interplay 
of actual objects in the world and memes. In Breaking the Spell (2006), Dennett 
describes intentional objects as ‘the things somebody can think about’192. Other people 
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figure as intentional objects in our thinking, depending on our relation to them: ‘I can’t 
hate or love my neighbour without having a pretty clear and largely accurate set of 
beliefs that serve to pick this person out of the crowd so I can recognize, track, and 
interact effectively with him or her’.193 Dennett builds on this in developing his theory 
of religion. Usually ‘the things we believe in are perfectly real, and the things that are 
real we believe in, so we can usually ignore the logical distinctions between an 
intentional object […] and the thing in the world that inspired/caused/grounds/anchors 
the belief.’194 This is not always the case. Dennett cites Jaynes’s argument that early 
religious rituals before the advent of consciousness constituted ‘exopsychic’ forms of 
thought195. These rituals arose in relation to, and further defined, intentional objects 
not linked to any actual objects: gods. Jaynes situates the origin of self-consciousness 
in such rituals, and in the interplay between intentional objects and corresponding 
beliefs. In this sense, consciousness can be understood in terms of the interplay of 
exopsychic forms of thought and objects in the world within the mind.  
Dennett’s use of ‘intentionality’ derives from the work of Franz Brentano196. 
Freud also studied under Brentano. Donald McIntosh’s reading of Freud’s model of 
cathexis (the investment of energy in the mind in an object or person) in relation to the 
concept of intentional objects is useful here. McIntosh claims that Freud ‘initially held 
the object of a cathexis always to be intra-psychic, a position which is untenable and 
which he largely abandoned after 1915, when he began (correctly) to take cathected 
objects generally to be persons of events, not their representations’197. The ‘object’, 
on this reading is ambiguous. It can best be understood, according to McIntosh, by 
analogy to the philosophical concept of ‘intentional’ objects, which McIntosh sees as 
similar to the object of cathexis198. The shift in his thought around the time of ‘The 
Unconscious’ thus entails, according to McIntosh, a revision of earlier mistakes 
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through a reconnection with the influence of Brentano. There is a long tradition of 
philosophical work exploring the relation between language and consciousness, which 
has influenced Dennett and the writers of my primary texts. Dennett’s formulation of 
memes has also become influential. 
 
Homeostasis 
Over the course of their work during the Second World War, Norbert Wiener and his 
colleague Julian Bigelow ‘concluded that there were important analogies between the 
feedback aspects of engineering devices and the homeostatic processes by which the 
human nervous system sustains purposeful activity’199. The synthesis Wiener 
developed from these ideas was formalised into the discipline of cybernetics. As 
Gardner, shows, cognitive science partly grew out of this discipline, and 
interdisciplinary work at the Macy conferences on cybernetics200. Andrew Pickering 
argues that cybernetics is fundamentally different from cognitive science in its 
understanding of the brain as ‘an immediately embodied organ, intrinsically tied into 
bodily performances’ whose main function was adaptation rather than 
representation201. Cybernetics was eventually displaced from its tentative foothold in 
the academy by the adoption of representational AI and cognitive science in computer 
science and social science departments; Pickering argues that this shift derived from 
the latter’s ‘familiar ontology’, its association with digital computers, and disparities 
in military research funding202. Nonetheless, cybernetics continues to exert its 
influence through several channels. Johnston demonstrates that Jacques Lacan 
‘confronted the new challenge brought by information machines’, and drew on 
cybernetics in advancing ‘the decentralization of the ego begun by Freud’203. 
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Christopher Johnson argues that Claude Lévi-Strauss drew on the influence of 
cybernetics, particularly in ‘The Structural Study of Myth’ (1955)204. Both of these 
figures have been influential on the humanities, leading to ideas that contrast with 
those of cognitive science. 
 The most significant legacy of cybernetics is its influence on the concept of 
homeostasis. The basic concept of homeostasis derives from Claude Bernard’s ‘Milieu 
intérieur’, the ‘environment within’, the stability of which Bernard identified as a 
‘prerequisite for the development of a complex nervous system’205. Walter B. Cannon 
coined the term ‘homeostasis’ for ‘the tendency of the mammalian organism to 
maintain a constant internal environment’206. Reflecting on his treatment of post-
encephalitic patients, Sacks maps their experience into three stages, the last of which 
is accommodation, ‘achieving the optimum which is possible in (or compossible with) 
particular circumstances – in short, ‘making the best of things’’207. Sacks argues that 
we must ‘recognize homeostatic endeavours at all levels of being, from molecular to 
cellular to social and cultural, all in intimate relation to each other’208. Both Freud and 
Dennett describe the narrative self as a product of basic homeostasis processes. 
Freud’s model of consciousness as characterised by language is grounded in 
technological metaphor, which is further grounded in a description of basic biological 
processes. This allows a counterintuitive model of the mind to be aligned with a more 
conventional notion of consciousness. Dennett’s model is similar. Referring to ‘simple 
replicators’, he argues that as soon as ‘something gets into the business of self-
preservation boundaries become important, for if you are setting out to preserve 
yourself, you don’t want to squander effort trying to preserve the whole world: you 
draw the line. You become, in a word, selfish.’209 This ‘distinction between everything 
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on the inside of a closed boundary and everything in the external world’ is ‘at the heart 
of all biological processes’210. 
Cybernetics redefined homeostasis as a process grounded in the flow of 
information, allowing it to apply to living organism, machines, and assemblages of 
both. The term ‘Cyborg’ is an acronym for ‘Cybernetic Organism’ or ‘Cybernetically 
Controlled Organism’, referring to ‘both a notion of human-machine merging and to 
the rather specific nature of the merging envisaged’, one based in homeostatic 
processes211. This conceptual merging of the human with technology has implications 
for our understanding of identity. Wiener describes homeostasis as made up of 
‘negative feedback mechanism of a type that we may find exemplified in mechanical 
automata’, while also arguing that the ‘pattern maintained by this homeostasis’  is the 
‘touchstone of our personal identity […] We are not stuff that abides, but patterns that 
perpetuate themselves.’212 The concept of homeostasis as it is now understood, in 
terms of information and feedback, offers alternative possibilities for describing 
consciousness and the self, which Antonio Damasio has explored in his work. With 
Hannah Damasio, he argues that in humans, there is in addition to basic homeostasis 
a ‘supplementary mechanism of control that involves feelings of the simplest variety, 
also known as homeostatic feelings’213. The conscious experience of these feelings 
‘turns the owner of the respective organism into a potential agent of its own 
regulation’214. Core consciousness, as Damasio defines it, derives from the organism’s 
monitoring of its body and internal homeostasis. It consists of an ‘imaged, nonverbal 
account’ of how the body is affected by an object215. Core consciousness is generated 
‘in a pulselike fashion, for each content of which we are to be conscious’; there is ‘no 
noticeable process of inference, no out-in-the-daylight logical process that leads you 
there, and no words at all – there is the image of the thing and, right next to it, is the 
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sensing of its possession by you’216. The self revealed in core consciousness is 
‘transient, ephemeral, […] remade and reborn continuously’ in relation to different 
objects217. Damasio distinguishes core consciousness from the ‘postlanguage 
consciousness’ analysed by Jaynes and Dennett218. Damasio calls this form of 
consciousness ‘extended consciousness’. The sense of self that appears to remain the 
same is ‘the autobiographical self […] based on a repository of memories for 
fundamental facts in an individual biography that can be partly reactivated and thus 
provide continuity and seeming permanence in our lives’219. The autobiographical self 
imposes a form of homeostasis achieved partly through language, through the ability 
to incorporate the transient instances of core consciousness within a coherent 
narrative. This structuring of experience is aided by the use of material and linguistic 
prostheses. The use of language, a prosthesis that joins up the individual self-narrative 
with those of others and of society as a whole, incorporates the processes of individual 
homeostasis within a broader process which also tends towards homeostasis. Damasio 
calls this ‘sociocultural homeostasis’, the regulators of which include ‘[j]ustice 
systems, economic and political organizations, the arts, medicine, and technology’220. 
I would add theory of mind to this list. Damasio’s model offers a vision of human life 
in terms of the actions of various interlocking homeostatic processes operating within 
and between individuals, technologies, environments, and cultural narratives. 
Consciousness is both a disruptor and driver of homeostasis. Damasio’s work proposes 
oscillation as inherent to the function of consciousness in homeostatic systems: 
when homeostasis regulation is enriched by feeling/conscious interfaces, 
adaptability increases at the risk of basic efficiency. […] The novelty of some 
responses deviates from the standard path; in turn, the unexpected response 
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generates yet another non-standard response because the system is still 
searching for stability and oscillates.221 
The tension between individual and sociocultural homeostasis in this model develops 
the opposition between the demands of instinct and society in Civilization and its 
Discontents, as well as Freud’s more general model of the individual as divided 
between the id and the superego. As Žižek argues, it also implies a distinction between 
the conscious self and narrative: 
The properly dialectical tension between the singular Self and narrative is 
crucial here: the singular Self stands for the moment of explosive, destructive, 
self-referential negativity, of a withdrawal from immediate reality, and thus a 
violent rupture of organic homeostasis; while “autobiography” designates the 
formation of a new, culturally created homeostasis which imposes itself as our 
“second nature.”222 
The oscillation between individual and sociocultural homeostasis, not narrative, is the 
basis of personal identity and agency, experienced and enacted through consciousness. 
I argue that this dynamic is present in my primary texts, as a result of a shared critique 
of narrativity and a shared engagement with a variety of third culture texts.  
 
Structure 
I have structured four of the chapters of my thesis according to these technical systems, 
as they relate to similar formal aspects of two of my primary texts. In the first chapter, 
‘Metaphors of the Mind’, I take as my starting point George Lakoff and Mark 
Johnson’s response to cognitive science. Lakoff and Johnson argue that the discoveries 
of cognitive science can be summarised in three propositions: ‘The mind is inherently 
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embodied’, ‘Thought is mostly unconscious’, and ‘Abstract concepts are largely 
metaphorical’223.  The implication for study of the mind is that it is ‘virtually 
impossible to think or talk about the mind in any serious way without conceptualizing 
it metaphorically’224. The metaphor system for cognition ‘does not give us a single, 
overall, consistent understanding of mental life. Instead, it provides us with conceptual 
metaphors that are inconsistent with each other.’225  This is not to say that these 
metaphors are arbitrary. The use of metaphor is structured by the ‘cognitive 
unconscious’, which consists of ‘all those mental operations that structure and make 
possible all conscious experience, including the understanding and use of language, 
and of making use of and guiding the perceptual and motor aspects of our bodies’226. 
A metaphor ‘can serve as a vehicle for understanding a concept only by virtue of its 
experiential basis’227. This experiential basis includes technology. The role of 
technology within the extended cognitive system is expressed and reaffirmed through 
the structuring role of technological metaphors for cognition. Technology also 
increases the sense of inconsistency, in shaping different forms of cognition in 
increasingly specialised ways, and in providing concrete and contrasting models for 
different conceptual metaphors. In this chapter, I identify three interrelated sets of 
metaphors for the mind found in my primary texts, each relating to a particular form 
of technology, the human faculty of which that technology is an extension, and a more 
fundamental set of metaphors. I argue that their interactions, the form of which derives 
from their inconsistency, provides the basis for the model of cognition I explore in 
subsequent chapters. 
 In the second chapter, ‘Thinking and Thought in Remainder and Saturday’, I 
focus on how a particularly contemporary conception of theory of mind – the 
intentional stance – has been used by McEwan and McCarthy. I argue that their use of 
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the term ‘thinking’ follows on from the model formalised in the imitation game in 
regarding the question of what someone is thinking as a matter of interpretation. It 
differs from Turing’s definition here, however, in that these novels present ‘thinking’ 
as reductive, and not fully reflective of an individual’s conscious experiences and of 
their relation to the world. This expressed through a disjunction between ‘thinking’ as 
verb, used to depict an active process, and ‘thought’ as noun, used to depict the 
contents of consciousness. Saturday and Remainder incorporate the former but 
question it by refusing to accept the latter. 
 In the third chapter, ‘Prosthetics: Language and Vision in The Child in Time 
and C’, I trace the influence of Freud’s analysis of perception and cognition as 
determined by the operations of a set of separate components within the mind. The 
Child in Time and C establish an opposition between language and vision, situating 
what their protagonists see and how they narrate this experience as separate but 
interrelated aspects of their consciousness. I read this development as a reappraisal of 
the influence of Freud on their earlier work. While both writers have distanced 
themselves from Freud, I argue that their use of an opposition between language and 
vision adapts their earlier use of a Freudian opposition between consciousness and the 
unconscious. This modified opposition in Child in Time and C complements the 
technological model of the mind developed in Freud’s later work, while providing an 
alternative to the narrationism he used to frame it. 
 In the fourth chapter, ‘Other Selves: Intentionality in The Book of Dave and 
The Accidental’, I examine how Smith and Self have responded to Dennett’s model of 
the mind as made up of memes. Both writers depict the individual mind as made up of 
various actual and potential selves, formed through the episodic interactions of 
intentional states (memes), which spread from person to person in the form of 
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language, and intentional objects. Smith and Self’s shared concern with social control, 
and the mediation of vision by technology, is reflected in stylistic features in their 
work, most notably the use of italics to depict memes, conspicuous repetition of 
significant terms, and an adaptation of indirect free style in which first person prose 
expresses the intrusion of external processes into the mind. This engagement has led 
to a literary form which implicitly critiques narrationism and the contemporary 
understanding of the self in general.  
 In the fifth chapter, ‘The Environment Within: Consciousness and 
Homeostasis in How to Be Both and Umbrella’, I analyse how Smith and Self’s 
engagement with concepts derived from cybernetics relates to their concern with 
space, and with their use of modernist form in their later novels. These forms focus on 
the depiction of visual consciousness, while emphasising the ways in which 
consciousness undermines assumptions about space, time, and causation as they 
inform our understanding of the mind. Both emphasise the limitations of literary 
narrative. Their depiction of consciousness is better understood through reference to 
the interaction of individual and sociocultural homeostasis in relation to perception 
and memory.  
 
Writing Machines 
My thesis argues that a model of consciousness and the self based on an oscillation 
between individual and sociocultural homeostasis, rather than narrative, is implied by 
these novels and their sources. In the fifth chapter, I show how Smith’s depiction of 
visual perception draws on Italo Calvino’s characterisation of thought and literature 
as based around visual images rather than stories in Six Memos for the Next Millennium 
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(1988). How to Be Both reflects the influence of the cognitive scientist Douglas 
Hofstadter on Calvino.  Discussing a language program he was involved in the creation 
of, Hofstadter describes the ‘feeling that the output is coming from a source with no 
understanding of what it is saying and no reason to say it’, adding that one senses in 
particular ‘an utter lack of visual imagery behind the words […] the program had no 
idea what a self is, what a person is, or what anything at all is.’228 The experience left 
him with ‘an intangible image’, one he could not convey in words, ‘a glimmering sense 
that real thought was composed of much longer, much more complicated trains of 
symbols in the brain – many trains moving simultaneously down many parallel and 
crisscrossing tracks’229. Hofstadter has collaborated with Dennett, and their models of 
the mind share some similarities, as can be discerned here in his description of the 
parallel operations of cognition. Hofstadter’s approach contrasts with Dennett in 
positing conscious visual imagery as crucial to human thought. Calvino refers to 
Hofstadter to make the point that the role of mental images in art depends on 
‘processes that, even if they do not originate in the heavens, certainly go beyond our 
intentions and our control – acquiring – with respect to the individual – a kind of 
transcendence’230. The imagination is a ‘kind of electronic machine that takes account 
of all possible combinations and chooses the ones that are appropriate to a particular 
purpose, or are simply the most interesting, pleasing, or amusing’231. 
 In an earlier lecture, Calvino responds to the shift in our understanding of 
thought prompted by cybernetics and cognitive science. He remarks that ‘the ever-
changing cloud that we carried in our heads until the other day, the condensing and 
dispersal of which we attempted to understand by describing impalpable psychological 
states and shadowy landscapes of the soul’ has been replaced by ‘the rapid passage of 
signals on the intricate circuits that connect the relays, the diodes, the transistors with 
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which our skulls are crammed’232. This is a shift in metaphors, which, as I explore in 
the first chapter, has an effect on our understanding of the mind in general. In 
Calvino’s account, rather than fixing the nature and role of theory of mind or of 
literature, this shift only heightens their complexity and mutability. The operations of 
the ‘folk imagination’ and of narrative, ‘like those of mathematics, cannot differ all 
that much from one people to another, but what can be constructed on the basis of 
these elementary processes can present unlimited combinations, permutations, and 
transformations’233. In the creation of literature or of art, at a certain moment,   
things click into place, and one of the combinations obtained – through the 
combinatorial mechanism itself, independently of any search for meaning or 
effect on any other level – becomes charged with an unexpected meaning or 
unforeseen effect which the conscious mind would not have arrived at 
deliberately: an unconscious meaning, in fact, or at least the premonition of an 
unconscious meaning.234 
The unconscious is the ‘ocean of the unsayable, of what has been expelled from the 
land of language, removed as a result of ancient prohibitions’; the power of modern 
literature ‘lies in its willingness to give a voice to what has remained unexpressed in 
the social or individual unconscious: this is the gauntlet it throws down time and 
again.’235 Literature does not have to be defined by language, or by narrative. It can 
be understood in terms of the tension between what can be said in a particular time 
and place and what is unsayable or intangible. Meaning is produced not through 
narrative, but through the operations of an extended combinatorial mechanism 
incorporating narrative, the subject, object, and their shared sociocultural and material 
environment. In the act of writing the writer ‘splits into a number of different figures: 
into an “I” who is writing and an “I” who is written, into an empirical “I” who looks 
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over the shoulder of the “I” who is writing and into a mythical “I” who serves as a 
model for “I” who is written. The “I” of the author is dissolved in the writing.’236 
Writers, then, are ‘writing machines; or at least they are when things are going well’237. 
What is true of writing is true of thought. Calvino’s response to the influence of 
cognitive science is an example of a productive interchange between that discipline 
and literature which questions rather than re-affirms conventional notions of 
subjectivity, using the example of technology to situate cognition within its full 
context. My primary texts do the same. This thesis is written in the same spirit. 
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Chapter One - Metaphors of the Mind  
Cognitive science is founded on the metaphor that the mind is somehow like a 
computer. This metaphor persists because it is a complex of more fundamental spatial 
and visual metaphors, and because of its relation to a longstanding cultural 
understanding of rational thought. Since the emergence of this metaphor, other 
technologies have been altered the use of the spatial and visual metaphors on which it 
is founded. As a result, the meaning of the computer metaphor has changed. In this 
chapter, I argue for the continued relevance of the computer metaphor on this basis.  
Draaisma points out that many metaphors, ‘particularly in science, owe their 
existence precisely to the fact that they express what cannot be said literally – either 
not yet or in principle’239. This is particularly true in relation to the mind: ‘with much 
figurative usage in psychology no literal alternative is available’240. In this chapter, I 
survey the dominant metaphors used to depict the mind, consciousness and cognition 
in my primary texts. I identity three sets of metaphors. Each relates to a particular form 
of technology, the human faculty of which that technology is an extension, and a more 
fundamental set of metaphors: media technology networks/spatial mapping/the mind 
as a spatial entity, the camera/seeing/understanding as seeing, and the 
computer/calculation/thoughts as discrete objects. Lakoff and Johnson argue that the 
metaphors through which we think have an experiential basis in the faculties of the 
human body. The technologies I have listed extend those faculties, and thus alter the 
experiential basis of those metaphors. At the same time, the continuity of these 
technologies with those faculties allows for their incorporation within the associated 
metaphor. For this reason, if, as Lakoff and Johnson argue, thought is embodied, in 
that the fundamental components of thought are metaphors derived from the faculties 
of the human body, it is also extended. Hayles points out that from the EMT 
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perspective, ‘the impact of information technologies on the mindbody is always 
understood as a two-way relation, a feedback loop between biologically evolved 
capabilities and a richly engineered technological environment’241. I have found that 
the use of technology in each set of metaphors in my primary texts complements this 
point. Technological networks and the camera are both used to alter existing spatial 
and visual metaphors for cognition, undermining the distinctions between inside and 
outside, and between subject and object, that accompany these metaphors. The 
computer metaphor is an adaptation of a particular way of understanding thought, but 
it is also a complex of spatial and visual metaphors. As the contemporary technological 
adaptations of those metaphors define the associated aspects of cognition as extended, 
the computer metaphor is a complex of extended processes. I begin by looking at 
particularly significant metaphors within my primary texts. I then discuss the 
interaction theory of metaphor as a possible model for cognition in general. I then 
survey each set of metaphors in turn. 
 
Advertising Materialism 
 Draaisma describes the metaphor at its most basic as a ‘verbal’ phenomenon which 
contains a ‘reference to a concrete object’ and therefore a ‘pictorial aspect’; the 
metaphor is ‘an instrument with two layers, a unification of word and image’242. ‘The 
mind’ as a concept is characterised by a certain inconsistency. in that It is linked to a 
variety of other objects or images through other metaphors, each of which promises to 
resolve this inconsistency in referring to a discrete, concrete object. This is partly why 
technological metaphors, based around physical objects which behave in tangible 
ways, are often central to studying the mind. This is less to do with any actual 
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properties of material reality than of reality as it available to consciousness, given 
inherent aspects of the human sensorium. Each such object can, however, only 
illuminate a particular aspect of the mind. Objects or images capable of embodying 
the inconsistency of ‘the mind’ as it is defined through metaphor are unusual. 
McEwan’s Saturday does however reference one. Perowne recalls attending the 
opening of the Tate Modern and seeing a sculpture he describes as ‘like a brilliant idea 
bursting out of a mind’: Cornelia Parker’s ‘Cold Dark Matter: An Exploded View’243. 
The construction ‘a brilliant idea bursting out of a mind’ is made up of two dominant 
metaphors for thought, visual and spatial, in their most basic form. To know is to see; 
an idea illuminates. At the same time, to know is to incorporate; the mind is a space 
containing and incubating ideas. Separately, these basic metaphors make sense. Their 
combination in the sentence above might seem innocuous, but it introduces a 
fundamental ambiguity as to the nature and boundaries of the mind. Does the mind 
illuminate the idea, or is the idea the source of light? Where does the idea come from, 
and where does it go once it bursts out of the mind? What is left of the mind? How 
can it be altered by its own product? ‘Cold Dark Matter’ physically embodies this 
mixing of metaphors while still retaining ambiguity. Shards of an exploded shed are 
hung from the ceiling by invisible threads, arranged in a loose approximation of the 
original form. The viewer sees an ongoing explosion, its aftermath, and its absence. 
At the centre of the shed is a light which casts shadows of the shards onto the walls of 
the gallery. The components of the mind become objects, lit up by an idea which 
breaks up their continuity while expanding the boundaries of their presence to include 
the room containing them, and the viewer. Seen like this, the interactions of 
fundamental metaphors for the mind suggest a different way of understanding 
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consciousness and thought which blurs the distinctions between subject and object, 
inside and outside, and mind and world. 
 Self’s Umbrella uses a different method in representing these relations in a 
sequence in which a bomb falls on one of its characters, Stanley. The passage has an 
ambiguous status in the novel, for Stanley apparently survives the explosion. Later, 
the novel hints that this sequence is a fantasy in the mind of his sister, Audrey. Rather 
than referencing an object that embodies the uncertain spatial structures of the mind, 
as in Saturday, the passage posits that Stanley can see the effects of technology on 
other minds:  
all the scores and hundreds of repetitive motions that led to its triumphantly 
short-lived embodiment are there, plain to his exophthalmic eye […] upon 
impact all of its strings, hammers, levers, cogs and screws will blast upon the 
shattered terrain in wave upon wave of tics, jerks, yawns, spasms, blinks, 
gasps, quivers, pursing, bobbing, pouts, chews, grindings, palsies, tremors and 
twitches, sending them dancing from mind to mind, so animating body after 
body to perform choreography that will stand in for civilization unprompted.244 
The metaphor that knowing is a form of seeing makes sense, in that sight and the way 
it works impose fundamental limitations on what we can know. Language makes other 
forms of knowledge possible, but it has its own limitations. The individual bomb is, 
as Stanley perceives it here, the results of hundreds of repetitive motions, of broader 
networks and processes, and the effects of its explosion go beyond its immediate 
environment. Self is making a link between the increased mechanisation of the early 
twentieth century and the epidemic of Encephalitis Lethargica that occurred around 
the same time. If there is a causal link here, it is not a straightforward one. This is 
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partly because causality is itself grounded in a set of visual and spatial metaphors. To 
say that Stanley can see this process, or that the explosion sends waves of tics ‘dancing 
from mind to mind’ is a metaphor, but one that expresses something that cannot be 
articulated in non-figurative language. The use of ‘seeing’ here is ironic, pointing to 
the limitations on understanding imposed by metaphor and by the experiential 
foundations of those metaphors.  
 In a conversation with McCarthy in 2001, Self describes metaphor as ‘another 
trick for making you believe in the externality and objective character of the material 
world […] the advertising of materialism.’245 Metaphor is ‘bound up with what's in the 
interests of our type of society: to believe in this material world of ashtrays and 
microphones and cigarette lighters.’246 While our understanding of the externality and 
objective character of the material world derives from our limited perspective on the 
world, it is also affected by other factors in society. Technology and technological 
metaphors can entrench this perspective. McCarthy examines this process in 
Remainder’s depiction of its narrator’s relation to his assistant, Naz. When he first 
meets Naz, the narrator compares his mind to a computer: 
Naz’s palmtop organizer […] was lying face up on the table, but Naz wasn’t 
using it. Instead, he was logging his requirements in his mind, translating them 
into manoeuvres to be executed. I could tell: something was whirring behind 
his eyes. […] The thing behind Naz’s eyes whirred for a while.247  
Whirring, or variants (‘whirred’ and ‘whir), are used in descriptions of Naz 
throughout248.  At the end of the novel, he is described as ‘like a computer crashing – 
the way the screen, rather than explode or send its figures dancing higglepiggledy 
around, simply freezes’249. After comparing Naz’s breakdown to a computer crashing, 
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the narrator also describes it in terms of data or information, similarly contained within 
him: ‘figures, hours, appointments, places, all abandoning their places, all abandoning 
their posts and scrambling for the exits, sweating their way out of him, rats scurrying 
from a sinking ship’250. As with the metaphor of the crashing computer, this forms a 
more developed instance of a recurring metaphor associated with Naz. ‘Processing’ is 
first used as a synonym for ‘whirring’ in the same context: ‘his eyes went vacant while 
the thing behind them whirred, processed’251. ‘Processing’ or variants is repeated to a 
similar extent as ‘whirring’, applied not only to Naz but to other characters and the 
narrator himself252. Information processing is another metaphor for consciousness on 
which the computational model builds. Draaisma describes the influence of Turing’s 
work in terms of the ‘metaphor of man-as-an-information-processing system’253. The 
analogy between the mind and the computer arose from the latter’s ability to process 
information, which only the former had been able to do previously. Developing this 
analogy has had the effect of defining the mind solely in terms of information-
processing. The description of Naz implies that an inability to handle the information 
being presented to him has led to a kind of blockage in his mind. This is one way of 
explaining his breakdown. Another way is to say that Naz is by this point complicit in 
the deaths of multiple people, despite his reservations, and has just been informed of 
another death and the failure of his employer’s plan to rob a bank. The protagonist’s 
use of this metaphor reflects his inability to empathise with Naz, or to understand the 
ethics of his actions.  
 The idea that the mind works like a computer is rooted in the metaphor that 
thought is a form of calculation. This metaphor is at the heart of various models of 
cognition, as well as other forms of cultural knowledge, such as (variants of) 
evolutionary psychology and behavioural economics. In these kinds of works, this 
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metaphor tends to go unquestioned, and to be accepted in almost literal terms, as a 
truth claim. In the context of a novel, these claims can be apprehended as metaphors. 
At several points, Self’s The Book of Dave places the ‘Thought as Calculation’ 
metaphor in its full context by literalising it: 
After fifteen years of cabbing Dave Rudman was so finely attuned to the meter 
that he could minutely calibrate it with his own outgoings. At the beginning of 
each day a spreadsheet popped up from behind his heavy eyelids, and as he 
drove, picking up and dropping off, ranking up and driving again – so the 
figures were instantly calculated to inform him whether he was ahead or behind 
[…] Time, distance and money – the three dimensions of Dave Rudman’s 
universe.254 
The first sentence here contextualises the metaphor by stating that Dave’s thought 
processes include calculation as a function of his job, and establishing his relation to 
technology (the meter, his cab). The next sentence then develops the metaphor. The 
exaggerated version of this metaphor emphasises the fact that it is a metaphor, rather 
than a basic fact about the mind or cognition. A later sequence reiterates this point. 
Michelle, Dave’s future wife, takes cocaine, which chops her into ‘two Michelles, idiot 
drunk and calculating fool’255. The cocaine makes ‘tiny little calculations for her, 
white beads on a sparkling synaptic abacus’256. The ‘Thought as Calculation’ 
metaphor is used in an exaggerated form and placed into a provisional context. The 
mode of thought that corresponds to calculation is a temporary, altered state. 
Significantly, it also co-exists with other modes of thought within the mind.  
 By referring to ‘other modes of thought’ I want to open up thinking to 
multiplicity, to claim that the individual is capable of different forms of thoughts, 
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depending on the situation, and that multiple forms of thought can be at work in the 
same individual mind at any one moment. Attending to multiple modes of thought 
reveals the limitations of the vocabulary we use when talking about the mind, a point 
implicit in a passage from McEwan’s The Child in Time, describing protagonist 
Stephen:  
Much later he was to realise that he never really thought about his situation at 
all, for thought implied something active and controlled; instead images and 
arguments paraded in front of him, a mocking, malicious, paranoid, 
contradictory, self-pitying crowd. He had no distance, no clarity, he was never 
looking for a way through. […] He was the victim, not the progenitor, of his 
thoughts.257   
There is a clear distinction here between ‘thinking’ as a verb and ‘thoughts’ as a noun. 
The former implies an associated subject, asserting agency and control and an 
associated form of rationality. The latter consists of defined objects acted on by the 
subject. The passage above makes the point that this distinction is contingent on a 
certain state of mind in which the individual is able to think in a certain way. When 
this is not possible, the fixed relation between subject and object breaks down. The 
metaphor of thoughts as a crowd expresses this breakdown, while pushing its 
implications further. Personifying ‘thoughts’ in this context makes the point that what 
is meant by ‘thinking’ on the one hand and ‘thoughts’ on the other are both aspects of 
the mind and of consciousness, and cannot be fully distinguished. If ‘thinking’ and 
‘thoughts’ are both aspects of the mind, why is Stephen pushing his way through a 
crowd, not part of it? 
65 
 
   
 
 The passage also emphasises the use of the visual metaphor for knowledge in 
maintaining the distinction between subject and object. Thoughts are ‘images’, to be 
seen by the ‘thinker’. The passage complicates this by introducing ‘arguments’ 
alongside ‘images’, and, as in the passage from Saturday, by constructing a mixed 
visual/spatial metaphor (‘looking for a way through’). While the distinction between 
subject and object may be grounded in fundamental features of human vision, that 
distinction operates through metaphor. There are aspects of thought that do not fit this 
metaphor, and there are aspects of thought linked to other metaphors which complicate 
each other. In addition, seeing in itself operates in different ways, given the situation.  
In Smith’s The Accidental, Astrid, the youngest member of the Smart family, 
reflects on causality and time, based on a particular form of seeing, mediated by a 
camera, when looking at her footage of the sunrise: ‘All there is when you look at it 
on the camera screen getting more visible. So does this mean that the beginning is 
something to do with being able to see?’258  She applies this to the beginning of the 
self: ‘Possibly the real beginning is when you are just forming into a person and for 
the first time the soft stuff that makes your eyes is actually made, formed, inside the 
hard stuff that becomes your head, i.e. your skull.’259 The fact that she associates 
objective sight with the camera subtly alters her understanding of seeing: ‘The outside 
world shifts on her eyes, like an inside photograph. Then the inside photograph is laid 
over the outside world when she opens them. If she could take photographs with her 
eyes it would be amazing.’260 Astrid becomes aware of the subjectivity of vision, 
through the use of a metaphor which elsewhere posits the possibility of objective sight. 
Understanding consciousness as a photograph defines visual consciousness as an 
objective representation of the object. Visual experience without perception can be 
understood as an ‘inside photograph’, according to this model. However, the enduring 
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effects of the inside photograph on subsequent perception emphasizes the subjectivity 
of vision. Technology extends and complicates fundamental metaphors.  
 The process through which technology extends these metaphors suggests a 
continuity between the mind and technology within metaphor. This continuity is 
emphasised in a passage from McCarthy’s C:  
Serge carries the sound of the celluloid strip running through its gate to bed 
with him, clicking and shuffling in his ears long after the machine’s been put 
to sleep, more real and present than the trickle of the stream of the chirping 
grasshoppers. Each time Widsun racks up and starts running with it, Serge feels 
a rush of anticipation through the cogs and sprockets of his body; his mind 
merges with the bright bedsheet, lit up with the possibilities of what might 
dance across it in the next few seconds.261 
Like Astrid, the young Serge feels himself to be physically altered by his encounter 
with technology. Serge becomes more machine-like, while the machine is subtly 
anthropomorphised, sleeping and dancing. Serge carries the ‘clicking and shuffling in 
his ears’, while the machine ‘sleeps’. While Serge’s body contains ‘cogs and 
sprockets’, the machine is described in terms of moths, mosquitoes, hair and speckles. 
‘Artificial life’ applies both to the machine and to Serge by the end of the passage. 
This is accomplished through metaphor, but the passage also implies that it can be 
understood as literally true through its own relation to vision, If a piece of technology, 
a camera or a projector, determines what we see, then that technology is part of the 
mind.   
 Understanding the mind in spatial terms, for example, as a container, capable 
of ‘carrying’ sense impressions such as sound, raises the possibility that it can be 
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located in space. Visual and spatial metaphors dovetail at the end of the above passage, 
as Serge’s mind ‘merges’ with the projector. All of the examples from my research 
corpus above are based on combinations of these fundamental metaphors, which they 
share with more conventional models of the mind. As I discussed in the introduction, 
the novel is also a technology, which serves the same purpose. In Smith’s How to Be 
Both, George uses the novel as a metaphor to reaffirm a particular mode of thought in 
the face of conscious experience undermining it. By the end of her half of the novel, 
George has reached a new understanding by accepting the enduring presence of 
memory, and the continuity between herself and the outside world. The narration 
responds by acknowledging the spatial basis of narrative: 
This is the point in the story at which, according to its structure so far, a friend 
enters or a door opens or some kind of plot surfaces (but which kind? the one 
that means the place where a dead person’s buried? the one that means the 
place where a building’s to be built? the one that means a secret stratagem?); 
this is the place where a spirit of twist in the tale has tended, in the past, to 
provide a friendly nudge forward to whatever’s coming next.262 
Understanding narrative as grounded in spatial metaphors allows us to apprehend and 
explore the ways in which it complicates those metaphors applied to the mind. In the 
introduction, I argued that the authors of my primary texts all share at least an 
ambivalence towards narrationism. This is reflected in their use of metaphors for the 
mind. Their use of new metaphors, or their adaptations of existing ones, emphasise 
inconsistency. Each metaphor is a complex of other metaphors. This complicates the 
material referents of the metaphors; rather than grounding the implicit models of the 
mind in relation to discrete material objects, those material objects assume an 
uncertainty mirroring that of the verbal layer of the metaphor. Questioning the material 
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basis of these metaphors hints at a way of understanding the mind which overcomes 
the limitations of the human senses. 
 
The Mangrove Effect 
Draaisma reads the computer metaphor through Max Black’s interaction theory of 
metaphor. Black argues that the ‘maker of a metaphorical statement selects, 
emphasizes, suppresses, and organizes features of the primary subject by applying to 
it statements isomorphic with the members of the secondary subject’s implicative 
complex’263. In a particular metaphorical statement, the two subjects interact in the 
sense that: 
the presence of the primary subject incites the hearer to select some of the 
secondary subject’s properties; […] invites him to construct a parallel 
implication-complex that can fit the primary subject; […] reciprocally induces 
parallel changes in the secondary subject.’264  
In Draaisma’s summary, in a metaphor ‘the topic term and vehicle term are linked by 
a set of associations and these associations are involved in an interaction. This 
reproduction creates a new meaning which is given neither in the one nor in the other 
term separately.’265 In the computer metaphor, ‘the exchange of associations between 
computer and memory has not only made the memory more technical, but has made 
the computer more psychological’266. Both memory and the computer are grounded in 
a broader material context. The interaction theory of metaphor offers one way of 
understanding how two extended processes determine each other. 
Black argues that ‘every implication-complex supported by a metaphor’s 
secondary subject […] is a model of the ascriptions imputed to the primary subject: 
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Every metaphor is the tip of a submerged model’267. Psychological language is 
embedded within and partly determined by a broader context, as Kurt Danziger has 
shown. Psychological categories such as ‘cognition, emotion, learning, motivation, 
personality, attitude, intelligence etc. […] were not invented as a consequence of 
empirical investigation – they were there before anyone used them to identify the 
objects of empirical studies’268. Most terms in psychology also ‘remain heavily 
dependent on shared understandings in general culture’: 
Psychology may have developed certain theories about motivation, about 
personality, about attitudes, and so on, but the network of categories that 
assigns a distinct reality to motivation, to personality, to attitudes, etc. has been 
taken over from a much broader language community of which psychologists 
are a part. Most psychologists want to preserve the relevance of their work for 
life outside the laboratory. To do this they have to demonstrate correlates 
between their scientific categories and phenomena defined in terms of common 
categories of everyday life. But that entails taking on board much of the 
traditional meaning of the everyday category.269 
This point is relevant to Draaisma’s use of the interaction metaphor. Material 
technologies such as the computer alter our understanding of the mind. There is, 
however, no pre-existing understanding of the mind that has not already been 
determined by a broader cultural context and by previous technologies.  
These points could be taken to imply that metaphor, and the models of the mind 
it grounds, derive entirely from material aspects of existence, whether embodied or 
extended. Claire Colebrook claims that to argue as Lakoff and Johnson do  
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that thinking emerges from a metaphorics of the lived body […] not only 
restricts the range of metaphor to those that emerge from the lived body; such 
a theory of genesis must occlude the figure of metaphor itself. For metaphor is 
only conceivable if we have installed ourselves within an imaginary of a mind 
that molds its world: the image of the body that shapes and makes sense of its 
own mind and world is itself figural and cannot provide some ultimate pre-
imaginary reality.270 
This critique also applies to some readings of EMT: ‘As long as we regard relations, 
texts, apparatuses, assemblages, distances, gaps or points of inertia as retrievable or 
reducing to the complexity of the lived, we remain at the level of organic narrative 
(tracing relations from bodies)’271. Contrary to Colebrook’s summary here, Lakoff and 
Johnson acknowledge the active role of metaphor as a filter. They note that the ‘very 
systematicity that allows us to comprehend one aspect of a concept in terms of another 
[…] will necessarily hide other aspects of the concept.’272 In ‘allowing us to focus on 
one aspect of a concept […] a metaphorical concept can keep us from focusing on 
other aspects of the concept that are inconsistent with that metaphor.’273 They also 
reject the objectivist notion of a reality ‘made up of distinct objects, with inherent 
properties and fixed relations among them at any instant’ prior to and distinct from 
interpretation274. Even so, Colebrook’s critique is worth keeping in mind to counter a 
tendency in some cognitivist accounts to disregard the role of language in thought (I 
discuss this point in the next chapter in reference to Pinker). Clark’s work suggests 
another response. He describes public language as, in many ways, ‘the ultimate 
artefact’: ‘Not only does it confer on us added powers of communication; it also 
enables us to reshape a variety of difficult but important tasks into formats better suited 
to the basic computational capacities of the human brain’275. He describes language’s 
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top-down structuring of thought through analogy: the mangrove tree grows out of 
floating seeds, setting out roots which trap floating matter, forming islands which 
effectively grow out of the trees they support276. While it is ‘natural to suppose that 
words are always rooted in the fertile soil of pre-existing thoughts’, sometimes, at 
least, ‘the influence seems to run in the other direction’277. This model complements 
the interaction view of metaphor, which can be understood in terms of a feedback loop 
between different aspects of the material operating within the individual mind. The 
material, and our limited human forms of engagement with it, determine fundamental 
metaphors, but as Colebrook says, language has its own agency. The possibilities of 
language, its abstractions and interconnections, allow for the development of self-
contradictory complexes of metaphors, requiring unusual referents, such as ‘Cold 
Dark Matter’ or the mangrove tree.  
 Metaphors of the mind are extended in two senses. Firstly, psychological 
language is embedded in an extended context connected to other aspects of culture and 
of individual experience. Secondly, the experiential, embodied basis of metaphor is 
altered by material objects and processes occurring beyond the body, including various 
technologies. In the case of the computer metaphor, each of these extended aspects of 
metaphor has altered the other. Draaisma reads this through the interaction theory, 
which can be understood in this context as a feedback loop characterised by the kind 
of unstable oscillation described by Damasio. The medium for the interaction is the 
individual mind. If we think of metaphor as extended, then the interaction theory of 
metaphor can be understood as a model of cognition in itself.  
 
Something in the Structures  
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To a large extent, what differentiates the contrasting theories of cognition I reference 
in this thesis is their response to the question of where the mind can be located. The 
question of language is crucial to this debate. Clark remarks that ‘the sheer intimacy 
of the relations between human thought and the tools of public language bequeaths an 
interesting puzzle […] it is a delicate matter to determine where the user ends and the 
tool begins!’278 The role of language in thought undermines any attempt to fix the 
spatial dimensions of the mind. The assumption Clark refers to here, that user and tool 
cannot, by definition, occupy the same space is a product of how language works 
rather than of any inherent physical properties of entities falling into those categories. 
Lakoff and Johnson survey the interconnections between language, both spoken and 
written, and spatial metaphors279. As Ross and Ladyman point out, however, there are 
no facts ‘about where minds are located at all. To talk about the location of the mind 
is simply to resort to metaphor.’280  
Lakoff and Johnson argue that thinking and the mind are primarily understood 
through spatial metaphors281. The spatial metaphor forms the basis of two interlinked 
groups of metaphors used for the mind in the novels I have looked: neural metaphors 
and technological network metaphors. These two subsets of metaphors are linked 
through an assumed correspondence between neural plasticity and global 
informational networks. Kelina Gotman argues that the ‘neural metaphor’ offers ‘a 
seductive portrait of society and human life: networked, changeable, full of flows of 
information and capital and goods, conveniently biological as well as subject to a form 
of free will’282. The role of the neural metaphor in this view ‘offers a “networked” 
conception of actions performed intra- and interindividually, at a metaphoric level as 
well as at the level of “real” biosocial processes’, shaping ‘the biological and 
sociopolitical models it seek to describe as much as it is shaped by them’283. There is 
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however a contradiction here. Neural plasticity entrenches a model of causality 
understood in spatial terms: the mind’s relation to its environment is literally embodied 
in a material interaction. The actual experience of information technology, on the other 
hand, complicates the spatial model of causality in allowing for interactions between 
subjects and objects at great distances. Smith emphasises this contradiction in How To 
Be Both. An internet video is described as having ‘changed something in the structures 
of George’s brain and heart and certainly her eyes’284. What George sees affects her 
mind on a physical level despite the various layers of mediation. The point is repeated 
later on, when George receives a text from her friend H: ‘Back came a text that pierced 
whatever was between the outside world and George’s chest. In other words, George 
literally felt something.’285 The text’s content, ‘It’s good to hear your voice’286, is 
partly ironic, since it is sent in response to another text; the reference to ‘hearing your 
voice’ and ‘literally feeling something’ both emphasise the immediacy of the 
experience achieved through various layers of mediation and distance287. Perception 
and communication are able to exert a physical effect on the body, changing the 
structures of the brain, piercing boundaries. This is despite the actual physical distance, 
in time and space, between the subject and object made possible through the mediation 
of technology. 
In a short piece from 2010, Smith describes looking at a nature painting by a 
Cézanne: the gallery ‘falls away, leaves nothing but leaves and striplings in a 
landscape where the curve of the tree is the curve of the eye is the curve of the surface 
of the piece of gristle inside the chest that happens to be keeping me breathing’288. The 
act of seeing involves a fundamental continuity between subject and object, even at 
the material level. In mediating the subject’s perception of the object, the gallery also 
forms part of the extended machinery of perception. George uses metaphors in which 
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she describes parts of herself in terms of architecture and feels that parts of actual 
buildings are parts of her289. This complements references throughout which link 
nature to visual perception290. There are also references to a mingling of the two, to 
plants taking root within buildings291. 
In her earlier novel The Accidental, Smith calls attention to her characters’ use 
of different spatial metaphors for the mind. A passage shows one character, Eve, 
developing a metaphor, describing trying to forget another character as like ‘trying to 
forget a tune once you knew it off by heart. Or rather, off by brain; new research 
suggested, Eve had read somewhere, that tunes actually etch themselves, as if with a 
little blade, into our brain.’292 Smith refers to recent developments in the study of 
neuroplasticity, the shaping of neural connections in response to experience. Smith 
surrounds her use of the term with metaphors. One is used to articulate it (‘as if with 
a little blade’). One is a dead metaphor with the same function and origin (‘off by 
heart’). Smith does this throughout her novels, subtly foregrounding the metaphor as 
metaphor. Another example from The Accidental foregrounds the spatial metaphor: 
‘As Eve thought this, another thought struck her. It struck her forcibly.’293 The phrase 
‘a thought struck her’ is almost a dead metaphor; by literalising it, Smith activates it. 
The Accidental also explores the etymology of another metaphor: ‘Cliché, as well as 
its clichéd meaning of hackneyed phrases of stereotypical response, also meant the 
fixed impression made by a die in any soft metal. Michael Smart, stamped. Bitten by 
the teeth of cliché.’294 Smith here activates the dead metaphor of impressions. The 
implication of this metaphor is that ‘to perceive something is to incorporate its form 
into one’s mind, to actualize that form in the mind’295. The above reference to 
neuroplasticity places it in its proper context, as an extension of existing spatial 
metaphors for the mind. 
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The use of these contrasting spatial metaphor raises the question of to what 
extent it is possible to incorporate the workings of extended technological networks 
within the mind. McCarthy’s Remainder explores this tension when the narrator 
describes his therapy: 
Rerouting is exactly what it sounds like: finding a new route through the brain 
for commands to run along. It’s sort of like a government compulsorily 
purchasing land from farmers to run train tracks over after the terrain the old 
tracks ran through has been flooded or landslid away. The physiotherapist had 
to route the circuit that transmits commands to limbs and muscles through 
another patch of brain – an unused, fallow patch, the part that makes you able 
to play tiddlywinks, listen to chart music, whatever.296 
The brain is material in the sense of containing a limited amount of space. Utility is, 
however, determined by an outside force, judging which aspects of human behaviour 
can be understood as occupying an ‘unused, fallow patch’. Materiality frustrates this 
mode of utility, which as the novel points out is technological. Trying to lift a carrot, 
using a set of defined procedures, the narrator feels the ‘surge of active carrot input 
scrambling the communication between brain and arm’, comparing it to ‘how air 
traffic controllers must feel in the instant when they know a plane is about to crash’297. 
In this model, the spatially extended nature of control jars with the localised, material 
substrate of cognition. The point is made near the start of the novel when a character 
argues that ‘Markets are all global; why shouldn’t our conscience be?’298 The narrator 
tries to ‘visualize a grid around the earth […] linking one place to another, weaving 
the whole terrain into one smooth, articulated network’, but loses the image among 
‘disjoined escalator parts’, referencing an earlier sequence299. Remainder’s catalyst, 
the ‘something falling from the sky’ which injures its protagonist and ends up funding 
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his re-enactments, is described in limited though vivid terms that belie that 
protagonist’s evasions and claims to inarticulacy: ‘Technology. Parts, bits. That’s it, 
really: all I can say.’300 C. Namwali Serpell argues that it ‘is striking that a novel 
published in 2005 starts with neither the bytes nor the bits of computer technology – 
in which the narrator invests some of his money but about which he knows little – but 
rather with the material bits of a disintegrating physical world’301. Groes, on the other 
hand, claims that the use of the term bits at the start of the novel can be read as referring 
to both the ‘material parts of technology’ and ‘the basic units of information in 
computing’302. Serpell and Groes’s readings also differ in their response to the novel’s 
use of metaphors of the mind such as ‘rerouting’. Serpell argues that ‘in this day and 
age, nerve repair might more aptly be described in terms of networks; the materially 
minded narrator likens it to land, train tracks, floods. Transportation – cars, planes, the 
Tube – and telephone wires also offer figures for cognition.’303 Groes meanwhile 
points to the novel’s obsession with ‘analysing technological infrastructure, and its 
communication circuits that impact so heavily on the overladen mind at the start of the 
twentieth century’, reading the minimalist style of the novel as depicting ‘what is left 
of consciousness after overstimulation’304. Both readings are important in illuminating 
contrasting though complementary aspects of the novel. Remainder establishes its own 
form of dualism in a contrast between the immateriality sought by the narrator and 
pursued through his re-enactments, and an environment which resists it, expressed 
through ‘the novel’s innumerable images of matter – plaster, glass, soil, metal, tarmac 
– cracking, crumbling, and breaking into fragments’305.  
 Other novels make similar points through metaphors which explain the brain 
in terms of the city, and vice versa. The Book of Dave references a particular example 
of neuroplasticity, the changes in the brains of London taxi drivers caused by their 
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acquisition of the Knowledge, a comprehensive memory of the city streets. Dave 
implicitly refers to this in his choice of metaphor when reflecting on how his identity 
has been fixed by his profession: ‘There’s no going back now, no three-point turn out 
of here. All that Knowledge, the city crumpled up in my head … he could envision it, 
the streets superimposed on the whorls of his cerebellum and I’m holding on to it…’306 
Dave’s self-understanding is determined by a feedback loop between his brain and the 
city, conveyed here through an awkward synthesis of various spatial metaphors for the 
mind: he has moved into an area of experience that he cannot drive out of, in which 
the city is simultaneously inside his brain, able to be seen, and an object that he is 
holding onto. The novel uses various spatial metaphors for the mind throughout which 
develop this correspondence307. Complementing these are metaphors which describe 
people in terms of cars, or cars in terms of people308.   
A sequence from McEwan’s Saturday depicting Perowne at work uses the city 
as a metaphor for the physical structure of the brain: ‘He’s looking down at a portion 
of Baxter’s brain. He can easily convince himself that it’s familiar territory, a kind of 
homeland, with its low hills and enfolded valleys  of the sulci, each with a name and 
imputed function, as known to him as his own house.’309 The relation between the two 
derives from familiarity, from the extent to which the structuring of both takes place 
at an unconscious level: ‘How much time he has spent making routes to avoid these 
areas, like bad neighbourhoods in an American city. And this familiarity numbs him 
daily to the extent of his ignorance, and of the general ignorance.’310 The brain is taken 
to be the material substrate of the mind, but it is understood through reference to 
extended spatial structures, such as those of the city. 
In Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud compares memory to a city in order 
to establish what is distinctive about the mind: 
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If we wish to represent a historical sequence in spatial terms, we can do so only 
by juxtaposition in space, for the same space cannot accommodate two 
different things. […] The fact remains that the retention of all previous stages, 
together with the final shape, is possible only in the mind, and that we are not 
in a position to illustrate this phenomenon by means of any parallel.311 
We could argue that the novel is one possible parallel, building on Bakhtin’s definition 
of the form as characterised by its ability to contain multiplicity. This point might be 
at the root of Freud’s use of literary forms and tropes. Nora Pleske notes that Saturday 
includes a nod to this passage312. Trying not to think of his pregnant daughter’s Italian 
boyfriend, Giulio Perowne ‘thinks instead about Rome’313. He recalls visiting Nero’s 
palace, ‘entered by a gated hole in a hillside’, where a curator described the 
rediscovery of the place during the early Renaissance, and its influence on the work 
of Raphael and Michelangelo, who ‘had themselves lowered down on ropes’314. The 
mayor of Rome ‘had offered an image he thought might appeal to his guests; the artists 
had drilled through this skull of brick to discover the mind of ancient Rome’315. He 
reflects on this image: ‘If only the mayor was right, that penetrating the skull brings 
into view not the brain but the mind. Then within an hour, he, Perowne, might 
understand a lot more about Baxter; and, after a lifetime’s routine procedures would 
be among the wisest men on earth.’316 Perowne acknowledges here that the mind is 
not the brain. The use of the spatial metaphors in these novels heightens the difference 
between the mind and the material. This has the effect of undermining the spatial 
boundaries that enclose the mind within the body.  
  
The Bright Inward Cinema of Thought 
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The spatial metaphor for the mind is fundamentally contradictory on its own. It 
achieves a limited coherence when supported by visual metaphors for the mind. Again, 
this derives from human sensory capacities. We map our position in space by seeing. 
This set of metaphors has its own contradiction: while it is used to distinguish the 
subject from the object, it implies that the subject is determined partly through its 
relation to the object, by the act of seeing something. The incorporation of modern 
technologies within this metaphor heightens these contradictions, in constructing an 
ideal of objective sight based on an increased mediation of perception.   
Various examples from my primary text depict the experience of seeing as 
altering the spatial structures of the mind. Near the start of Saturday, Perowne reflects 
on the ‘Schrödinger's cat’ thought experiment. In the Copenhagen interpretation, the 
determining factor in whether the cat is alive or dead is the conscious observer. This 
is articulated through spatial metaphors: when the box is opened, a ‘quantum wave of 
probability collapses’317. While none of this makes any ‘human sense’ to Perowne, he 
adapts the spatial metaphor in arguing against it: what ‘collapses’ in the act of 
observation ‘will be his own ignorance’318. As Perowne notes later on, ‘the close at 
hand, the visible […] exerts an overpowering force’319. In a moment of confusion he 
again uses spatial metaphors drawn from physics: 
he’s feeling too many things, he’s alive to too many contradictory impulses. 
His thoughts have assumed a sinuous, snaking quality, driven by the same 
undulating power that’s making the space in the long room ripple, as well as 
the floor beneath his chair. Feelings have become in this respect like light itself 
– wavelike, as they used to say in his physics class. He needs to stay here and, 
in his usual manner, break them down into their components, the quanta, and 
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find all the distal and proximate causes; only then will he know what to do, 
what’s right.320 
His ‘contradictory impulses’ here recall Schrödinger’s cat, as well as being depicted 
in the mixing of metaphors in this passage: His thoughts are like light, or water, but 
they can also possibly be broken down, ‘sift[ed] and order[ed]’321. There is no clear 
overall structure. In order for Perowne to think through his situation, he needs to break 
his thoughts down into discrete objects, to reassert the implicit spatial structuring of 
the computational model. The model is undermined by the fact that the objects of 
consciousness can assert a similar alteration on their container, ‘collapsing’ or 
‘tipping’ different aspects of the mind.  
The most fundamental visual metaphor for the mind is ‘Knowing is Seeing’. 
Lakoff and Johnson point out that this metaphor ‘was present in Plato, as it has been 
for virtually every conception of mind in the history of Western philosophy’322. 
Draaisma gives this summary: 
The eye’s primacy among the senses is reflected in the imagery for higher 
mental activities. In the Classical period the intellect was the natural light, the 
lumen natural; when you have a luminous idea you see the light. […] 
Introspection too, literally, ‘looking inward’, is a quasi-visual process, as is 
reflective thought. The eye is the only sense that has an inner pendant in the 
‘mind’s eye’. 323 
Draaisma cites Gilbert Ryle’s description of such metaphors as ‘para-optics’ 
which ‘reconstruct the image of consciousness as a ghostly theatre in which 
quasi-sensory images are projected’324. The mind, in this metaphor, is split 
between the viewer and the theatre. Seeing implies its own spatial structure. 
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As with computers, the ubiquity of cameras and screens can be said to 
implicitly reinforce this understanding of consciousness, despite a rejection of 
the ‘Cartesian theatre’ in cognitive science. The division within this model can 
be understood in terms of a more fundamental distinction between the Subject 
and one or more Selves325. The Subject is ‘the locus of consciousness, 
subjective experience, reason, will and our “essence,” everything that makes 
who we uniquely are’, while the Selves ‘consist of everything about us – our 
bodies, our social roles our histories, and so on’326. Lakoff argues elsewhere 
that ‘incompatible aspects of the Self are conceptualized in different Selves, 
and compatibility of Subject and Self is conceptualized as Subject and Self 
being in the same location’327.  The distinction between Subject and Self maps 
onto the distinction between the core self and the autobiographical self made 
by Damasio. It is also embodied and altered in the distinction between viewer 
and camera/projector in the visual metaphors for cognition in my primary texts. 
 In The Child in Time, when Stephen encounters a place he thinks he has 
experienced before, he makes no distinctions between the possible explanations that 
he has seen it before in ‘a memory, a dream, a film, a forgotten childhood visit’328. 
The Subject’s visual relation to the object is the same regardless of the Self’s 
mediation of that relation. Remainder emphasises this point when its narrator watches 
a film:  
My memory had come back to me in moving images, as I mentioned 
earlier – like a film run in instalments, a soap opera, one five-year 
episode each week or so. […] It could have been another history, 
another set of actions and events, like when there’s been a mix-up and 
you get the wrong holiday photos back from the chemist’s.’329  
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The rest of the novel implies that the narrator is trying to establish a relation between 
himself and his environment modelled on film, beginning with his use of a filmic 
register to describe fantasies which he would ‘play, refine, edit and play again’330 on 
the next page. The ground has already been paved by his description of his memories 
as ‘vague images, half-impressions’ on the opening page, and of his recovered 
memories as returning ‘in instalments, like back episodes of some mundane soap 
opera’331. His repeated insistence on having no cameras, or other forms of recording, 
used during his re-enactments is an indirect signal332. This is complemented by the use 
of a filmic register elsewhere, along with the suggestion that the narrator wants to take 
the place of the absent camera. As McCarthy puts it, he wants ‘to “be” in some kind 
of movie without there being a movie’333. The Enactor ‘scan[s]’ his imagined building 
in his mind, ‘moving from left to right and back again’334; hires a set designer on the 
principle that ‘you only have to make the bit the camera sees look real’335; runs through 
scenarios in his imagination in which bad ones ‘cut in’ to good ones336; applies for 
filming licence for one re-enactment; runs through a re-enactment at half speed ‘Like 
in an action replay on TV’337; imagines a brain editing visual impressions338; and wants 
a re-enactment set up like in a film but for him instead of an audience or cameras339.  
Other metaphors are possible, however. Near the end of the novel, the narrator uses a 
very different metaphor for perception, using photography as a reference point. After 
his last re-enactment, the narrator watches a van of security guards emerge ‘like a 
stain, a mark, an image emerging across photographic paper when it’s dunked in 
liquid’340. A few pages later he describes himself ‘taking in’ the sight of one of his re-
enactors, ‘absorbing it like blotting paper or like ultra-sensitive film, letting it cut right 
through me, into me till I became the surface on which it emerged’341. The passage 
builds on the container metaphor of the mind – the narrator ‘taking in’, ‘absorbing’, 
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‘letting it cut right through me’ – while foregrounding a water metaphor to suggest a 
fundamental continuity within the material. Visual images, the contents of 
consciousness are in this context the product of an ongoing interaction between mind, 
body, and environment.  
McEwan addresses this point through subtle irony. After Perowne witnesses a 
burning plane from his window, he checks the news: ‘Straight away it’s obvious that 
the burning plane has yet to enter the planetary matrix. It remains an unreliable 
subjective event.’342 ‘Objectivity’ depends in Saturday on the mediation of cameras, 
news organizations, and the medium of television, in contrast to which a direct view 
from a window is unreliable. A few pages later, Perowne’s son Theo is described as 
emerging ‘into adult consciousness’ through an ‘initiation, in front of the TV’, with 
the result that as long as ‘there’s nothing new, his mind is free’343. Perowne’s ‘nerves, 
like tautened strings, vibrate obediently with each new release. He’s lost the habits of 
scepticism, he’s becoming dim with contradictory opinion, he isn’t thinking clearly, 
and just as bad, he senses he isn’t thinking independently.’344. Again, there’s an irony 
to such statements, but passages elsewhere in the novel act as evidence for the shaping 
of contemporary consciousness by visual media. In one passage, this is expressed 
through an implicit conflict between Perowne’s materialism and his use of visual 
metaphors: 
Walking up three flights of stairs has revived him, his eyes are wide open in 
the dark; the exertion, his minimally raised blood pressure, is causing local 
excitement on his retina, so that ghostly swarms of purple and iridescent green 
are migrating across his view of a boundless steppe, then rolling in on 
themselves to become bolts of cloth, swathes of ragged velvet, drawing back 
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like theatre curtains on new scenes, new thoughts. He doesn’t want any 
thoughts at all, but now he’s alert.345 
The individual’s relation to their environment determines conscious experience. This 
materialism is juxtaposed with a model of consciousness as the presentation of ‘new 
scenes, new thoughts’ to the Subject. The operative metaphor attempts to link these 
contradictory models of the mind: the effect of excitement on the retina transforming 
into curtains rolling back to give a view onto thought. Visual experience carries its 
own spatial structure – the theatre – which then alters what is seen. The metaphor 
works the same way in a later sequence in which Perowne, operating on Baxter’s brain, 
reflects on the future of knowledge about the mind: 
Just like the digital codes of replicating life held within DNA, the brain’s 
fundamental secret will be laid open one day. But even when it has, the wonder 
will remain, that mere wet stuff can make this bright inward cinema of thought, 
of sight and sound and touch bound into a vivid illusion of an instantaneous 
present, with a self, another brightly wrought illusion, hovering like a ghost at 
its centre. Could it ever be explained, how matter becomes conscious?346 
Perowne’s materialist view of the brain shares space with a conspicuous set of 
metaphors, two of them technological: ‘the digital codes’ of DNA and the ‘bright 
inward cinema of thought’. The use of the metaphor in the sequence from Saturday 
seems to relate to the deeply ingrained metaphor that ‘Knowing is Seeing’, the 
persistence of the container metaphor, here adapted as a ‘bright cinema of thought’, 
and the primacy of vision to consciousness and action. Perowne is literally looking at 
Baxter’s brain as he thinks this. The experiential basis of this metaphor stands in the 
way of and alters Perowne’s neuromaterialism.  
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In The Accidental, the camera metaphor allows Astrid to begin to question her 
own perception, and to become conscious of the role of nonconscious processes. Early 
on in the novel, Astrid recalls her brother Magnus telling her that ‘something on a film 
is different from something in real life. In a film there is always a reason. If there is an 
empty room in a film it would be for a reason they were showing you the empty 
room.’347 Later on she applies this logic to what she remembers: ‘When Astrid thinks 
of the village the weirdest details come into her head like the lamppost next to the field 
on the road […] Why would anyone’s memory want to remember just seeing a 
lamppost like that?’348. She also becomes aware of the subjectivity of memory: ‘When 
Astrid remembers that morning in the class, it all takes place inside her head in a kind 
of strange film with strange colours, everything bright and distorted, like the colours 
have had their volume turned up to full too’349. Elsewhere, she approaches the 
realisation that this understanding of thought might be determined by the prevalence 
of cameras in the environment, wondering whether a shop worker thinks ‘inside her 
head that she is being recorded, by something that watches everything we do, because 
she is so used to it being everywhere else?’350 
 When C’s Serge watches the landscape from a plane, the links between 
similarity and perception cause an alteration of the landscape articulated through 
another film metaphor. While flying the landscape ‘prints itself on Serge’s mind by 
dint of his repeated passage over it’351. His visual experience from the plane is made 
up of discrete images, ‘reappearing at his vision’s upper edge and sliding down his 
eyes like a decorated screen being lowered just in front of them’352. The same thing 
happens while driving in a car. The landscape blurs into a ‘tapestry’, which becomes 
‘a screen, a fixed frame through which sky and landscape race, nearer and nearer all 
the time; soon it’s as though he were no longer merely watching the projected image 
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but pressing right up against the surface of the screen itself.’353 The ‘screens’ described 
here, are static images that are the products of movement through space. Contrasts 
between successive screens then give the illusion of movement: ‘Sliding his mind’s 
gaze between the old images and these updated ones, Serge has a flickering 
apprehension that the landscape’s somehow moving, as though animated’354. The 
sequence builds to a depiction of Serge as a god: ‘As space runs backwards like a strip 
of film from his tail, the world seems to anoint him, through its very presence, as the 
gate bulb, aperture and general projection point that’s brought it about: a new, tar-
coated orb around which all things turn’355. The Self – the individual, moving through 
space, integrated with technology – creates the Subject and the visual images it views. 
These visual images are projected over the landscape as ‘screens’. The Subject is god-
like in creating the landscape around it.  
Enda Duffy has posited the experience of driving as tied to a particular kind of 
consciousness characteristic of modernity:  
On the one hand, the shock effect of multiple images that appear to rush up 
close and then zip by on either side seems to offer a new kind of sensory 
immediacy, a contact between the viewer and the scene that is more intense, 
because faster, than any previous imaginable. Paradoxically, however, the 
same view turns out to be constructed around a new kind of distancing, a glance 
that is always framed in advance, which offers the sensation of looking into a 
scene of which one is not a part.356  
Walter Benjamin’s ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’ (1935) 
offers another perspective on the transformation of consciousness by the urban 
environment and by film. For Benjamin, film has a paradoxical effect because it 
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provides a supposedly objective image of reality – ‘an aspect of reality which is free 
of all equipment’ – through a ‘thoroughgoing permeation of reality with mechanical 
equipment’357. The individual is integrated into an extended technological machinery 
of perception, which determines what they see. And yet, their relation to this is 
distanced. Serge repeatedly ‘pictures’ or ‘sees’ things in response to his experience, 
or thinks of clearly defined ‘images’358. The phrase ‘mind’s eye’ recurs throughout359.  
The abstract images he ‘sees’ are composites of different objects united by a similarity 
in language or in the way a recurring word or phrase links two aspects of his 
experience. Later, Serge wonders whether the Egypt he sees around him is  
one big, endlessly repeating pornographic film […] The camel-schoolchildren 
turn into dancing girls with flailing limbs, then flowers or umbrellas opening, 
or perhaps bodies being torn apart: tricks of the light casting a flickering 
pageant of agony and remorse across a dense and endless sheet of matter.360 
This form of perception is not so much an illusion, a barrier between the individual 
and their material environment, as a function of their embedding within that 
environment. The phrase ‘tricks of the light’ here refers to an earlier discussion, in 
which an optician explains to Serge how mirages work: 
 “It’s an illusion, then?” Serge asks. “There are no birds?” 
“Oh, there are birds all right. But the light’s bending and expanding them. Ditto 
the salt.” 
 “You’re seeing it too?” 
“We’re both seeing what the light’s gradient as it hits the warmer air is 
conveying to our retinas.”361 
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This is a significant point. What the individual ‘sees’ is determined by the interaction 
of the object of perception, light, environment, and what the novel refers to near the 
start as the ‘perceptual apparatus’362. There is no unmediated perception. The mirage 
occupies a halfway point between what we might want to think of as perception on the 
one hand, and memory of fantasy on the other. In doing so, it blurs the distinction 
between the eye and the mind’s eye. Pepperell and Punt argue that ‘what one sees as 
the ‘objects in themselves’ is actually the accumulation of reflections and deflections 
caused by the interaction of objects and light. […] From a purely visual standpoint, 
there is little to distinguish the real from the reflection.’363 It would be a mistake to 
believe that ‘images of things and reflections of things are not ‘the things in 
themselves’ but only observable consequences of them’, however: ‘There is no 
intrinsic distinction between things and their consequences, nor between objective 
reality and its reflection in the mind’364. In a similar vein, Alva Noë argues that ‘the 
world itself can be described as belonging to the very machinery of our own 
consciousness’365. The subjectivity of vision is not proof that visual consciousness is 
made up of representations. It is instead proof of the extended nature of perception.  
 Everything presented to consciousness through the mind’s eye is a screen 
overlaid on an unknowable material realm. The Child in Time and The Book of Dave 
define time as a screen, a product of thought and not an objective property of reality. 
The former novel establishes this from the start in its depiction of Stephen imagining 
his missing daughter’s existence: 
The clock, sinewy like a heart, kept faith with an unceasing conditional; she 
would be drawing, she would be starting to read, she would be losing a 
milktooth. She would be familiar, taken for granted. It seemed as though the 
proliferating instances might wear down this conditional, the frail, semi-
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opaque screen, whose fine tissues of time and chance separated her from him; 
she is home from school and tired, her tooth is under the pillow, she is looking 
for her daddy.366 
The screen here is a metaphor for the difference between two grammatical tenses. 
McEwan returns to the idea of time as contingent when replaying his memories of the 
day she went missing: ‘He had been back a thousand times […] and tried to move his 
eyes, lift them against the weight of time […] But time held his sight for ever on his 
mundane errands, and all about him shapes without definition drifted and dissolved, 
lost to categories.’367 Earlier, the narration mentions time ‘not necessarily as it is, for 
who knows that, but as thought has constituted it’368. Thought in this case includes 
tense, and language in general, understood in terms of visual metaphor; on the next 
page Stephen’s daughter is described as finding ‘no word to frame what she saw’369. 
Self makes the same point in The Book of Dave. At the height of his delusion Dave 
‘could see nothing that wasn’t presented to him on the screen’370. After he walks away 
from his cab, he has a similar vision through time: 
Dave knew none of it – his Knowledge was gone. The city was a nameless 
conurbation, its street and shop signs, its plaque and placards, plucked then 
torn away by a tsunami of meltwater that dashed up the estuary. The screen 
had been removed from his eyes, the mirror cast away, and he was privileged 
with a second sight into deep time.371 
Screens include Dave’s cab, its effect on his consciousness, the mapping of the city 
streets embodied within his mind in the Knowledge. What lies beyond these screens 
cannot be understood in objective terms. The Accidental questions the notion of 
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objective knowledge understood as unmediated perception from the starting point of 
a reflection on film and its relation to consciousness: 
Magnus looks at the edges of the screen, where the edges of light of the film 
meets the blackness. He wonders why the thing films are shown on is called a 
screen. What is it in front of? 
Behind this one is probably just a blank brick wall. 
He thinks about the way that human eyes take the outside world and flash it 
back, like an upside-down film, on the retinal screen at the backs of the eyes, 
then the brain instantaneously turns it the right way up.372 
The incorporation of the camera within the visual metaphor for thought emphasises 
the fact that perception is inherently a ‘screen’ in this sense, a construction based on 
various embodied and extended processes. Nonetheless, the Subject is constituted in 
part by what they see. 
 
Hum and Rush 
Turing’s ‘universal machine’ is made up of a set of spatial and visual metaphors for 
the mind. Turing describes a ‘computer’, a human being performing a set of 
calculations:  
The behaviour of the computer at any moment is determined by the symbols 
which he is observing, and his “state of mind” at that moment. We may 
suppose that there is a bound B to the number of symbols or squares which the 
computer can observe at one moment. If he wishes to observe more, he must 
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use successive observations. We will also suppose that the number of states of 
mind which need be taken into account is finite.373 
The computer interacts visually with discrete symbols, which he can observe one at a 
time. The computer is distinct from those symbols. His mind, when engaged in this 
activity, has a basic input/output structure. His response to these symbols is 
determined by a finite, discrete set of states of mind: For the purpose of his thought 
experiment, Turing imagines ‘the operations performed by the computer to be split up 
into “simple operations” which are so elementary that it is not easy to imagine them 
further divided’374. The proposed machine concretises these metaphors: ‘We may now 
construct a machine to do the work of this computer. To each state of mind of the 
computer corresponds an “m-configuration” of the machine.’375 Charles Petzold 
comments that the m used here stands for machine: ‘A machine has a finite number of 
configurations and does something different depending on its current configuration. A 
more modern term is state, and later Turing makes reference to “states of mind” that 
are analogous to these machine states.’376 A washing machine, for example, ‘has states 
called fill, wash, rinse, and spin. Performing a long division likewise involves a 
number of different mental configurations or states of mind: “Now I need to multiply.” 
“Now I need to subtract.” “Now I need to borrow.”’377 There is already an implicit 
‘mind as machine’ metaphor at work in Turing’s thought experiment, even before he 
introduces the calculating machine. This machine embodies a set of metaphors. As we 
have seen above, these metaphors have been complicated. The computer metaphor 
therefore acts as a medium through which the two forms of extension implied by the 
contemporary adaptations of the spatial and visual metaphors for thought interact. 
Uses of the computational metaphor in my primary texts respond to these shifts in the 
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spatial and visual metaphors for the mind, breaking up the basic model of causality at 
work in Turing’s example. 
The most basic spatial metaphor for the mind is that of a container, with 
thoughts or representations as objects378. Self’s use of spatial metaphors to depict 
particular forms of consciousness resulting from the use of technology in Umbrella 
complicates this model. When protagonist Zack Busner watches office workers 
‘twitch-twich-twichety-twitching at their computer mice, their ticking back and forth 
across a few fractions of inches, and in these acts alone crossing continents, 
journeying to alien worlds, or penetrating the psyches of others’379. Rather than 
responding to symbols, the user of technology metaphorically travels through space. 
Minds are conceptualised as spatial structures, but the consciousness of one person 
can move in and out of these forms. The passage refers to one near the start of the 
novel, in which two brothers, reading, exemplify possible variations of the computer 
metaphor: 
Albert’s glassy paperweight eyes, Welsh-slate blue, scan up and then down the 
narrow columns of Rous’s Trigonometric Tables – not consigning cosines, 
sines and tangents to memory, only confirming the tight joins of the granite 
setts already laid out along the rule straight roadways of his metropolitan mind. 
And Stanley […] he sighs, shuffling fingertips from one page to the next of a 
Free Library book. His eyelids flicker and his fringe bobs, the whirring 
mechanism of Bakelite and crystal rods, propelled by scores of flywheels, 
squeezes his very atoms into the kinetomic beam.380 
Albert takes in information, applying a fixed store of knowledge to it, remaining 
unaffected by it. His ‘metropolitan mind’ is depicted as a material container in which 
knowledge takes on a spatial form. The computational mind excludes the outside 
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world rather than admitting and responding to it, but it also linked to an outside 
environment, the city, through an embedded metaphor. Stanley, by contrast, is 
dissolved and conveyed by a form of machinery. In both cases, the mind is depicted 
in spatial terms, as a machine which extends beyond the individual. The difference 
lies in the individual’s relation to that machine.  
 The ‘Mind is a Machine’ metaphor is a component of the computational 
model381. Complementing this is the ‘Thinking is Mathematical Calculation’ 
metaphor382. Smith’s The Accidental draws out contradictions within the 
computational model by contrasting this metaphor with the ethical consequences of 
one character’s use of computers. Magnus has been split into two selves through his 
guilt over his part in the death of a schoolmate: ‘Hologram Boy’, a ‘creation of 
coherent light […] a three-dimensional reproduction of something not really there’, 
and ‘the real Magnus […] massive, unavoidable’383. As in Umbrella, the individual is 
either a shifting, mutable product of the machine, with no physical embodiment, or 
extended so far outwards into the material world as to lose all agency. With two others, 
Magnus has photoshopped a pornographic image of a classmate and distributed it 
email. The ‘equation’, as he calls it, a structure which includes him, the others, and a 
computer, has had equivalent consequences in the material: ‘The bone, the muscle that 
held her body on her head were snapped. […] They took her head. They put it on the 
other body. Even though it was a lie it became true. It became more her than her.’384 
The image of her has determined her treatment at school, and the taking of her head 
from her body in the image has been repeated in her suicide by hanging. After 
Magnus’s school has discovered Magnus’s part in the death, but decided not to punish 
him, he tries to process his feelings of guilt through calculation: ‘Simple as abc, 123. 
He can let it go, now that the old year is ending and the new one is beginning […] He 
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can forget it. A simple act of subtraction. Him minus it. He can have his memory 
erased by a special laser pen-torch’385  In the earlier chapter, Magnus deals with the 
consequence of equations and computers in the material. In the latter chapter, he sees 
how his own emotions resist their structuring by calculation, and how this resistance 
prevents his conscious experience from being determined by extended social 
structures. 
 Lakoff and Johnson describe how the ‘Thought is Mathematical Calculation’ 
metaphor, combined with the ‘Thought as Language’ metaphor, led to the 
understanding of thought as a formal system, separate from its material substrate, in 
the mid-twentieth century386.  McCarthy explores the relation between thought and 
language, understood as a formal system, and the material, in C. One character gives 
a talk discussing how deaf children can be taught to speak. He starts with the claim 
that the human body is a ‘mechanism’ from which speech must be ‘wrenched out’, 
adding that the ‘body’s motor must be set to work, its engine-parts aligned, fine-tuned 
to one another’387. Language acts as an external force: the children ‘stare straight 
ahead, vacant, as though entranced, or taken over by a set of ghosts’388.  Protagonist 
Serge perceives his words as seeming not to issue from him but to ‘divert through him 
– as though his mouth, once it formed and held the correct shape for long enough, 
received a sound spirited in from another spot, some other area, eerie, ear’389. Meaning 
is a transmission from somewhere beyond the interlinked machines of the material 
realm. The model of thought as a formal system, understood in spatial terms, forms 
the basis of the conduit metaphor. The characteristics of the conduit metaphor, 
identified by Michael J. Reddy, are  
(1) language functions like a conduit, transferring thoughts bodily from one 
person to another; (2) in writing and speaking, people insert their thoughts and 
95 
 
   
 
feelings in the words; (3) words accomplish the transfer by containing the 
thoughts or feelings and conveying them to others; and (4) in listening or 
reading, people extract the thoughts and feelings once again from the words.390 
The metaphor draws on the basic container metaphor of the mind, while sharing 
several features with the computational model. Reddy argues that contemporary use 
of the conduit metaphor functions as a frame conflict, expressing a failure to 
conceptualise the implications of information theory and cybernetics when moving 
from the theory’s original mathematical formulation into ordinary language: ‘The 
theory conceives of information as the power to reproduce an organization by means 
of nonrandom selections. Signals do something. They cannot contain anything.’391  
While the conduit metaphor seems appropriate to technologies like the above, 
its contradictions are exposed when the unconscious is depicted as the source of 
meaning.  McEwan has repeatedly emphasised this point. Perowne, is a ‘dreamer’, in 
that, like ‘a car-radio traffic alert, a shadowy mental narrative can break in, urgent and 
unbidden, even during a consultation’392. The Child in Time draws out the 
consequences of this model for agency and understanding. Near the beginning, 
protagonist Stephen ‘[runs] memories and daydreams, what was and what might have 
been’, before the narrative interrupts to ask ‘Or were they running him?’393 If we 
accept a description of the contents of consciousness as symbols, representations of 
objects outside of the individual, and of thought as the manipulation of these symbols, 
the way in which they are made present to consciousness undermines individual 
agency. The conduit metaphor defines the contents of consciousness as transmissions 
from a source outside of consciousness.  
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 Another contradiction of this model is expressed by references to a ‘clear 
mind’, the stated aim of McEwan’s protagonists. A sequence from Umbrella depicts 
the experience of post-Encephalitis and of death as a literal version of a clear mind: 
‘There is no information, no current, no up or down or back-to-front – only this that 
worms through the mind, a thought that sucks its own tail even as it is reborn, 
disappearing into one hole, re-emerging from another, expressing only this 
nightmarishly symmetrical identity.’394 A ‘clear mind’ might be a viable consequence 
of the container and conduit metaphors, but it does not work when taken literally. The 
computational mind cannot function without content, without representations. These 
representations form a fundamental aspect of the conscious mind.  Our understanding 
of agency in this model must then address the role of the individual’s relation to their 
environment within consciousness. C provides an alternative to the conduit metaphor 
in a sequence in which Serge listens to his radio, describing the static as like ‘the sound 
of thinking. Not of any single person thinking, nor even a group thinking, collectively. 
It’s bigger than that, wider – and more direct. It’s like the sound of thought itself, its 
hum and rush.’395 In a contemporary context in which much of conscious experience 
is mediated by technology, the ‘container’, the medium for conscious experience, 
extends beyond the individual. 
Dennett addresses the status of the computer metaphor in a 2013 interview:  
The vision of the brain as a computer, which I still champion, is changing so 
fast. The brain’s a computer, but it’s so different from any computer that you’re 
used to. It’s not like your desktop or your laptop at all, and it’s not like your 
iPhone except in some ways. It’s a much more interesting phenomenon.396 
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Nicholas Carr argues that this admission signals the failure of the computer metaphor 
at the level of metaphor: 
Normally, the explanatory power of a metaphor comes from describing a thing 
we don’t understand in terms of a thing we do understand. But this brain-as-
computer metaphor now seems to be diverging from that model. The computer 
in the metaphor seems to be something very different from what we mean when 
we talk about a “computer.” The part of the metaphor that is supposed to be 
concrete has turned into a mystery fluid.397 
The brain is not like any computer that actually exists but is still assumed to be like a 
‘computer’ in some sense. The state of the metaphor, as exemplified by Dennett, 
derives from the fact that the computational model is made up of a set of interlinked 
metaphors. This uncertain status is what gives the metaphor validity as a way of 
understanding the mind. Given changes in the use of the spatial and visual metaphors 
due to new technologies, the computer metaphor can be used to express something 
radically different from what was intended in its original formulation: the interaction 
of two extended processes operating in a feedback loop.
98 
 
   
 
Chapter Two - Thinking and Thought in Remainder and Saturday 
There are other surgeons Jay can call on, and as a general rule, Perowne avoids 
operating on people he knows. But this is different. And despite various shifts 
in his attitude to Baxter, some clarity, even some resolve, is beginning to form. 
He thinks he knows what it is he wants to do. 
- Ian McEwan, Saturday (2005) 
I did it because I wanted to. Seeing him standing there in Four’s position as I 
stood in his, replaying in first my mind and then my body his slow fall, I’d felt 
the same compulsion to shoot him as I’d felt outside Victoria Station that day 
to ask passers-by for change. Essentially, it was the movements, the positions 
and the tingling that made me do it – nothing more. 
- Tom McCarthy, Remainder (2005) 
 
In the last chapter, I surveyed the types of metaphors for the mind used in my primary 
texts. From the position that the mind is inherently metaphorical, I came to several 
conclusions that will provide my starting point here. Firstly, I have built on Lakoff and 
Johnson’s argument that thought is metaphorical, and therefore embodied, to suggest 
that thought is extended because technology provides a material and experiential 
grounding for contemporary metaphors for thought, in the same way as the body. 
Secondly, I have adapted Black’s interaction theory of metaphor to suggest that both 
subjects of contemporary metaphors of the mind (the mind and a particular 
technology) alter each other. The cognitive model is an example of this process: a 
material object, the computer, derives from a particular understanding of the mind 
based in a set of existing metaphors. This object then further alters the mind through 
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its effects on consciousness. Again, building on the work of Lakoff and Johnson, I 
have taken this process as my model for other forms of thought. As I showed in my 
reading of Turing’s ‘On Computable Numbers’, the cognitive model is partly based 
on a complex of visual and spatial metaphors for the mind. In my primary texts, the 
incorporation of contemporary technologies within visual and spatial metaphors 
allows both of them to be used to depict extended modes of thought. In this context, 
the computer metaphor therefore expresses two contradictory models of the mind. 
Firstly, a reductive cognitive model of the mind as information-processor, with a fixed 
spatial structure and a simple input-output visual relation to its environment, and 
secondly, a feedback loop consisting of two processes extending beyond the 
individual.  
 In this chapter I will show how this contradiction is reflected not only in 
psychological metaphors, but in the use of the most fundamental psychological terms, 
‘thinking’ and ‘thought’. By assuming that thought consisted of a set of operations 
which could be understood in terms of a defined visual relation between subject and 
object and a set spatial structure, Turing laid the foundations for the computer and for 
cognitive psychology, thereby altering how we understand the mind. His definition of 
thought in his later paper ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’ complements this 
shift, as well as operating in the same way. Turing seeks to address the question ‘can 
machines think’ by replacing it with another ‘which is closely related to it and is 
expressed in relatively unambiguous words’.398 This replacement is the imitation 
game. This thought experiment can be read in metaphorical terms, as operating in the 
same way as the Turing machine. To ‘think’, according to Turing’s logic here, is 
simply to be able to convince someone through the use of words that you can think. 
This assumption is grounded in a set of metaphors, most prominently that of thought 
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as language, and embodied in the material technological set-up of the imitation game. 
This embodiment then subtly alters the definition of the term ‘thinking’ such that it 
excludes what was left out of the original assumption. The most significant exclusion 
here is of consciousness. Another significant exclusion here relates to the term 
‘thinking’ itself. The noun ‘thought’ is distinct from the verb ‘to think’ in ways that 
reflect the metaphorical underpinnings of both terms. In the spatial metaphor, 
‘thoughts’ are objects to be manipulated, while ‘to think’ is the act of manipulation. 
In the visual metaphor ‘thoughts’ are object to be seen, while ‘to think’ is the act of 
seeing. Turing’s has explicitly redefined ‘thinking’ so as to allow for the possibility 
that a machine could be said to think without being able to have ‘thoughts’.  
 Metaphors for the mind operate through the interaction of psychological terms, 
which are embedded in a broader context including other metaphors, everyday usage 
of those terms, and the structure of language, and of the body, embedded in a 
contemporary technological environment. I address each aspect of this relation in the 
work of McCarthy and McEwan in turn. I begin with McCarthy’s use of the term 
‘thinking’, relating it to his depiction of computers. I then address McEwan’s use of 
the terms ‘thinking’ and ‘thought’, before showing how their disjunction relates to his 
analysis of the individual’s relation to a mediatised contemporary environment. I then 
discuss McCarthy’s concern with how particular uses of language alter perception, 
and the links he makes between the reductive aspects of contemporary psychology and 
the limitations of language itself as a way of understanding the mind. 
 
Relatively Unambiguous Terms 
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Remainder uses a version of the computational model in its descriptions of Naz. This 
metaphor is emphasised through conspicuous repetition of the terms ‘whirring’ and 
‘processing’. It is also framed in ethical terms: the narrator’s reduction of Naz to a 
computer whose function is to process information is self-serving, blocking the 
possibility of reflecting on his motivations or on the consequences of his actions. The 
same dynamic applies to the novel’s use of the term ‘thinking’.  
 At various points in the novel, the time taken by Naz to process the information 
presented to him becomes longer and more pronounced: 
His eyes had glazed over while the thing behind them processed. […] I could 
almost hear the whirring: the whirring of his computations and of all his 
ancestry, of rows and rows of clerks and scribes and actuaries, their typewriters 
and ledgers and adding machines all converging inside his skull into giant 
systems hungry to execute ever larger commands. […] “I’ve never managed 
so much information before,” he eventually replied.399 
Naz is literally computing here; processing quantitative information entirely within his 
mind. The term computing, as used here, is split into its various components: broadly, 
the current meaning of the term as it applies to the mind’s processing of external 
stimuli, references to various forms of computing technology (computers, typewriters, 
ledgers and adding machines), and the computing of numbers. The passage is an 
example of what Groes identifies throughout Remainder as moments where the impact 
of information is ‘literalised in a surreal fashion through metaphor’400, while also 
fitting Serpell’s identification of an outdated metaphorical register in the novel. This 
metaphor also refers back to the history of the term ‘computer’. The three aspects of 
the term at work in the above passage fit three broad shifts in its use. Before the 
development of the von Neumann machine, the term computer would have referred to 
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‘professional calculators of flesh and blood, working for a university or a company’401, 
much like Naz. From there, the term was applied to computing machines. The term 
was then applied to human beings through the adoption of the von Neumann machine 
as dominant metaphor for cognition in the 1950s402. ‘Computing’ thus moves from a 
description of a specialised, regimented form of human activity to a description of the 
fundamental activity of the mind. Draaisma describes this pattern, which he identifies 
in relation to various other technologies, in terms of an ‘advanced technique which is 
absorbed without too much fuss into psychological theorising; again it is a technique 
with impressive public effects; this time too, the technique is to serve as a proof of 
existence’403. 
  The sequence from Remainder can be read in terms of this pattern, as Naz 
becomes more and more machine-like. The use of ‘whirring’ is repeated later on: 
‘Naz’s eyes went vacant while the thing behind them whirred. Another plane passed 
overhead, moaning and tingling.’404 The description of the plane here is a reference to 
the plan Naz is beginning to formulate here, according to which he will gather all of 
the narrator’s employees into a plane and destroy it. This second sentence also acts as 
a counter-point to the first: as Naz whirrs and becomes more machine-like, the plane 
moans and tingles (a sensation felt by the protagonist, his only form of affect), 
anthropomorphised. The machine is humanised: it is described as similar to the 
narrator, negating its status as an object separate to the narrator’s perception of it. Naz 
loses agency as he becomes more like a machine. Serpell argues that the narrator 
‘transforms an uncertain synchronicity into a synchronic synthesis, merging things 
that ought to remain separate into a single quasi-religious vision with one cause: 
himself’405. McCarthy’s description enables this dynamic. Another description of Naz 
in this sequence develops the idea: ‘Naz’s whole body tensed. He was completely 
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static for a while, his musculature suspended while the calculating part of him took all 
the system’s energy. After a while the body part switched back on.’406 Here, Naz is 
split into two: a ‘system’ incorporating various apparently separate parts, and a 
machinic assemblage of those parts. This split refers back to the first description of 
Naz. Naz is introduced as one of the components of the narrator: ‘He was like an extra 
set of limbs, tentacles spreading out in all directions, coordinating projects, issuing 
instruction, executing commands. My executor.’407 Naz comes from a ‘long line of 
scribes, recorders, clerks, logging transactions and events, passing on orders and 
instructions that made new transactions happen. Facilitators. That made sense: Naz 
facilitated everything for me.’408 The passage subtly hints at the idea of the narrator as 
not so much an individual as a system made up of transactions.  
At other points in the novel, Naz is situated within an extended informational 
and technological network through his use of his phone: ‘“And then…” Naz began; 
his phone beeped. He looked at it, then slipped it back into his pocket and continued: 
“And then we’d also have to separate…”’409 As in the preceding descriptions, Naz 
pauses to process information. In contrast to those descriptions, there is no physical 
description of Naz, and the interruption to his train of thought is shorter, allowing him 
to resume his sentence. This shift in the prose style responds to a more direct 
integration of Naz and machine in his interaction with his phone. The beep signals a 
message from his employees, returning information Naz has requested on behalf of 
the narrator. The narrator, Naz, his phone and his employees, as well as the network 
infrastructure allowing for mobile phone communication, all form parts of an overall 
system understood in terms of the flow of information. Despite the erasure of 
boundaries between human and technology within this system, the particular form of 
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technology at work – the mobile phone – doesn’t register in terms threatening of 
subjectivity and agency.  
In a sense, moments when Naz has his employees look up a word have become 
obsolete. The narrator could now look up the word himself on a smartphone. Clark 
predicted in 2003 that ‘we will one day live in a world in which, thanks to some easy-
to-access implant or wearable device’ we will be able to look up words instantly410. 
The implication is that our sense of self is ‘surprisingly plastic and reflects not some 
rigid preset biological boundary so much as our ongoing experience of thinking, 
reasoning, and acting within whatever potent web of technology and cognitive 
scaffolding we happen currently to inhabit’411. However, the problem here is that the 
terms through which we articulate our sense of self may be inadequate in engaging 
with this scaffolding. 
Uses of ‘thinking’ in Remainder occupy the same space as ‘whirring’ and 
‘processing’: brief pauses during which one or another character processes some kind 
of information. The term is first applied to the protagonist in a sentence placed between 
dialogue spoken by him and Mark Daubenay, his lawyer: ‘I thought about this for a 
while, then said.’412 ‘This’ is the content of Daubnay’s previous statement, and the 
results of this act of thinking are contained entirely within the next line of dialogue 
spoken. This dynamic is then repeated, with the roles reversed: ‘Daubenay thought 
about this for a moment’413. Here, the result of thought is compliance with the 
protagonist: ‘“I suppose it should,” he answered.’414 Subsequent references to thinking 
follow on from and develop the dynamic used to describe Daubenay, and the use of 
‘whirring’ and ‘processing’ to describe Naz; in other places, pauses or silences 
between dialogue occupy the same space415. This continues when the protagonist 
offers to buy a homeless teenager a meal: ‘He looked up at me with his mouth still 
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hanging open, thinking. I wasn’t a Christian soul-hunter, and he could tell I wasn’t 
police.’416 The moment is distinct within the novel in that the protagonist seems to be 
attempting to determine the thought processes of another person, perhaps in a hint at 
the empathy we might expect him to be in the course of developing here, if we follow 
Zadie Smith’s reading of the sequence417. The logic of these assumed thought 
processes leads to the teenager assenting; we learn shortly afterwards that the entire 
episode has been made up by the narrator418. Arne de Boever reads this scene, and the 
subsequent revelation, as McCarthy ‘interrupt[ing] his narrative in order to draw 
attention to the power-practice of writing’419. As Sidney Miller puts it, Remainder’s 
narrative depicts the narrator attempting ‘to strip the accidental of its essential 
stochastic quality by systematically taking control of everyone and everything in his 
world, until an unintended fall catastrophically subverts a carefully planned trip’420. 
The narrator, planning a re-enactment ‘calculat[es]’ that if one the participants 
‘slightly tripped on purpose, this would prevent him tripping by mistake’421, an 
assumption later proving fatal. While ‘calculated’ could be read as a synonym for 
‘thought’ or ‘conjectured’ here, the error’s repercussions reveal the arbitrary nature of 
the narrator’s assumption, and its distinction from ‘calculation’ as strictly defined. The 
narrator is describes how others ‘think’ in a way that actively strips them of their 
agency by depicting them as information-processors within a network he controls. As 
the use of the term ‘calculating’ – used elsewhere as a synonym for ‘thinking’ – shows, 
this does not reflect what is actually happening, or what those characters are actually 
thinking. Instead, it is active, part of the narrator’s attempts to control others. 
The depiction of thinking fits into what de Boever identifies as an emphasis on 
the power-practice of writing in the sense that characters have no agency within an 
ongoing narrative largely determined by the protagonist. Moments at which they 
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‘think about’ what he has said to them are simply brief interruptions. Given the relation 
of this depiction of thought to the depiction of Naz, and the shared use of such terms 
as ‘processing’, we can further link this to a computational model of thought. The 
computational model is not just a flawed interpretation, but something which responds 
to other pressures and actively shapes the narrator’s conscious experience and his 
response to those around him.  
 
Hordes of Bits and Bytes 
McCarthy has since developed the relation between thinking and the computer through 
Satin Island’s (2015) references to ‘buffering’. Rather than acting as conspicuous 
metaphors, the uses of this term are developed by the protagonist, U, in reference to 
his immediate circumstances, and a material environment filled with computers. Satin 
Island also furthers McCarthy’s foregrounding of narration and writing as something 
that actively shapes experience.  
Thought and computers are first linked when a Skype call freezes. The 
description, like that of Naz’s breakdown, blurs the distinction between human and 
machine: ‘I’m lacking, she began to tell me – but just then the audio dropped. Her face 
froze in mid-sentence too […] a little circle span in front of her, to denote buffering.’422 
This spinning circle is later described as whirring:  
I’d spend long hours staring at the little spinning circle on my screen, losing 
myself in it. Behind it, I pictured hordes of bits and bytes and megabytes, all 
beavering away to get the requisite data to me […] the data itself, its pure, 
unfiltered content as it rushed into my system, which, in turn, whirred into 
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streamlined action as it started to reorganize it into legible form. The thought 
was almost sublimely reassuring.423 
U uses a form of the conduit metaphor in his reference to the ‘pure, unfiltered content’ 
of data rushing ‘into [his] system’. This develops into an explicit comparison between 
consciousness and buffering:  
Staring at this bar, losing myself in it just as with the circle, I was granted a 
small revelation: it dawned on me that what I was actually watching was 
nothing less than the skeleton, laid bare, of time or memory itself. Not our 
computers’ time and memory, but our own. This was its structure. We require 
experience to stay ahead, if only by a nose, of our consciousness of 
experience424. 
U’s interpretation misses out, however, on the situated, contextualised nature of his 
revelations. His first experience of buffering is a direct encounter with it, in an airport 
surrounded by screens; his elevation of it to a model of consciousness follows on from 
problems with the bandwidth throughout his office; the last realisation is set up by a 
reflection on the pervasiveness of technology. The models of consciousness 
tentatively developed by the protagonist always follow on from his surroundings. The 
novel begins by running through the history of the Turin shroud. The image ‘isn’t 
really visible on the bare linen’, and only became so in the late nineteenth century on 
a photographic negative, its legitimacy subsequently disproven a few decades later by 
radiocarbon dating425. There is an irony in the narrator hinting at an awareness of how 
technology determines meaning while remaining unaware of the contemporary form 
of this process, in his use of metaphor in the same passage: ‘We see things shroudedly, 
as through a veil, an over-pixelated screen’426. The irony is developed in the 
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retrospective situating of the opening fragment, which follows on from the narrator 
being stuck in an airport. ‘As through a veil’ references McCarthy’s previous novel, 
C (2010), written between Remainder and Static Island, which explored the effects of 
new technology on subjectivity in the early twentieth century427. As I mentioned in the 
previous chapter, that novel emphasises the alternate meaning of ‘screen’, as 
something which obscures rather than illuminates. U’s own veil is the over-pixelated 
screen. 
Other passages show U beginning to adapt the metaphor of buffering to fit the 
experience of others, with varying levels of success. When he reads about a skydiver, 
dead after his parachute fails to open, he imagines the skydiver’s ‘experiences of his 
experiences – his awareness of himself, his whole reality’ as ‘mere side-effects of a 
technical delay, a pause, an interval; an interval comparable, perhaps, to the ones you 
get down phone-lines when you speak long-distance or on Skype’428.  Later, he tries 
to apply it to a friend’s account of dying, but is ignored:  
What do you mean? I asked. Well, he said, throughout my life I’ve always 
lived significant events in terms of how I’ll tell people about them. What I 
mean is that even during these events I would be formulating, in my head, the 
way that I’d describe them later. Ah, I tried to tell him: that’s a buffering probl 
… but Petr wasn’t listening.429  
The success of interpretation through metaphor depends on the situation; there is a 
clear contrast between an individual responding to news media and to a conversation 
between two people each in different emotional states. U’s growing understanding of 
all reality and experience as algorithmic is allowed to develop without interruption or 
counter-argument when reality and experience is at its most algorithmic, when he is 
109 
 
   
 
interacting primarily with (or through) technology. In conversation, his power-play 
falters.  
U mistakes situated metaphors for timeless and universal truths about the 
human mind. He does so partly because of the nature of the project he is engaged in. 
He has been tasked by his employer, Peyman, with writing the ‘Great Report’: ‘The 
Document, he said; the Book. The First and Last Report on our age.’430 Just as U’s 
reflections on the mind are always inflected with computer metaphors, the ‘Great 
Report’ is primarily literary, as the examples above indicate. This literary aspect 
derives from Peyman and U’s understanding of anthropology. Peyman explains the 
Great Report by describing the working methods of an anthropologist: you return 
home from the jungle, and ensconced in your study, you ‘write the book […] Not just 
a book: the fucking Book. You write the Book on them. Sum their tribe up. Speak its 
secret name.’431 U counters that this version of anthropology is outdated, but accepts 
the task nonetheless432. Anthropology, as he describes it, is a literary endeavour. The 
‘First Commandment’ of the anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski, is ‘Write 
Everything Down’433. U’s understanding of the Great Report emphasises the contrast 
between this mode of literary interpretation and the nature of the contemporary 
environment and of conscious thought, which are described through visual and spatial 
metaphors: 
Had it [the Great Report], when these events (q.v.) took place, found its shape? 
It was finding it – finding it in the same way we might say that we’re looking 
for an object rather than that it’s lost or non-existent. Shapes were happening 
inside my thought; or, rather, shapings, a preliminary set of shifts and swirls 
[…] Frames, contexts, modes, tones, formats would suggest themselves – pipe 
up, step forwards, as though volunteering for a task – then, no sooner than 
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they’d made their willingness known to me, fall silent again, slink back into 
the crowd and disappear.434 
‘Thoughts’ are multiple, visual and resistant to a mode of interpretation that is 
inherently singular and literary. Later on, U has an epiphany when watching the 
objects a woman in a bar has placed around herself:  
Where previously I would have made a mental note of all these objects and 
then, a la Malinowski, written them down later […] now I simply looked at 
them, blurring my vision till my own gaze became soggy and I lost myself 
among them till my own gaze became soggy and I lost myself among them.435  
He wonders whether ‘just coexisting with these objects and this person, letting my 
own edges run among them, occupying this moment, or more to the point, allowing it 
to occupy me […] was part of the Great Report? What if the Report might somehow, 
in some way, be lived, be be-d, rather than written?’436 He calls this ‘Present-Tense 
Anthropology’437. His vision of a new approach is immediately frustrated by the 
recognition that the Report ‘still had to be composed. That was the deal: with Peyman, 
with the age.’438 Interpretation cannot fully reflect experience because it requires a 
form that is always to some extent imposed rather than shaped by experience.  
 As I argued in the metaphors chapter, this point is inherent to any discussion 
of the mind – psychological models and concepts are metaphors, partly determined by 
their use in contexts other than psychology, and partly shaped by the material referents 
used in particular metaphors. Remainder defines ‘thinking’ in terms of the 
computational metaphor, emphasising the way in which this metaphor actively shapes 
the narrator’s relation to his environment. As such, it can be linked to narration. Satin 
Island develops this point by having its narrator actively creating several 
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computational metaphors for the mind while disregarding their situated nature. At the 
same time, he becomes aware of the limitations imposed by narration and by literary 
interpretation. This awareness is prompted partly by his ‘thoughts’, primarily visual 
objects expressing the embodied multiplicity that literary interpretation excludes.  
 McCarthy sets out Satin Island’s theoretical background and main concerns in 
‘The Death of Writing’ (2015). He equates the novelist with the anthropologist, 
describing the work of the latter as the writing of a ‘Great Report’ in exactly the terms 
used by Peyman439. The literary form of anthropology leads to an ‘almost systematic 
unworkability inscribed’ in the discipline: ‘the very ‘purity’ it craves is no more than 
a state in which all frames of comprehension, of interpretation or analysis, are 
lacking’440. McCarthy ascribes this point to Lévi-Strauss. Gardner has argued that 
Lévi-Strauss’s work shares several important features with the cognitive science of 
the time and deserves to be situated alongside it441. As Johnson points out, Lévi-
Strauss also praised work in cybernetics, and collaborated with participants in the 
Macy conferences from the field of cognitive psychology emerged. McCarthy’s 
references to Lévi-Strauss, in ‘The Death of Writing’ and in Satin Island 442, take issue 
with the idea that universal features of cognition can be articulated in written form, in 
a way that complements his critical depiction of U’s computational metaphors for 
consciousness. Another reference in Satin Island suggests another way of reading 
Lévi-Strauss’s relation to cognitive science. U mentions one of Peyman’s 
characteristic aphorisms, ‘What are objects? Bundles of relations…’443, a reference to 
a passage from ‘The Structural Study of Myth’ in which Lévi-Strauss argues that the 
constituent units of myths consist of bundles of relations 444. Johnson reads this phrase 
as referring to ‘groups of relations of the same type’: ‘The ‘meaning’ of the myth, as 
Lévi-Strauss understands it, derives not from the ‘diachronic sequence of its narrative 
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(which can often be absurd and senseless), but from the combinations (or more 
precisely, the binary oppositions) between these bundles of relations’445. The myth has 
a ‘cybernetic function, to the extent that it is a ‘looped’ message from a given society 
to itself, a meta-discourse whose function […] is the regulation and resolution of 
contradiction’ through a process of ‘negative feedback’446. Myth could therefore be 
seen as ‘a king of information technology, an instrument, a ‘logical model’ or ‘logical 
tool’ […] that supplements human cognition and permits the intuitively unthinkable 
to be thought.’447 Interpretative structures respond to the contemporary environment, 
to the individual’s conscious experience, and to the limitations of human cognition 
through a feedback process. The use of metaphor in McCarthy’s novels expresses this 
extended process. The use of the computational metaphor to describe Naz is grounded 
in Naz’s relation to technology, and in his profession, but it also serves other purposes 
for the narrator.  
  
The Extent of his Turmoil 
The distinction between ‘thoughts’ – embodied, visual, resistant to interpretation – and 
‘thinking’ – linear, computational – present in Remainder and developed in Satin 
Island is also at work in McEwan’s Saturday. McEwan’s use of ‘thinking’ and 
‘thought’ ties into the subtle doubling allowed by his use of indirect free style, which 
allows Perowne to take a somewhat removed perspective on himself, interpreting his 
own thoughts and actions. While Perowne the ‘thinker’ loosely corresponds to a 
computational model of the mind, the thoughts express his relation to his environment. 
The opening epigraph, from Saul Bellow’s Herzog (1964), embodies this dynamic. 
The passage McEwan quotes follows on from Herzog conducting a form of internal 
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dialogue, in which the act of narration is an implicit subject. Herzog feels that he is 
being taught a lesson by another character, and asks ‘how was he to describe this 
lesson?’448 He responds to this, tentatively: ‘The description might begin with his wild 
internal disorder, or even with the fact that he was quivering. Any why? Because he 
let the entire world press upon him. For instance?’449 McEwan begins his quotation on 
this last question. The response is ‘Well, for instance, what it means to be a man.’450 
This is complicated by a set of modifiers which broaden outwards: ‘In a city. In a 
century. In transition, In a mass. Transformed by science. Under organized power.’451 
The question of what it is to be a man requires context, but this context is so broad as 
to render the question unanswerable. The context cannot even be represented without 
some form of interpretation. Midway through the list, which has taken on a 
pessimistic, critical position with regard to progress, the narrative voice argues against 
itself, attacking that pessimism452. The complexity of this context implies that any act 
of narration is subjective because it actively shapes the individual’s response to that 
environment. This creates a split within the conscious self: ‘There, Herzog, thought 
Herzog, since you ask for the instance, is the way it runs.’453 What it means to be a 
man, in a city, in a century, is to be in constant dialogue with that environment through 
the medium of a separate self within your own consciousness, at least if you are honest. 
As Martin Ryle points out, the epigraph also ‘suggests a perspective on state 
power, militarism, technological modernity, and urban disorder more complex and 
more critical than Perowne ever adopts’, thus acting as evidence that the novel ‘does 
not simply endorse Perowne’s view of things’454. Rather than being expressed directly, 
as in the passage from Herzog, a similar split is introduced through a distinction 
between ‘thinking’ and ‘thought’. From the first line of the novel, there is a split 
between Perowne as actor and Perowne as conscious observer, and a sense that the 
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latter is secondary, not in control. He ‘wakes to find himself already in motion […] 
It’s not clear to him when exactly he became conscious, nor does it seem relevant.’455 
This split is also central to the novel’s ethical concerns: 
Now that the shutters are closed and he’s in darkness again, he understands the 
extent of his turmoil. His thoughts have a reeling, tenuous quality – he can’t 
hold an idea long enough to force sense out of it. He feels culpable somehow, 
but helpless too. These are contradictory terms, but not quite, and it’s the 
degree of their overlap, their manner of expressing the same thing from 
different angles, which he needs to comprehend.456 
His ‘culpability’ here relates partly to his wondering whether he should have called 
the emergency services when faced with the major incident of a burning plane, a 
dilemma which, as Graham Hillard points out, is an ‘absurdity’ he ‘imposes upon 
himself’457. In this, the novel builds on McEwan’s reflections on the individual’s 
relation to 9/11 in the 2001 essays ‘Beyond Belief’ and ‘Only Love and then 
Oblivion’458. The passage above dramatises parts of the latter: ‘Waking before dawn, 
going about our business during the day, we fantasize ourselves into the events. What 
if it was me?’459 The essay also notes that ‘[m]ost of us have had no active role to play 
in these terrible events. We simply watch the television, read the papers, turn on the 
radio again […] we remember what we have seen, and we daydream helplessly.’460 
Caroline Lusin has identified references to daydreaming as a significant motif in 
McEwan’s fiction, particularly from The Child in Time onwards, and notes that such 
references are used throughout Saturday to emphasise the theme of ‘helplessness and 
control’461 established here. ‘Thought’ as a term is tied here with helplessness, while 
‘thinking’ expresses at least the possibility of control. There is also an analogy made 
between ‘consciousness’ and ‘conscience’, two words used on the first page of the 
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novel. ‘Conscience’ is also used on the last. Andrew Foley takes this bookending of 
the novel as evidence for McEwan’s concern with the two terms as the basis of human 
nature462. Consciousness/conscience is a disturbance originating in the mind’s 
inextricable link with the outside world: in darkness, seeing nothing, Perowne is faced 
with ‘the extent of his turmoil’, a situation repeated at the end of the novel when, in 
the same darkened room, ‘all he feels now is fear’463. Despite this, Perowne several 
times expresses a wish to be back there. Following his first confrontation with Baxter, 
it ‘occurs to Perowne that what he really wants is to go home and lie down in the 
bedroom and think it through, the dispute in the University Street, and decide how he 
should have handled it, and what it was he got wrong’464. Visiting his mother, he wants 
to ‘stretch out on the oversprung bed and start to think about the day, and perhaps to 
doze a little’465. The sense Perowne has that to be alone and free from the outside 
world would allow him to actively think through what has occurred over the day, to 
take some degree of control over it, is shown to be mistaken in the opening and closing 
scenes of the novel. This contradiction is implicit in the dual nature of 
thinking/thought. The first use of the term, as noun, implies a passive relation 
appropriate to the half-awake Perowne: ‘the prospect of the experience ending saddens 
him briefly, then the thought is gone’466. The second use of the term, as verb, begins 
to establish the awakening Perowne’s sense of himself in terms of his evaluation of 
events such as 9/11: ‘And now, what days are these? Baffled and fearful, he mostly 
thinks when he takes time from his weekly round to consider. But he doesn’t feel that 
now.’467  
In McEwan’s essays on 9/11, the motifs of daydreaming and helplessness 
identified by Lusin gain a new relevance as a way of describing our mediated relation 
to the event. In ‘Beyond Belief’ McEwan describes how ‘[f]or most of us, at a certain 
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point, the day froze, the work and all other obligations were left behind, the screen 
became the only reality. We entered a dreamlike state. We had seen this before, with 
giant budgets and special effects, but so badly rehearsed’468. The individual’s relation 
to the screen here implies not only the lack of agency of the ‘dream’ but a numbed 
sense of helpless culpability: ‘The information junkie inside me was silently 
instructing the cameras: go round that tower and show me that aeroplane again; get 
down in the street; take me on to the roof […] Cameras, at last, were everywhere, just 
as I was sickening of this surfeit and horrified at myself for wanting it.’469 Television 
here functions as a metaphor for the mode of consciousness depicted in Saturday. Our 
relation to the outside world is essentially passive in that our relation to it is that of an 
observer. ‘Thoughts’ are the medium for this relation. The televised images are 
representations, discrete visual images presented to the subject through a defined 
conduit. The subject, as a ‘thinker’ responds by trying to assert control through the 
ordering of those representations.   
 Hayles distinguishes ‘thinking’, ‘what conscious entities such as human (and 
some animals) do’, and ‘cognition’, a ‘broader term that does not necessarily requires 
consciousness but has the effect of performing complex modelling and other 
informational task’470. The built environment ‘increasingly instantiates nonconscious 
cognition’, creating a general trend for ‘more and more communication to flow among 
intelligent devices, and relatively less among devices and humans’471. This creates a 
shift in the meaning of ‘thinking’ in relation to cognition. This shift can be seen in 
Saturday. ‘Thinking’ denotes a response to the operations of cognition as they are 
available to consciousness, in the form of visual representations. The continuity of the 
cognitive nonconscious between the body and the technological environment is 
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expressed through a correspondence between ‘thoughts’, mental representations, and 
television images.  
 
Hardly a Language 
McEwan claims that ‘the moral basis’ of the novel as a whole lies in the fact that ‘the 
apprehension of other minds is something that we’re cognitively sophisticated at 
doing, perhaps instinctively so’472. The verb ‘thinking’ is also associated in Saturday 
with theory of mind, applied to others and to oneself. This point is complicated by the 
fact that the terms through which theory of mind is formulated are in many cases 
inadequate in responding to the technological nonconscious. This creates a disjunction 
between theory of mind and other aspects of conscious experience, expressed as 
‘thoughts’. This disjunction allows McEwan to situate theory of mind within its 
embodied and affective context. 
The use of ‘thinking’ is most prominent in Saturday in scenes of conflict, 
particularly during Perowne’s argument with his daughter Daisy and the confrontation 
with Baxter which follows. In the argument, ‘thinks’ is repeatedly used by both: ‘I 
think you’d still be against it’; ‘if you think that’s a good idea’; ‘it’s called thinking 
through the consequences I’m against this war because I think terrible things will 
happen. You seem to think good will come of it’; ‘I honestly think I could be wrong’; 
‘do you think we’re going to be any safer?’473 The term is used to define both one’s 
own position and that of the other, in the context of a competition in which one must 
win. The term’s use resists genuine dialogue, and is misleading in its ascription of 
definite positions to both. Perowne is left ‘with a hollow feeling from arguing only 
half of what he feels. He’s a dove with Jay Strauss, and a hawk with his daughter’474. 
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The implicit distinction between what Perowne thinks and what he feels is significant 
in contrasting thinking with a more embodied and affective register.  
 The prominent use of ‘thinking’ as a verb continues with Baxter’s entrance, 
with an added attention to theory of mind. Perowne speculates throughout about what 
others are thinking: Baxter475, Rosalind476, Theo477, and even himself478. Such 
speculation has a clear purpose: finding an advantage, taking control of the situation. 
Rosalind’s ‘understated ‘I think’’ carries ‘rebellion’479; Nigel’s ‘you know what I’m 
thinking?’ is met with Baxter’s ‘I do Nige. And I was thinking the same thing 
myself’480 as a confirmation of Perowne’s helplessness. This association of thinking 
with power continues even after Daisy’s reciting of a poem begins to alter the situation. 
Baxter is described as ‘finding nothing extraordinary in the transformation of his role, 
from lord of terror to amazed admirer’481, his lack of self-consciousness signalling a 
loss of control. This transformation is subtly mirrored in the prose, as from this point 
descriptions of Baxter’s thoughts are no longer marked as speculation, but as narration, 
consistent with Perowne’s earlier diagnosis:  
It’s of the essence of a degenerating mind, periodically to lose all sense of a 
continuous self, and therefore any regard for what others think of your lack of 
continuity. Baxter has forgotten that he forced Daisy to undress, or threatened 
Rosalind. Powerful feelings have obliterated the memory.482  
The shift plays on an ambiguity inherent to indirect style, in which objective 
descriptions still bear some relation to the perspective of individual characters. Tim 
Gauthier notes the ‘palpable condescension’ of the description of Baxter as ‘amazed 
admirer’ or ‘excited child’, arguing that this tone marks the narration as Perowne’s 
thoughts, and that ‘from that moment on, Perowne effectively establishes a 
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professional, objective distance from his adversary, as though observing a test 
subject’483. Hannah Courtney’s reading of the initial confrontation claims that 
‘Perowne believes that as soon as he can pinpoint the cause of the disorder that is 
causing a man to threaten his life, he can predict Baxter’s every move and thus be free 
from harm’484. Perowne is ‘thoroughly convinced that he is safe because Baxter’s 
actions are determined by his genetic makeup and free choice is therefore not playing 
a part in his decisions’485. This dynamic is similar to that in Remainder: theory of 
mind, interpretation, is a form of power-play.  In contrast to that first encounter, in the 
later sequence power does not follow from interpretation. Apparent confirmation of 
Baxter’s condition merely confirms a deeper unknowability:  
Even if the trial existed, why would Baxter believe that this doctor would keep 
his word rather than call in the police? Because he’s elated as well as desperate. 
Because his emotions are wild and his judgment is going. Because of the 
wasting in his caudate nucleus and putamen, and in his frontal and temporal 
regions. But none of this is relevant. Perowne needs a plan, and his thoughts 
are too quick, too profuse486. 
The mention of thoughts – as opposed to thinking – confirms Perowne’s lack of 
control. The conflict is resolved not by a thinking through, or by theory of mind, but 
in unthinking collaboration, as Perowne and Theo throw Baxter down the stairs 
following Nigel’s exit487. The chain of events leading up to this point could not have 
been fitted into Perowne’s reading of the situation in terms of what each individual is 
thinking.  
 The shift in this section from speculating about Baxter’s thinking to a 
helplessness not lessened by that knowledge comes from a confirmation of his 
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condition, and an associated irrationality. Baxter can no longer be understood as what 
Dennett calls an ‘intentional system’, ‘a system whose behaviour is reliably and 
voluminously predictable via the intentional strategy’488. Dennett acknowledges that 
the intentional stance, and the associated characterisation of humans as ‘rational-
agents’, is not always applicable, even to healthy individuals: ‘It is important to 
recognize the objective reality of the intentional patterns discernible in the activities 
of intelligent creatures, but also important to recognize the incompleteness and 
imperfections in the patterns’489. Saturday juxtaposes several alternative levels of 
explanation. As Courtney points out, while Baxter’s behaviour throughout the scene 
may not be predictable according to ‘Perowne’s determinist theory’, it is ‘highly 
predictable from the vantage of literature, where revenge and violence commonly run 
amok to heighten tension, especially in the final dramatic climax. […] Free will is not 
predictable through science, yet it is also not possible in literature.’490 The point here 
is not that Perowne’s literary philistinism is preventing him from arriving at a correct 
reading of the situation, but that there is, as Mark Currie puts it, a ‘gap between 
knowledge and life’; Perowne’s ‘own knowledge is deficient to the extent that the real 
debate between scientific and fictional knowledge is being conducted at a level to 
which he has no access’491. Groes further notes and maps the ‘overwhelming extent of 
intertextual references’492, linking this to a certain gap between Perowne and the 
narrator: ‘It is made clear to the reader that Perowne’s experience is at the mercy of 
the narrator’s locutions, which constantly deride him by pointing out the limits of his 
frame of reference’493. Molly Clark Hillard, reads Perowne’s mistaken belief that the 
poem Daisy reads is her own as ‘McEwan’s wink at a literary audience that Perowne 
misprizes what Daisy and we readers conceive’494. Waugh argues that the intertextual 
references in Saturday set up a ‘kind of Socratic dialogue on the mind that underpins 
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both its moment-to-moment phenomenology and its thematic plot’495. While 
maintaining his use of indirect free style, McEwan introduces other forms of discourse 
into the novel, placing them in dialogue with Perowne’s scientific materialism, in line 
with Bakhtin’s view of the novel of the possibilities of the novel form. The fact that 
Perowne’s materialism is closely aligned with his theory of mind allows this dialogue 
to question several of the premises of narrationism, including the supposed ubiquity 
of a singular narrative within consciousness, and the suitability of a singular 
interpretation. 
McEwan’s conceptualisation of theory of mind through a distinction between 
similar sets of psychological terms originates in his teleplay ‘The Imitation Game’ 
(1982), based partly on Turing’s work at Bletchley Park during the war, and 
originating in McEwan’s research into machine intelligence and conversations with 
Andrew Hodges, Turing’s biographer496. In one scene, Turner, a version of Turing, 
describes the imitation game as a response to a discussion on whether machines can 
think497. Turner mentions that the trouble is that ‘one tends to get bogged down in 
definitions of ‘machines’ and ‘think’’498. The teleplay repeats variants of two terms: 
‘think’ 499 and ‘know’ 500. The introduction of ‘know’ as a complement to ‘think’ 
allows for Turing’s modification of theory of mind to be situated within a broader 
context. McEwan notes in in writing the teleplay he had come to think of Bletchley 
Park as a ‘microcosm’, not only of the war but of a whole society’, organised on a 
‘‘need to know’ basis as a set of concentric rings’501. In this context, what one thinks 
- but does not know - has significant consequences. The ending turns on a phrase 
spoken by the protagonist, Cathy, to Turner in bed: ‘You know all the secrets’502. She 
means this as flirtation, but Turner interprets it as an insult: ‘Do you know what you 
are? […] You’re a … do you know what you are? […] ‘You know all the secrets’ ... 
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You vindictive little bitch.’503 Cathy is unaware that Turner is either sexually 
inexperienced or gay. The latter interpretation is assumed as common knowledge by 
several male characters, none of whom openly tell Cathy. After she says to one that 
the men from Cambridge at Bletchley must be in ‘great demand’, a male character 
replies: ‘Not them, you must have heard about them. […] Half of them … are, you 
know…’504 The privileged knowledge of male characters, together with their 
assumptions about what Cathy must know, lead to a series of misunderstandings that 
culminates in Cathy being mistaken for a spy. Speculation about others has a tangible 
effect, and the embodied context of these speculations must be taken into account, 
particularly in an environment defined by interpretation and withheld knowledge, such 
as Bletchley Park or the imitation game.  
McEwan returns to this point in The Innocent (1990) when one character, 
Glass, gives an account of the origins of consciousness again rooted in a cold-war 
context: 
When he sees a leopard coming, he knows something the others don’t. And he 
knows they don’t know. He has something they don’t, he has a secret, and this 
is the beginning of his individuality, of his consciousness. If he wants to share 
his secret and run down the rack to warn the other guys, then he’s going to 
need to invent language. From there grows the possibility of culture. Or he can 
hang back and hope the leopard will take out the leadership that’s been giving 
him a hard time. A secret plan, that means more individuation, more 
consciousness.505 
Glass claims to have learned this from his study of biology and evolution506. In ‘The 
Imitation Game’, the distinction between thinking and knowing was also mapped onto 
the distinction between what is articulated and what is left unspoken or indirectly 
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implied. This distinction is partly determined by the operations of power and control. 
McEwan’s take on evolutionary psychology in this passage bears the traces of his 
critical engagement with Turing’s work. This continues in Enduring Love (1997). A 
significant intertext for that novel is Pinker’s The Language Instinct (1994), which 
McEwan mentions in the acknowledgments507. In that book, Pinker argues that the 
language instinct is an evolutionary adaptation, a structure in the human brain enabling 
communication and cooperation. His argument is explicitly grounded in cognitive 
science, and in the computational or representational model inaugurated by Turing in 
particular508. The representational model forms the basis of his rejection of (his 
interpretation of) the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis that people think in language and that 
therefore language partly structures conscious experience509. Drawing directly on ‘On 
Computable Numbers’, Pinker claims that thought consists of representations – which 
he calls ‘mentalese’ – and that since language cannot provide the medium for such 
representations, language is secondary to thought510. As well as cognitive science, this 
argument also draws on evolutionary psychology. For language to be effective in an 
evolutionary sense, it must correspond to mentalese – which must correspond to 
objects and processes in the world – without altering it511. Enduring Love uses 
references to ‘mentalese’ to establish a split between linguistic and ‘pre-verbal’ 
thought. Going over his memories of a traumatic incident, protagonist Joe notes that 
he believes himself to have been aware of the scene around him, despite not being 
aware at the time: ‘I must have assumed a good deal about the relationships of our 
neighbours, and done it barely consciously, out of the corner of my eye, wordlessly, 
in that pre-verbal language of instant thought linguists call mentalese’512. He refers 
again to this concept when describing a conversation: ‘I was about to say something 
to her when I got it, I understood completely, it came to me without effort, in that same 
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neural flash of pre-verbal thought that comprehends relation and structure all at once, 
that knows the connection between things better than the things themselves’513. The 
distinction between what is spoken and what is known is situated at the level of 
individual consciousness. As with the distinction between thinking and thought, this 
creates a split within the individual self. Despite Pinker’s grounding of his argument 
in Turing’s work, McEwan’s adaptations of both reveals an inconsistency. The 
implication of the representationalist model established in ‘On Computable Numbers’ 
is that thought is not linguistic. In on ‘Computing Machines and Intelligence’, the 
representationalist model is the basis of an argument according to which the 
interpretation of written language is the criteria for thinking.  
 McEwan also refers to mentalese in Saturday. Reflecting on anti-war 
marchers, and on his position in the world in general, Perowne comes up against the 
limitations of language in thought:  
These questions don’t spell themselves out. He experiences them more as a 
mental shrug followed by an interrogative pulse. This is the pre-verbal 
language that linguists call mentalese. Hardly a language, more a matrix of 
shifting patterns, consolidating and compressing meaning in fractions of a 
second, and blending it inseparably with its distinctive emotional hue, which 
is rather like a colour. A sickly yellow. Even with a poet’s gift of compression, 
it could take hundreds of words and many minutes to describe.514 
Time is important here. Perowne notes at the beginning of this passage that a second 
‘can be a long time in introspection’515. In relaying his memory, Joe admits that 
‘[w]hat takes a minute to describe took two seconds to experience’516. Courtney 
identifies and discusses three ‘distended moments’ in Saturday, points at which time 
is represented as momentarily slowed down: the representation of the crashing plane 
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at the start of the novel, the confrontation with Baxter here, and the final confrontation 
in Perowne’s home517. She concludes that these moments allow McEwan to ‘skilfully 
embed in his text the theory of the relativity of time as experienced by the human 
mind, using the science to aid his creation of a new variation of the literary techniques 
associated with the exploration of character consciousness in moments of crisis’518. 
Groes, on the other hand, reads these moments as introducing ‘a rupture between lived 
experience and its narration’, demonstrating how ‘our experience of the contemporary 
twenty-first century has become increasingly complex, while sense-making processes 
are increasingly difficult’519. These readings complement one another. Linguistic 
thought, along with spoken and written language, operates at a different timescale to 
pre-verbal thought. In this sense, they are distinct. McEwan takes this point from 
Pinker. However, both linguistic and pre-verbal thought, and the relation between the 
two, are partly determined by the contemporary environment. Linguistic thought can 
affect pre-verbal thought. Pinker claims that language allows to ‘shape events in each 
other’s brains with exquisite precision. […] Simply by making noises with our mouths, 
we can reliably cause precise new combinations of ideas to arise in each other’s 
minds’520. This fits the scene in which Daisy’s reading of a poem causes a change in 
Baxter’s mood. The poem’s effects on Perowne are shown through impressionistic 
descriptions of what he ‘sees’ when listening to it521. He ‘feels himself slipping 
through the words in to the things they describe’522. The fact that language does not 
map directly onto thought means that language has the capability to alter thought, 
whether through conversation – for example, when Perowne finds himself 




   
 
McEwan’s initial response to Turing was to emphasise the disjunction between 
what is spoken and what is known. This point continues to inform his response to a 
cognitive model which, implicitly or explicitly, assumes that language is secondary to 
representational thought. Theory of mind, whether folk psychology or rational-
agentism, does not map onto experience or reality perfectly. It is precisely because of 
this that it has the capacity to alter thought and behaviour. While McEwan is 
influenced by Pinker, his adaptation of his ideas aligns him with McCarthy’s response 
to Lévi-Strauss. 
 
Obliterate a Whole Universe 
The use of ‘thinking’ and ‘thoughts’ in Saturday derives partly from the long-standing 
influence of cognitive science on McEwan’s work. The distinction between these 
terms expresses several internal contradictions within the 
computational/representational model of the mind. Broadly, ‘thinking’ is associated 
with the computer, while ‘thoughts’ correspond to representations. The implication of 
McEwan’s use of a distinction between the two is that these can be understood as two 
separate aspects of the mind, each of which partly determines the other. This dynamic 
requires that we think of both of these aspects of the mind as extended. Representations 
are a medium through which the outside world interacts with perception and cognition. 
Different forms of ‘thinking’ that act on these representations, such as calculation, 
narration or theory of mind, are themselves shaped by structures external to the 
individual brain, such as language. Saturday and Remainder both establish a link 
between the use of technological metaphors for cognition and the role of technological 
media and networks within cognition. In Saturday, ‘thoughts’, understood as discrete 
objects corresponding to events in the outside world, prompt a response according to 
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a computational model of ‘thinking’. In Remainder, a computational mode of 
‘thinking’ determines the narrator’s relation to the outside world in terms of 
representations to be manipulated.  
  Baxter’s invasion into Perowne’s home has been read as analogous to 
Perowne’s relation to world events523. Baxter is taken as a discrete embodiment of the 
outside world in its most troubling aspects, and the resolving of the conflict becomes 
inseparable from the resolving of Perowne’s relation to the outside world. Throughout 
the second confrontation, Perowne is locked in a cycle of speculation and doubt. Early 
on he ‘suddenly sees’ that until now ‘he’s been in a fog […] In his usual manner he’s 
been dreaming’524, his plans ‘the stuff of fantasy’525, but soon drifts back into more 
conjecture. ‘Is this fantasy again?’ he asks of one course of action, describing another 
as ‘more fantasising’ two paragraphs later526. Throughout this section there is a tension 
between his speculative response to the situation, into which references to ‘thinking’ 
fit – rejected again and again as fantasy – and a more embodied register which includes 
references to ‘thoughts’: 
Henry feels himself rocking on his feet in fear and indecision. A strong urge to 
urinate keeps nudging between his thoughts. […] Henry’s self-cancelling 
thoughts drift and turn, impossible to marshall […] But when Henry imagines 
himself about to act, and sees a ghostly warrior version of himself leap out of 
his body at Baxter, his heart rate accelerates so swiftly that he feels giddy, 
weak, unreliable. […] He simply doesn’t know how to be reckless.527 
When Perowne attempts to imagine another possibility, he is still in a passive position: 
despite the fact that he has imagined it, he cannot control it. 
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 There is a similar depiction of thought near the start of Enduring Love: ‘Like 
a self in a dream I was both first and third persons. I acted, and saw myself act. I had 
my thoughts, and I saw them drift across a screen.’528 Perowne’s response to Baxter 
in this sequence, and to his thoughts in general, replicates his relation to television 
news. At the start of the chapter leading to Baxter’s entry he has the realisation while 
watching the news that ‘it’s an illusion, to believe himself active in the story’529. As I 
discussed in the previous chapter, references to television in Saturday hint at a 
continuity between the body and the television. In the above examples, Perowne’s 
passive to his body, and to his visualisations, correspond to his passive relation to the 
television and the images it conveys.  
This correspondence extends to Perowne’s understanding of ‘thinking’ and of 
agency, which is structured in relation to technological media. Earlier, during a break 
in a game of squash, a frustrated Perowne cautions himself that he has to ‘think about 
his game’530. In the next paragraph, he does so in relation to a news report on a 
television in the changing room: 
Isn’t it possible to enjoy an hour’s recreation without this invasion, this 
infection from the public domain? He begins to see the matter resolving in 
simple terms: winning his game will be an assertion of his privacy […] It seems 
to Perowne that to forget, to obliterate a whole universe of public phenomena 
in order to concentrate is a fundamental liberty. Freedom of thought.531 
The passage looks ahead to the home invasion that will follow, and to the breaching 
of the quasi-private space of Henry’s car that preceded it. The model of ‘thinking’ that 
Henry develops in response is grounded in a spatial metaphor according to which he 
can create a boundary between himself and the outside world. Joe describes a similar 
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state of mind as a ‘high-walled infinite prison of directed thought’, a ‘clean beach’ 
free of ‘the usual flotsam, the scraps of recent memory, the tokens of things not-done, 
or ghostly wrecks of sexual longing’532. Perowne’s understanding of the mind is based 
on the spatial metaphor for thought at work in the computational model: a fixed 
structure (the mind) with an input and output, acting as a container for thoughts, 
discrete representations of the outside world. Television complicates this model in 
presenting the subject with visual images corresponding to those discrete 
representations, while allowing them no scope for agency (control over those 
representations). It also undermines the spatial boundaries of the container model in 
greatly extending the scope of the subject’s perception and in externalising the 
medium for representations. This point is reinforced by the use of an embodied, 
affective register to describe Perowne’s relation to the television throughout. His 
recourse to a computational model of thought and of agency in response to the threat 
posed by the intrusion of thoughts and of television confirms his essentially passive 
relation to both. His use of a spatial metaphor for the mind with a clear boundary 
between himself and the outside world is a function of the outside world’s continuity 
with his mind. As he puts it later on, television has led to a ‘narrowing of mental 
freedom, of his right to roam’533. A spatial metaphor determined by his visual 
experience has an effect on how he thinks. 
 
Framed like Saints 
‘To obliterate a whole universe in order to forget’ also works as an apt summary of 
the project attempted in Remainder. The narrator responds to trauma by radically 
reshaping his environment to fit his own desires. The computational model which 
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characterises the narrator’s limited theory of mind also acts as a means through which 
he controls those around him. This works primarily within his own consciousness, in 
that he actively works not to acknowledge any individual agency on the part of his 
employees. This also applies to his visual experience. In contrast to Perowne, 
McCarthy’s narrator is able to actively shape what he sees. He does by adopting an 
understanding of consciousness partly informed by cognitive representationalism and 
partly modelled on cinema.  
Like television, cinema in a sense acts as a technology literalising 
representationalism, in that the experiences mediated through it are presented to the 
viewer as representations, literal images. In doing so it renders the viewer passive 
while transferring agency to the medium itself, in its capacity to manipulate and edit 
the images shown. Alongside its use of a computational metaphorical register for 
cognition, Remainder makes use of a metaphorical register for perception related to 
film and to cameras. The first reference to register appears in the narrator’s claim to a 
‘photographically clear memory’534 at the end of the first chapter. The register is 
inconspicuous for the moment but is picked up on and developed at the start of the 
next chapter, which details the narrator’s recovery. To ‘cut and lay new circuits’ in the 
brain, he is made to ‘visualize’ things. The example given is of lifting a carrot535. 
Actually lifting a carrot is taken to be a matter of visualising doing so, and breaking 
down the action into a series of motions which must be understood and pictured536. 
There is a clear correspondence between this treatment and a representationalist model 
of cognition. As the narrator points out, however, the actual experience does not follow 
on from this: the sequence cannot be broken down into an arbitrary number of 
actions537. The feeling of the carrot as physical object is ‘enough to start short-
circuiting the operation’538. The narrator’s training leads him to think of his hand, 
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fingers and brain as ‘active agents, and the carrot as a no-thing’, but the physical carrot 
is ‘more active’ than him539. On one level, the narrator understands that this treatment 
does not correspond to actual experience: ‘in the normal run of things you never learn 
to walk like you learn swimming, French or tennis. You just do it without thinking 
how you do it: you stumble into it, literally.’540  Thinking – defined in terms of 
computation and representationalism – is secondary to embodied processes. The 
Enactor soon finds an example of experience that does function in this way: cinema. 
Robert de Niro’s character in Mean Streets has no such gap separating him from his 
actions: ‘He doesn’t have to think about them, or understand them first. He doesn’t 
have to think about them because he and they are one.’541 He and they are one because 
‘thinking’, in the sense that the narrator has been taught during his recovery, 
corresponds more closely to film as a medium than it does to consciousness. The 
narrator is persuaded that the gap between his consciousness and his actions is 
universal, that he is ‘just more usual than everyone else’542. The narrator’s relation to 
the outside world is not universal; it is one determined by an explicitly 
representationalist model of the mind which corresponds to the relationship between 
the camera and the film set.  
As noted by Waugh and Jennifer Hodgson, the use of the word ‘vision’ in the 
novel references a ‘neo-corporate’ register543. This register complements the model of 
the mind taught to the narrator; agency requires ‘picturing’ what he wants to do, which 
is later developed into ‘communicating’ what he calls ‘vision, what I wanted to do’544 
to others. The use of the word ‘speculation’ also develops this link. It is initially used 
in relation to the narrator’s investment of the settlement545. Later, Naz returns a 
definition: ‘The faculty of seeing, […] observation of the heavens, stars etc.; 
contemplation or profound study of a subject; a conjectural consideration; the practice 
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of buying and selling goods.’546 Seeing, understanding, buying and selling: the way in 
which the narrator understands the mind derives from connections between these 
concepts operating in economics, psychology and media. In the chapter which 
contains these reflections on vision and speculation, the narrator repeatedly ‘pictures’ 
what is happening on the other end of the telephone547. At first, the imagined images 
correspond to his frustration. He pictures ‘workmen in their jeans stained white with 
sandstone and cement discussing politics or football or whatever it was they were 
discussing – anything, but not my project’548. Explaining his project to Daubenay, 
there is a long silence on the other end: ‘I pictured his office in my mind […] I gripped 
my phone’s receiver harder and frowned in concentration as I thought about the wires 
connecting me to him, Brixton to Angel. It seemed to work.’549 It works in the sense 
that Daubenay resumes the conversation, suggesting Naz’s company, Time Control. 
The narrator calls Naz: ‘I couldn’t quite picture his office, but I saw his desktop 
clearly: it was white and very tidy.’550 Naz proves his usefulness by communicating 
the narrator’s vision in arranging to meet at a restaurant which corresponds to the 
‘image’ which comes to the narrator551. Talking to Naz, he pictures his office again. 
This time the connection between the two spaces is a different form of 
communications technology, Naz’s mobile phones: ‘I traced a triangle in my mind up 
from our restaurant table to the satellite in space that would receive the signal, then 
back down to Time Control’s office where the satellite would bounce it’552. Repeated 
use of the term ‘picturing’ continues in the next chapter, in which the narrator finds 
the building in which to stage his re-enactment553. The aim of the re-enactment at this 
point seems to be a correspondence between what the narrator ‘pictures’ and what he 
actually sees, developing on the assumed logic of his therapy earlier on. The narrator’s 
conceptualisation of Naz’s suggestion to kill the employees through the use of mental 
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images is used to emphasise the ethical limits of his reductive model of the mind. 
During this sequence, the narrator ‘sees’ a series of abstract and ‘beautiful’ images 
corresponding to the suggestion which prompt him to agree to the suggestion. 
Throughout, ‘understanding’ is tied to ‘looking’ or ‘seeing’: ‘I thought: Naz wants to 
vaporize these people. I pictured them again being fed through a tube and propelled 
upwards, turned into a mist, becoming sky’; ‘He looked back at me’; ‘I looked at him 
again, and tried to understand’; ‘his eyes still stared straight at me, making sure I 
understood what he was telling me. I looked away from them and saw in my mind’s 
eye a plane bursting open and transforming itself into cloud’554; ‘I saw it in my mind 
again’; ‘I saw it a third time […] I’d never seen something so wonderful before’; 
‘running this picture through my mind again and again and again’; ‘I lay there for the 
rest of the night, picturing planes bursting, flowers dehiscing’; ‘I pictured all my 
people lifted up, abstracted, framed like saints in churches’ stained glass windows, 
each eternally performing their own action’555; ‘I pictured this all night’556; ‘the image 
of the plane dehiscing played across my mind again’557. What the narrator ‘pictures’ 
is determined by extended processes. These images then exert a corresponding effect 
on the narrator’s actions, influencing those processes. 
 Like Perowne, the narrator’s relation to the world is determined by film 
technology, and his elevation of this model to the level of thinking morally 
compromises him. Our awareness of this ethical aspect lies in how the actual content 
of the images exceeds their status as images, and of how their reduction to images 





   
 
Overwhelmed by Sunlight 
The reduction of thought, and of the individual’s relation to their environment in 
general, to representations, follows on from the definition of ‘thinking’. While the 
relation between visual images and the camera is one example, Remainder also 
explores a broader and perhaps more fundamental form of this dynamic in its attention 
to grammar.  
At one point, the narrator asks Naz to have the meaning of the word ‘residual’ 
looked up. The definitions returned by his employees define the term as an adjective 
tied to particular processes: ‘“Of or pertaining to that which is left – e.g. in 
mathematics […] “In physics,” Naz continued, “of what remains after a process of 
evaporation; in law, that which – again, remains of an estate after all charges, debts, 
etc. have been paid. […] Residual analysis […] Residual heat […] Residual error.”’558 
There is of course an implicit reference to the title of the novel here, again contrasting 
two aspects of a term: ‘that which remains’/’Remainder’. The narrator has been 
prompted to look up the word by someone using it like a ‘thing’, which Naz corrects 
to a ‘noun’559. In attempting to differentiate ‘residual’ as noun from ‘residual’ as 
adjective the narrator suggests ‘recidual’560. The employees come back with the 
similar words ‘rescinding’ and ‘recidivate’, defined as ‘the act of rescinding, taking 
away (limb, act of parliament, etc.)’ and ‘to fall back, relapse – into sickness, sin 
debt…’561 The brief emphasis on grammar here is important. The use of the adjective 
‘residual’ in relation to particular processes implies, for the narrator, the existence of 
‘residual’ as noun. This corresponds to the way in which his ‘thoughts’, visual images, 




   
 
The passage from Remainder continues by incorporating the intersubjective 
technological networks which drive the novel within the ongoing depiction of Naz as 
computer: ‘Naz’s eyes rested on a spot vaguely near my head for a few seconds. I 
could see him running what I’d just said past his data-checkers, and deciding I was 
right: I did say what was important.’562 Just as the data-checkers cannot identify 
‘residual’ as noun, meaning here does not fit what is implied by a model of thinking 
as processing. The ‘decision’ made by Naz here is not a result of rational thought, but 
of other processes. Most obviously, economic: the narrator is his employer, rich 
enough to hire him, the data-checkers and many others. References to this debt in this 
passage are significant in alluding to the economic formulation of residual. McCarthy 
reads Ulysses (1922) as a novel in which ‘the logic of accountancy has permeated the 
prose’563: a correspondence between ‘financial computation’564 and the computational 
model of thought is expressed through the use of verbs shared by the register of both. 
‘Ulysses and its Wake’ (2014) alludes to a moment in Ulysses in which the sun 
‘profligately flings, through a chequerwork of leaves, dancing coins onto Deasy’s 
shoulders: light itself turning into money’565. The moment is reworked in Remainder, 
when the narrator is ‘overwhelmed by sunlight […] streaming from the sun’s chest’566 
in a reference to the death of one of his employees, whose blood flows into the stolen 
money, ‘dampening one of its edges, eddying into a pool behind a crinkle, as though 
the bag and not he had leaked. […] “Speculation,” I said; “contemplation of the 
heavens. Money, blood and light.’567 
The economic and psychological models at work here use the same or similar 
terms, and also correspond to what McCarthy has called the ‘grammar’568 of the novel. 
The propensity to repeat by which Freud and contemporary researchers define the 
experience of trauma fits the ‘laying out of time along the trajectories of capital’569 
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implied by financial models. Pieter Vermeulen points out that trauma, ‘far from 
registering as a psychologically significant event, is merely mobilized as a device that 
triggers and structures the plot’, and that in ‘indirectly funding the events that make 
up the novel’s plot […] provides the novel with the narrative capital it needs to keep 
going for some 280 pages.’570 This refusal to address trauma in itself is the starting 
point of the novel, the opening lines of which admit to an inability to articulate: ‘About 
the accident itself I can say very little. Almost nothing. It involved something falling 
from the sky. Technology. Parts, bits. That’s it really: all I can divulge. Not much, I 
know.’571 Again, we find a gap between two levels of knowledge, one deliberately 
limited – what the narrator ‘can say’ – and an acknowledgement of something more 
comprehensive beyond articulation – ‘Not much, I know’. The narrator’s elaboration 
of this refusal defines the accident as singular: ‘a blank: a white slate, a black hole.’572 
He excuses this refusal to articulate the ‘vague images, half impressions’ he retains of 
the accident by reference to the subjectivity of consciousness: ‘Minds are versatile and 
wily things. Real chancers.’573 The next paragraph complicates this, by mentioning the 
‘terms of the Settlement’ that legally prohibit him ‘from discussing, in any public or 
recordable format (I know this bit by heart), the nature and/or details of the incident, 
on pain of forfeiting all financial reparations’574. The opening lines acquire a new layer 
of meaning, as does the narrator’s description of a mind whose creations go against 
his contractual obligation to inarticulacy. Miller also notes that ‘by heart’ here suggests 
that the narrator’s capacity for short-term memory, at least, remains unaffected by the 
accident, despite what he implies at the start575. Miller argues that the narrator, as well 
as other characters, stop short at the point of stating exactly what happened to him, 
‘intimating that the whole text is bound by the same nondisclosure agreement’576.  
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McCarthy repeats this in Satin Island: U mentions that what he is writing here 
is determined partly by confidentiality agreements relating to ‘the Project’, which is 
at the same time resistant to articulation, ‘a project formed of many other projects, 
linked to many other projects’, its complexity rendering it ‘well-nigh impossible to 
say where it began and ended, to discern its “content”, bulk or outline’577. Describing 
his boss’s brief on the project, he mentions that he is being vague ‘in part because I’m 
obliged to be vague; but in part because he was quite vague as well’578.  The legal and 
financial aspects of the situation in Remainder are similarly broken down into a series 
of individual concepts, the ‘Requirement’, the ‘Clause’ and the ‘Settlement’. In the 
reduction of these relations to a series of discrete nouns, the opening defines the model 
of the mind which dictates the narrator’s treatment during his recovery. Given that the 
narrator’s action through the rest of the novel attempt to shape his environment so that 
it can embody this model, these legal factors have a clear, though unacknowledged, 
influence on the form of the novel and its plot. 
At one point, the narrator describes the effects of the accident through a 
metaphor derived from Plato. He claims that it was ‘as though my memories were 
pigeons and the accident a big noise that had scared them off. They fluttered back 
eventually – but when they did, their hierarchy had changed.’579 Draaisma points out 
that the ‘image of the memory as a dovecote or aviary’ developed by Plato in the 
Theaetetus ‘represents retention of information as the preservation of an experience in 
an enclosed space.’580 It also defines memories, or thoughts, as discrete objects. 
Dennett uses the metaphor in arguing that consciousness is a result of thousands of 
memes ‘mostly borne by language, but also by wordless “images” and other data 
structures, [taking] up residence in an individual brain, shaping its tendencies and 
thereby turning it into a mind’581. According to Dennett, ‘what Plato saw was that 
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merely having the birds is not enough; the hard part is learning how to get the right 
bird to come to you when you call. […]  Learning to reason is, in effect, learning 
knowledge-retrieval strategies.582 The computational metaphor is founded on aspects 
present in this metaphor: ‘thinking’ as spatial structuring, and ‘thoughts’ as discrete 
objects. Other technologies undermine this distinction. ‘Thoughts’, or representations, 
can exist both inside and outside the individual, created by the perceptual apparatus or 
by cameras, and can reshape the spatial structuring of the mind. The spatial structuring 
at work in cinema or even in language can determine the precise form of 
representations. Both aspects are revealed as extended. As the example from Plato 
shows, the visual and spatial metaphors for the mind at work here predate the 
technological metaphors which they have incorporated in my primary texts. However, 
these technological metaphors, and their influence on psychological terms, have the 
effect of calling into question the fundamental aspects of these metaphors. 
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Chapter Three - Prosthetics: Language and Vision in The Child in Time and 
Saturday 
There was no succour to be had from the legends and symbology, the great, 
enveloping tradition of marital breakdown, for like many before him, he 
thought his own case was unique. […] Any drunk in a bar could have told 
Stephen that he was still in love with his wife, but Stephen was a little too 
clever for that, too in love with thought. 
- Ian McEwan, The Child in Time (1989) 
“Narrative, Carrefax.” The recording officer, seated behind a table with a stack 
of papers at the hangar’s exit, stops him. 
“What?” asks Serge, taking his globes off and wiping his hand across his face. 
“Flight narrative for Corps HQ. I have to remind you every time.” 
“Oh,” says Serge. “Well …” His hand has gathered a thick wedge of tar. He 
looks at it, then up at the recording officer. “We went up; we saw stuff; it was 
good.” 
- Tom McCarthy, C (2010) 
 
The distinction between thinking and thought I discussed in the last chapter maps onto 
several other significant distinctions relating to the mind. Firstly, that between 
language and vision. Secondly, that between inside and outside; this includes the 
distinction between subject and object in perception, as well as the boundaries of the 
body, and the implicit boundaries established by spatial metaphors for the mind. I 
found that ‘thinking’ and ‘thought’ could be understood as mutually constitutive. This 
140 
 
   
 
dynamic implicitly undermines the other distinctions it is associated with. In Saturday, 
Perowne’s linguistic understanding of himself and his relation to others is secondary 
to the operations of mentalese, which are represented in visual terms, and his embodied 
relation to what he sees around him, including images on television. The strictly 
defined spatial model of cognition through which he seeks to resolve his relation to 
the outside world is itself the result of the outside world’s presence within his mind. 
In Remainder, how the narrator describes others seems to alter his own visual 
perception. This mode of narration is determined by a particular understanding of 
psychology, by contemporary economic networks, and by the structure of language. 
What determines both ‘thinking’ and ‘thought’ incorporates material processes 
external to the individual.  
In this chapter I will discuss how this distinction maps onto that between 
consciousness and the unconscious. ‘Thinking’ corresponds to ‘consciousness’ as it 
was defined by Freud: supposedly the seat of individual agency, but in fact secondary 
to unconscious processes. ‘Thought’ corresponds to the unconscious as it is associated 
with a separate agency within the mind. As I discussed in the introduction, Freud’s 
later work also links the division between consciousness and the unconscious to those 
I mention above. He identifies consciousness with language and grounds his model of 
the mind in the organism’s tendency to develop a ‘protective shield’ between itself 
and the world. The basic distinction between what is and is not available to 
consciousness is determined by this tendency. 
Freud’s work has been read as a forerunner of cognitive science. The influence 
of his work lead to a widespread acceptance of the idea that the mind includes non-
conscious processes. In this chapter, I discuss his influence on the work of the two 
writers I looked at in the previous chapter. The distinction between ‘thinking’ and 
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‘thought’ I identified derives partly from the influence of Freud on each writer. This 
influence was pronounced in McEwan’s early fiction, while in his later fiction he has 
moved away from it. McCarthy, on the other hand, was partly influenced by Freud’s 
work on trauma in Remainder but has since embraced the influence of Freud and his 
followers. The Child in Time was McEwan’s first novel to question Freud’s ideas and 
to begin to incorporate the influence of contemporary popular science, in particular 
the work of Bohm. McCarthy’s C is partly based on one of Freud’s case studies and 
heavily influenced by Lacan. Both Bohm and Lacan build on Freud’s thought, drawing 
on the insights of physics and cybernetics respectively to emphasise the ego’s 
continuity with its environment. They diverge from Freud in questioning both the 
fixity of the spatial structures Freud describes, and the use of the ‘Lockean crutch’. 
Following their lead, McEwan and McCarthy have adapted Freud’s ideas, and in doing 
so implicitly question the contradictions inherent to his distinction between 
consciousness and the unconscious. I begin by showing how both novels depict 
consciousness in terms of a tension between linguistic interpretation and a visually 
mediated relation to their environment. I then discuss how the use of this tension 
complicates each writer’s relation to their stated influences. I then consider how the 
figure of the ‘prosthetic’ can be used to link these formal aspects of the texts to the 
extended model of the mind I have developed in earlier chapters. Finally, I argue that 
the use of the prosthetic provides an alternative to conventional notions of individual 






   
 
Not Recordings but Stories 
The association of consciousness and the self with language and a coherent narrative 
complicates any straightforward distinction between conscious and unconscious 
thoughts. Perception and memory are aspects of conscious experience which are partly 
structured by narrative but not fully subsumed by it. In this sense they fit into a 
modified understanding of the unconscious defined by its resistance to the narrative 
consciousness. In The Child in Time McEwan develops his early use of this opposition 
through a prose style that splits the thought processes of a single character into what 
that character sees and how he interprets it. This alignment of consciousness with 
literary narrative suggests another level of self-consciousness open to the novel form, 
in the contrasting of a distinctively novelistic prose style with one responding to what 
the other excludes. The Child in Time, building on McEwan’s dissatisfaction with 
Freud, limitations of his own earlier work, and the political aspects of language itself, 
takes this option through the use of a visual prose style. 
Stephen Lewis, protagonist of The Child in Time, is introduced as ‘always, 
though barely consciously, on the watch for children’583. The first chapter of the novel 
explores what it means to be ‘barely conscious’ in this sense. In a committee meeting 
at the start of the novel, Stephen ‘[runs] memories and daydreams, what was and what 
might have been. Or were they running him?’584 Throughout the chapter, Stephen is 
preoccupied by memories of the day Kate, his daughter, went missing. He ‘runs’ them, 
interrogating them in the hope of understanding what has happened. The question 
which interrupts the narrative here literally and formally suggests that the role of 
consciousness is passive, interpreting what is presented to it. The beginning of the 
novel introduces an opposition between memory and daydreams, represented through 
visual impressions, and Stephen’s narrative interpretation of them. His inability to 
143 
 
   
 
establish a coherent narrative is caused by the trauma of losing his daughter. The 
interpretation of his memories aims at re-establishing such a narrative.  
McEwan describes the committee members as ‘divided between the theorists, 
who had done all their thinking long ago, or had it done for them, and the pragmatists, 
who hoped to discover what it was they thought in the process of saying it’585. Dennett 
notes that we ‘often do discover what we think (and hence what we mean) by reflecting 
on what we find ourselves saying’586. In contrast to Pinker, for Dennett this means that 
language plays an active role within cognition. Dennett writes that in human cognition 
a ‘multitrack process occurs over hundreds of milliseconds, during which time various 
additions, incorporations, emendations of content can occur, in various orders’587. 
Contents ‘arise, get revised, contribute to the interpretation of other contents or to the 
modulation of behaviour (verbal and otherwise), and in the process leave their traces 
in memory’588. At any point in this process ‘there are multiple drafts of narrative 
fragments at various stages of editing in various places in the brain’589. Probing these 
drafts precipitates different ‘narratives […] single versions of a portion of “the stream 
of consciousness”’590. Stephen himself, mirroring the committee meeting, delivers 
‘compulsive imaginary speeches, bitter or sad indictments whose every draft was 
meticulously revised’591. The opening of the novel depicts the editing process as stuck 
in a loop, unable to narrativise trauma. 
Stephen lacks ‘the concentration for sustained thought’, daydreaming ‘in 
fragments, without control, almost without consciousness’592. These fragments are 
visual impressions, while ‘consciousness’ seems to denote their processing: ‘When he 
straightened he might have been conscious of a figure in a dark coat behind Kate […] 
he was barely a conscious being at all’593.  Running through the day of Kate’s 
disappearance, Stephen observes that the ‘bitter, anti-cyclonic day was to serve an 
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obsessive memory well with a light of brilliant explicitness, a cynical eye for detail’594. 
The description of memory as an ‘eye for detail’ served by light is belied by the irony 
of the details it offers up: a ‘flattened Coca-Cola can’ lying in the sun, an ‘ingenious, 
sparkling’ tree, and a dog shitting ‘as though illuminated from within’595. Descriptions 
of light here suggest that McEwan may be drawing on the concept of the ‘flashbulb 
memory’, a term coined by Roger Brown and James Kulik in 1977596. The term 
denotes ‘emotionally charged memories’ wherein the world ‘suddenly becomes very 
clear and enriched as we notice all manner of trivial details that we would not normally 
care about’, as if the scene had ‘suddenly been illuminated in a brilliant blaze of 
light’597.  As Stephen runs through his memories, the novel begins to question those 
memories themselves in several ways. Stephen lists the items he bought at the 
supermarket that day: 
What else did he buy? Toothpaste, tissues, washing up liquid, and best bacon, 
a leg of lamb, steak, green and red peppers, radice, potatoes, tin foil, a litre of 
Scotch. And who was there when his hand reached for his items? […] He had 
been back a thousand times, seen his own hand, a shelf, the goods accumulate, 
heard Kate chattering on, and tried to move his eyes, lift them against the 
weight of time, to find that shrouded figure at the periphery of vision […] But 
time held his sight for ever on his mundane errands, and all about him shapes 
without definition drifted and dissolved, lost to categories.598 
The narration formulates a split between language and visual memory. Stephen’s 
knowledge of that day is limited entirely to what he saw. The sequence goes on to 
emphasise gaps in Stephen’s memories of the event: ‘Something was rising in his 
throat and he bent double. Perhaps he was sick, but he had no memory of it’599; ‘Then 
without any apparent interval, any connecting events, he was outside the supermarket, 
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waiting at the zebra crossing with half a dozen other people’600. As in Saturday, the 
determination of consciousness by a set of discrete visual images is associated with a 
lack of control.   
 There are two sets of metaphors at work in this sequence, verbal and visual, 
each of which is associated with a particular technology (the camera and written 
narrative). The two modes of thought (flashbulb and narrative memory) implied by 
these distinct sets of metaphors are both available to consciousness. This model of 
memory as a complex of two sets of metaphors is also present in contemporary third 
culture texts. Bruce Hood distinguishes between flashbulb memories and ordinary 
memories, the latter of which are ‘not recordings but stories we retrieve from the 
compost heap that is our long-term memory; we construct these stories to make sense 
of the events we have experienced’601. These memories ‘change over time as they 
become distorted, merged, turned over, mixed in and mangled with other experiences 
that eventually fade’602. Charles Fernyhough describes memory as a ‘great 
storyteller.’603 This metaphor has been adopted partly as an alternative to the spatial 
metaphor of memories as ‘physical things’, which Fernyhough claims is ‘guaranteed 
to mislead’604. Fernyhough categorises the metaphor of the flashbulb memory with the 
latter, and argues that they, and traumatic memories in general, are also fabrications605. 
McEwan first hints at a similar idea in The Child in Time through his reference to the 
‘shrouded figure at the periphery of his vision’. Given the phrasing, it is uncertain 
whether this fantasy figure is present at the periphery of his vision in memory, or 
whether this is a figure of speech. The bottle of Scotch is also ambiguous. An earlier 
passage mentions Scotch as his drink of choice since Kate’s disappearance, before 
describing ‘the stubborn conspiracy of objects – lavatory seat, bed sheets, floor dirt – 
to remain exactly as they had been left’606. The objects he lists in the passage above 
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undermine Stephen’s initial attribution of a sustained objective character to his 
memories. This is further undermined by the role of language in constructing these 
memories, which are shown to be shaped by their telling. At one point, Stephen’s 
stomach contracts and ‘a bolt – he thought of it as a black bolt – of morning coffee’ 
shoots into his mouth607. As Stephen prepares to tell his wife Julie what has happened, 
he finds himself ‘looking down at her from an immense distance now, from several 
hundred feet’, reflecting that ‘from up where the air was thin and the city below was 
taking on geometric design, his feelings would not show, he could retain some 
composure’608. Fernyhough points out that observer memories, ‘in which the 
rememberer appears as an objective, third-person character’, also act as evidence that 
memories are reconstructions609. He notes that Freud argued that such memories ‘acted 
as screens for other, more significant events which our developing egos have 
repressed’610. This appears to be what is happening at the end of this sequence. Unable 
to make any sense of his visual memories through sustained interrogation, Stephen 
allows them to be altered into a fantasy. 
The structuring of visual impressions by narrative applies to perception as 
much as to memory. Later on in the novel, Stephen thinks a girl in school is 
‘unmistakabl[y]’ Kate611. After arguing his case with the headmaster, his recognition 
of the ‘enormity of his claims and lack of immediate proof’ has ‘a physical effect […] 
permeating to the very surface of his retina, right to the rods and cones, for the girl 
crossing the reception area was taller, more angular’612. Stephen becomes conscious 
of incongruous physical details he had previously overlooked, such as a woman behind 
him in a dress, ‘an odd choice for a cold day’, and a man carrying an empty bucket 
who refuses to answer Stephen when he asks why he is carrying it613. At the same 
time, he revises the fantasy of Kate’s presence in the face of evidence: ‘Stephen was 
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thinking about Kate’s spirit, how it might hover high above London, [descending] to 
inhabit the body of a young girl, infuse it with its own particular essence to 
demonstrate to him its enduring existence’614. William Watkin’s reading of the novel 
notes that Stephen’s failure to mourn stems from his inability ‘to see the lost object 
[Kate] as a lost part of himself and to see the missing Kate as only partially missing’, 
in the sense that while ‘the child in space is gone, the real child and his memories, the 
child in time, still lives’615. This corresponds to the distinction between the intentional 
object and the real object, which I address in the next chapter. In contrast to Julie, who 
is able to distinguish between her ‘love’ for Kate and her ‘desire’ for her616, Stephen 
‘cannot divide his daughter into parts and so his love for her is tainted by her lack 
making him love her as a thing he hates. In effect he loves his daughter as an idealised 
hallucination.’617 Stephen is unable to distinguish between memory and desire, as 
components of himself, and their relation to objects outside of himself.  
McEwan’s novella The Comfort of Strangers (1981) includes a similar instance 
of misrecognition, when one character sees another swimming from a distance and 
thinks that she is drowning618. McEwan explains the passage by saying that ‘if you are 
so wrong about something you have to question whether your desires aren’t involved 
in your judgment’619. Influenced by Freud, this idea has persisted in his later fiction. 
Variants on the idea that ‘satiated desire’ brings ‘clarity’ recur in The Child in Time620 
and Saturday621. Lynn Wells notes another instance of belated recognition in the The 
Comfort of Strangers, figured ‘like a repressed memory in a dream’622. She argues that 
this description ‘underscores the chronic inability of characters in this novel to see 
others distinctly, not as extensions of themselves’623. Seaboyer argues that a division 
‘between vision and language, looking and speaking’624 informs the novel’s 
structuring; the first two chapters, for example, are dominated by ‘a plethora of 
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concepts that are linked to the field of vision’ while the third is ‘a lengthy confessional 
monologue recited before a captive audience’625.  
McEwan’s early work depicts memory and perception as constructions in a 
way that is both influenced by Freud and congruent with the contemporary science of 
memory. He creates a split between vision and language: what is seen is determined 
by an overall narrative and altered by interpretation. On one reading, vision 
corresponds to consciousness while language corresponds to the unconscious. This is 
complicated by the fact that vision is also the medium for trauma, for incongruous, 
fixed details which undermine interpretation and narrative. As I discussed in the 
previous chapter, in his later work McEwan associates pre-linguistic thought 
(mentalese) with vision, building on an engagement with cognitive science begun in 
‘The Imitation Game’. M. Hunter Hayes and Groes note that ‘formally and 
stylistically, the attention to detail, above all visual perspective and point of view, 
which is the hallmark of McEwan’s writing […] suggest an imagination schooled in 
the demands and conventions of visual media’626. The form’s potential for a literal 
disjunction between what is seen and how it is described can be read as playing a part 
in the transition from the ‘gruesome specificities’627 of McEwan’s early work to The 
Child in Time’s treatment of memory and perception. A scene in ‘The Imitation Game’ 
shows an ATS officer giving a speech to male officers on the role of women. This 
speech is carried on in voice over in subsequent scenes, contrasted with the actions of 
female recruits, as well as with visuals of the officers’ response to the speech. The 
form of knowledge depicted visually undermines the voice over. The claim that 
women ‘need a ‘thrill’ to produce enthusiasm which is the first step toward esprit de 
corps’ precedes a cut to ‘ATS orderlies washing up’628; the claim that women ‘have a 
fairly good instinct for justice and respect it, even at their own expense’629 is given in 
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voice over at the beginning of a scene in which an ATS sergeant disciplines the female 
recruits through abuse and by denying them permission to speak630. This disjunction 
between language and vision mirrors the one between thinking and thought (or 
‘knowing’ in ‘The Imitation Game’) that I identified in the last chapter. McEwan’s 
formal and thematic response to Turing relates to his earlier response to Freud in this 
sense. 
McEwan’s depiction of the operations of memory in The Child in Time 
complements his use of ‘thinking’ and ‘knowing’ in ‘The Imitation Game’, and of 
‘thinking’ and ‘thought’ in Saturday, in its use of a formal distinction between seeing 
and interpreting. It also develops on aspects of his earlier work influenced by Freud, 
reformulating a distinction between consciousness and the unconscious as one 
between two aspects of conscious experience. 
  
Begin to Transcribe 
What links the models of thought proposed by Freud, Turing, and Dennett is 
interpretation. In each case, this stems partly from the particular methodologies 
employed by each thinker. Freud and Dennett both develop on this through the use of 
literary metaphors for consciousness. In C, McCarthy responds to Freud by using a 
different set of technological metaphors, most prominently that of radio transmission. 
While this metaphor responds to a particular technology, it is similar to the literary 
model in partly determining what Serge sees. What Serge sees then acts as the basis 
for an adapted spatial metaphor for the mind and its relation to its environment. 
In the metaphors chapter I discussed C’s description of static as the sound of 
thought in relation to the computational and conduit metaphors. The conduit metaphor 
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relies on adapting and imposing a pre-existing spatial metaphor for thought onto a 
technological medium and associated field of study which inherently contradicts that 
metaphor. In cybernetics and information theory, transmission is a physical process 
incorporating two entities, causing the creation of messages. In the conduit metaphor, 
messages (conceptualised as discrete objects) are transferred between containers. The 
sequence in C describing the young Serge’s use of RX radio emphasises this 
inconsistency through its depiction of visual perception, memory and imagination.  
Serge builds ‘a silence box around the desk to isolate his little RX station from 
the sleeping household – or, as it becomes more obvious to him with every session, to 
maintain the little household’s fantasy of isolation from the vast sea of transmission 
roaring around it.’631 This ‘fantasy of isolation’ from a vast sea of transmission fits the 
conduit metaphor. As in The Child in Time, the prose style seems to resist articulation 
by delaying it: 
The first stretches are angry, plaintive, sad – and always mute. It’s not until, 
hunched over the potentiometer among fraying cords and soldered wires, his 
controlled breathing an extension of the frequency of the air he’s riding on, he 
gets the first quiet clicks that words start forming: first he jots down the signals 
as straight graphite lines, long ones and short ones, then, below these, he begins 
to transcribe curling letters, dim and grainy in the arc light of his desktop…632 
The description stretches out, stopping short of articulating the actual transmission in 
favour of conveying impressions and the sense of a connection between Serge and 
material technology. The prose’s conspicuous rejection of the message is signalled by 
the ellipsis which ends the passage. 
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Pieter Vermeulen reads the use of ellipses in Remainder as a representation of 
the trances that the narrator falls into, as absences in the text similar to the gaps in 
memory described by Stephen in The Child in Time. Vermeulen claims that ‘it is 
possible to read these ellipses as mimesis of an intermittently unconscious mind’633, 
implying that ‘the routines of psychological realism are harder to shake off than 
McCarthy’s programmatic statements seem to promise’634. A discussion of 
psychology hints at this point. Samuels, a former armed robber hired by Naz to advise 
on a re-enactment, has studied psychology in prison. He describes reading psychology 
textbooks as ‘like suddenly being given the key to my own past. Understanding it. If 
you don’t want to repeat things, you have to understand them’635. There is an implicit 
reference here to the narrator’s post-traumatic state, and the model of the mind at work 
in his rehabilitation: ‘No Doing without Understanding: the accident bequeathed me 
that for ever, an eternal detour’636. For both Samuels and the narrator, trauma is 
overcome through the imposition of a linear spatial structure. The reference is 
developed when Samuels describes his method for robbing a bank as using shock – 
‘Psychology again, see?’ – to create a ‘bridge’, ‘suspension’, ‘enclave’ or ‘defile’ – a 
detour – within a ‘strict action reaction-reaction pattern’637. The narrator compares 
unanticipated factors within these patterns to the carrot used in his rehabilitation638. 
Trauma, or the relation to the environment, alters the spatial structuring of the mind, 
introducing defiles or detours. It is also the basis for this spatial structuring. 
 One sequence in Remainder establishes this distinction between pre-
programmed psychological patterns and detours within them by adopting a prose style 
similar to parts of The Child in Time, split between visual impressions and an 
interrogative mode. The chapter depicting the narrator’s re-enactment of a shooting 
opens by reflecting on the surfaces of the road where it takes place. In contrast to the 
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diagrams used in planning, the actual surfaces contains ‘so much to analyse, so many 
layers, just so much matter’639 that ‘your study of it would branch out and become 
endless until, finally, you threw your hands up in despair and announced to whatever 
authority it was you were reporting too: There’s just too much here, too much to 
process, just too much’640. As the narrator, playing the part of the shooting victim, falls 
to the ground, ‘a whole tumult of images’ comes to him: ‘some sky, a lamppost, tarmac 
and the coloured patterns floating on the puddle’s surface’641. The images are both 
representations and markers of his failure to process his experience. The patterns 
become more abstract, taking the form of ‘Greek or Russian letters’642. The same 
tumult of images and letters recurs when the re-enactment is repeated643. The narrator 
then decides to repeat the sequence ‘at half speed’, ‘like in an action replay on TV’644. 
This reference to television hints at the narrator’s motivations. He notes the victim 
‘would have edited most of’ the surfaces around him out, ‘dismissed them as mundane, 
irrelevant’645. Perhaps, he speculates, ‘if he’d looked more carefully’ at seemingly 
irrelevant details he may have been open to signals being sent646. Something similar 
to McEwan’s interrogative mode is developed when the narrator speculates on the 
signals being sent by the environment: ‘His mind would have asked this space to take 
him in, to shelter him – and been told: No, you can’t get there without being shot; it’s 
just not possible. It would have asked the same question of Movement Cars’ window, 
and been told: No.’647 Despite his attempts at a purely visual mode of consciousness, 
modelled on television, the narrator’s response to this form of consciousness takes the 
form of interpretation, and a form of the conduit metaphor, according to which his 
environment is sending signals to him. Visual images inevitably turn into phrases, 
messages. The rest of the chapter is split between the depiction of visual details and 
an interrogative mode speculating on the victim’s thought-processes648. At times such 
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as this, the narrator of Remainder wants to reject interpretation and understanding in 
favour of a sensual immersion within the material. His use of technological metaphors 
to conceptualise his visual relation to the world around him, however, leads him to 
understand this relation in terms of transmission. Therefore, he ends up deploying the 
same interpretative mode of thought as Stephen. As Fernyhough argues, the camera 
metaphor is both a visual and a spatial metaphor, in that it refers to a material 
technology. Immersion in the visual holds out the promise of a disruption of the spatial 
structures of the mind, but the mind’s response is the re-imposition of the camera’s 
spatial structuring.  
 C develops this point in depicting visual images as constructions, based on the 
narrator’s relation to technology, but not representative of any actual objects in the 
environment. The RX sequence depicts visual impressions arising from radio 
transmissions which hint at new interpretations. A burst of messages, headlines from 
the press, break down and combine: 
“Madero and Suarez shot in Mexico While Trying to Escape” … “Trade Pact 
Between” “Entretien de” … “Shocking Domestic Tragedy in Bow” … “Il 
Fundamentore” … “Husband Unable to Prevent” … The stories blur together: 
Serge sees a man clutching a kitchen knife chasing a politican across parched 
earth, past cacti and armadillos, while ambassadors wave papers around 
fugitive and pursuer, negotiating terms.649 
The visual impressions Serge ‘sees’ here are not the result of a transmission 
understood in terms of the conduit metaphor. They result instead from his integration 
within a broader technological circuit which includes material technology (the radio) 
and language. Serge assumes an interpretative stance appropriate to the medium he is 
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engaged with. This first allows him to draw out physical details and sense impressions, 
both in the form of what he ‘pictures’ and in the text’s depiction of his own 
engagement with technology. Taking off his headphones, the objects around him 
‘solid, tangible’ are ‘somehow made more present by the tinny sound still spilling 
from the heaphones’, itself ‘present too, material: Serge sees its ripples snaking 
through the sky’650. He is diminished in the interpretations he draws, and in the 
reductiveness of the stance. McCarthy signals this through a moment of self-parody: 
Serge ‘lets a fart slip from his buttocks, and waits for its vapour to reach his nostrils: 
it, too carries signals, odour-messages from distant, unseen bowels’651. Like the 
protagonists of Remainder, Saturday and The Child in Time, Serge’s psychology is 
defined by the act of interpretation. All forms of sensual experience – audio, olfactory 
– become images, and then become words. 
 The final signal Serge receives is death. Picking up on a distress call, Serge 
hears, or thinks he hears, ‘the sound of people treading cold, black water, their hands 
beating small disturbances into waves that had come to bury them.’652 Serge is partly 
based on the ‘Wolf Man’, Sergei Pankejeff, one of Freud’s patient’s, whose life story 
McCarthy summarises in Tintin and the Secret of Literature (2006)653. What Freud 
does to this story, according to McCarthy, is to ‘decode’654. McCarthy goes on to 
discuss Nicholas Abraham and Maria Torok’s reading of the case study in The Wolf 
Man’s Magic Word: A Cryptonomy (1976) using a ‘barrage of architectural metaphors 
to describe Sergei’s mind’655. On this reading, Sergei’s failure to mourn has opened 
up a ‘space within him which is not his own’656. Moreover, this space speaks: ‘The 
Wolf Man’s mind […] is conducting a complex conversation with itself’657. Reading 
the sequence from C through reference to the conduit metaphor offers another way of 
understanding this complex of metaphors. Serge’s integration with material 
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technological networks and with language causes him to ‘see’ hallucinatory 
transmissions from a space beyond the material. He interprets these as transmissions 
according to the conduit metaphor. McCarthy goes further than Abraham and Torok 
in arguing that the spatial structure is also a creation of Serge’s mind, based on the 
interactions of various technological networks and of the limitations of interpretation. 
As in Satin Island, this structure follows on from the limitations of articulation as 
opposed to embodied integration. There is no one transmitting messages to Serge: not 
another RX user, not his unconscious. 
In undermining this model of transmission, McCarthy is developing a critique 
of Freud’s model. Freud acknowledges the limitations of his ‘decoding’ approach in 
‘The Wolf-Man’ (1918) when he admits that the work of analysis ‘finds its natural 
limit at the point where it becomes a question of capturing a multidimensional 
structure in the two-dimensionality of description’, and that he ‘must therefore content 
[him]self with offering individual limbs which the reader can join together into a living 
whole.’658 The radio sequence from C makes the same point. Catherine Malabou reads 
Freud’s metaphor of the mind as a city in Civilization and its Discontents as an 
argument that all metaphors are inadequate in representing the mind659. Nonetheless, 
as I’ve discussed, Freud use of metaphor there and elsewhere was central to his model 
of the mind. C implicitly argues that such uses of metaphor alter the mind in 
describing, while hinting that the use of metaphor may have been one cause of his 






   
 
Rather Like a Colour 
As I discussed in the previous chapter, McEwan’s positioning of ‘thinking’ as 
secondary to ‘thought’ reflects his engagement with different third culture texts. His 
use of this distinction also corresponds to the distinction between language and vision 
in his earlier work. While in Saturday this distinction partially reflects the influence 
of Pinker’s adaptation of the representationalist model, McEwan’s use of visual 
elements implies that ‘thought’ is extended.  
 At one point in Saturday, Perowne recognises a street-sweeper he encountered 
earlier in the day660. The first encounter acts as a moment of connection: describing 
the ‘egg-yellow shading to red’ of the sweeper’s eyes, Perowne ‘feels himself bound 
to the other man, as though on a seesaw with him, pinned to an axis that could tip them 
into each other’s life.’661 This leads him to a meditation on his social position relative 
to the other man, and on broader questions of social inequality and the ways in which 
it has been overlooked. Perowne’s relation to Baxter is expressed most clearly in a 
passage which repeats the early encounter in a moment of connection through eye-
contact. As Baxter falls down the stairs, ‘Henry thinks he sees in the wide eyes a 
sorrowful expression of betrayal’662. Eye-contact establishes a connection and disrupts 
Perowne’s distance from others. 
Teresa Winterhalter notes that Henry ‘literally and metaphorically runs into 
numerous situations where he must revise what he thinks to be true’663. The opening 
scene of the novel acts as a ‘lesson in reading’, an explicit and detailed example of the 
dynamic characterising Perowne as ‘a man of limited scope – a man capable of only 
glimpsed understandings beyond the frameworks of his everyday world’664. His 
gradual recognition of the burning object he sees from his window proceeds in discrete 
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stages, in which he ‘sees’ it as one thing, before ‘chang[ing] his mind’665. As he does 
so, his perception of the object changes too: he approaches the truth in increments, 
through a series of discrete images. The novel’s depiction of his thought-processes are 
continuous, connecting up these changes. Several sequences in the novel build short 
narratives around a close attention to the visual. Perowne’s memory of meeting 
Rosalind, his wife, is grounded in visual perception: the two meet when Rosalind has 
to have an operation to save her sight, and the prose pays particular attention to what 
Perowne can see at various points, and to his speculation as to what Rosalind sees666. 
This split between language and vision becomes prominent during the home invasion. 
When Rosalind enters, followed by Baxter and Nigel, her eyes are ‘wide and dark, 
desperate to communicate what her lips, parting and closing once, are unable to tell 
them’667. Descriptions of eye contact, and of where certain characters are looking are 
also used in relation to theory of mind: Perowne tries to ‘see’ the house and his family 
through Baxter’s eyes668; Baxter ‘lets him know with a look that he too has seen’ him 
move669. Perowne’s sense of his own helplessness is articulated by the phrase 
‘suddenly sees’670, while Baxter ‘seems to be waiting to see what he himself will do 
next’671. Baxter’s threats: ‘you better shut up or watch my hand’672; ‘I want you to 
watch my hand […] You watch my hand and listen’673; ‘You’ll do it […] Or you’ll 
watch my hand’674. The poem’s effects on Perowne are shown through impressionistic 
descriptions of what he ‘sees’ when listening to it675. 
 At one point, Perowne turns towards his sleeping wife, imagining ‘the green 
eyes seeking out his own’ while reflecting on the ‘communicative warmth’ of the 
human form, and the ‘commonplace cycle of falling asleep and waking, in darkness, 
under private cover, with another creature, a pale soft tender mammal, putting faces 
together in a ritual of affection.’676 The visual impression of Rosalind’s green eyes is 
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situated within one of Perowne’s habitual reflections on the biological basis of his 
experience, as well as referring back to the ‘iridescent greens’ on his retina. Perowne 
deploys this attention to colour in describing mental processes beyond language. As I 
discussed in the last chapter, Perowne ‘sees’ mentalese as ‘rather like a colour’677. The 
sequence in which this description appears goes on to refer back to the moment 
prompting his memories of Rosalind, describing ‘a flash of red’ streaking in across his 
peripheral vision ‘like a shape on his retina in a bout of insomnia’678. The flash of red 
is a car about to crash into his, but he experiences it as having ‘the quality of an idea, 
a new idea, unexpected and dangerous, but entirely his, and not of the world beyond 
himself’679 . Nora Pleske’s reading of the scene notes the perspectival restrictions in 
place: due to ‘the intrinsic dynamism’ of the ‘perspective of the moving car’, the 
‘sensual perceptions are cinematic in kind’680. The car that crashes into Perowne has 
the quality of an idea because of its similarity to a representation, deriving partly from 
McEwan’s adaptation of Pinker’s model, and partly from the similarities the novel 
establishes elsewhere between consciousness and the experience of watching a screen.  
 McEwan grounds his references to mentalese in visual description, implying a 
continuity between the brain and the world, as well as heightening the sense of the self 
as split. This technique is also evident in Enduring Love. Joe is in a library and sees ‘a 
flash of a white shoe and something red’681. This is a reference to Jed Parry, Joe’s 
stalker, described earlier as wearing ‘box-fresh trainers tied with red laces’682. Joe does 
not immediately make the connection, but becomes aware of a ‘mental-visceral state’ 
he ‘had yet to understand’: ‘I couldn’t find the word for what I felt. Unclean, 
contaminated, crazy, physical but somehow moral. It is clearly not true that without 
language there is no thought. I possessed a thought, a feeling, a sensation, and I was 
looking for its word.’683 Once he settles on ‘apprehension’, he runs out looking for a 
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‘pair of white shoes, trainers with red laces’, still without articulating why684. The part 
of Joe that feels and that sees is separate in this sequence from the part that 
understands, that articulates.  
 This sequence reflects the influence of Damasio’s Descartes’ Error (1994), 
another text McEwan mentions in the acknowledgements685. Damasio argues that 
‘certain aspects of the process of emotion and feeling are indispensable for rationality’ 
and that ‘the body, as represented in the brain, may constitute the indispensable frame 
of reference for the neural processes that we experience as the mind’686. The sequence 
demonstrates these related points: Joe’s realisation that he is being stalked by Jed is 
an interpretation of his ‘mental-visceral state’. Furthermore, his relation to the outside 
world is mediated by his body. Jed’s appearance interrupts Joe’s research into ‘the 
death of anecdote and narrative in science’687. He is reading a letter to Nature from 
1904 contributing to a debate on consciousness in animals, in which the author relays 
an anecdote about a dog, concluding that ‘the dog must have had a plan, a sense of the 
future which it attempted to shape’688. Joe takes this as evidence of ‘how the power 
and attractions of narrative had clouded judgement’ in the author of the letter’s use of 
‘a laughable anthropomorphism’689. In the sequence that follows, however, he is in the 
same position as the writer of the letter, interpreting his body’s reaction to its 
environment through narrative.  
 As I discussed in the introduction, Damasio argues that core consciousness 
originates in the disruption of homeostasis by objects in the external environment. 
Homeostasis is restored through extended consciousness. McEwan approximates this 
process in Enduring Love, based partly on his reading of Damasio. At the same time, 
he is building on formal aspects of his work originating in his earlier fiction: a split 
between vision and interpretation, each of which seems to represent a separate aspect 
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of the self. The distinction at work loosely corresponds to Freud’s distinction between 
the unconscious and the conscious self: the former is a separate agency which precedes 
and determines the latter, undermining its sense of agency. With The Child in Time, 
McEwan resituates this distinction at the level of consciousness through his distinction 
between vision and language.  
 
Erased, Then Written Out 
In Saturday and Enduring Love visual impressions provide the medium through which 
the environment interacts with and alters the conscious self. As I’ve discussed above, 
these visual impressions are themselves partly determined by interpretation and 
language, as well as material technologies such as the camera or the car. What Serge 
‘sees’ throughout C is malleable, a function of interpretation and transmission. Despite 
the structuring of this dynamic according to the conduit metaphor, it also reflects the 
conscious self’s integration with the environment, and technological networks in 
particular.  
The depiction of what Serge ‘sees’ as a result of his integration within extended 
networks complements the sense of continuity between Serge and technology seen 
during the RX sequence. Serge watches a jazz band690 that ‘look like machine parts 
too, extensions of their instruments’, their bodies and those of the dancers ‘twitch and 
quiver with electric agitation’691. One dancer, lets out ‘a shriek of joy that manages to 
carry on its underside a note of anxiety, a distress signal. The music carries signals 
too: Serge’s eyes glaze over as he tunes into them.’ 692 As Serge ‘closes his eyes, the 
signals become images: words and shapes being written out in light against a black 
void, then erased, then written out again, worlds being made and unmade…’693 This 
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sequence follows the same structure as the RX sequence. Serge engages with a 
particular technological medium, leading into a long description of the material basis 
of that medium, with an emphasis on the continuity of technology and the body. This 
description is then followed by a representation of that continuity in the form of mental 
images. As these images become more abstract, Serge takes them to be signals, 
transmissions to be interpreted.  
 This structuring of visual impressions is developed in Remainder during a 
sequence split between visual impressions and an interpretative mode. Elsewhere, 
Remainder relies on a more straightforward structuring of visual impressions modelled 
on visual technology. Satin Island uses the internet as a model for its own structuring 
of visual impressions and interpretation. Milly Weaver’s reading of the novel argues 
that it ‘expresses a desire to do away with literary expression in its traditional form’694. 
The novel’s use of a visual mode is based in a contemporary environment, described 
early on: ‘Around me and my screen, more screens: of other laptops, mobiles, 
televisions.’695 U watches ‘images for hour after hour, my head rotating with them as 
they moved from screen to screen’.696 This description of watching screens ‘for a long 
time’ or ‘over and over’ recurs throughout697.  The Great Report referred to throughout 
is understood by U in terms of his ‘mental picture’ of it698. Weaver notes the novel’s 
concern ‘with de-mediation, with achieving a complete coherence between object and 
mode of expression. The Great Report, on these terms, would look like, and constitute, 
a real material trace of what it represents.’699 Weaver also notes a recurring description 
of U ‘picturing’ various things working in the same way as C. She reads Satin Island’s 
focus on physicality in its description of mental images’ as mapping onto ‘its wider 
thematic interest in representational forms that want to bear a more direct material 
relation to their referent’, or that want to do away with mediation altogether’, 
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expressed through McCarthy’s ‘placement of his narrator’s mind as a kind of 
photographic plate or film – a receptor and relater of direct physical images’700. As I 
discussed in chapter one, the metaphor of the mind as a photographic plate expresses 
not the unmediated mode of understand sought by McCarthy’s protagonists, but rather 
the determination of visual perception by extended material processes. In ‘Writing 
Machines’ McCarthy quotes the narrator of Alexander Trocchi’s Cain’s Book (1960), 
who feels like ‘a piece of photographic paper, waiting passively to feel the shock of 
impression […] a kind of sponge in which the business of being excited was going on, 
run through by a series of external stimuli’701. Consciousness is on this view a form of 
‘photosynthesis’, according to which external stimuli leave traces on the ‘writing 
machine’ of the mind702. Visual images in the mind derive from a connection between 
the individual and their environment, a material trace of what they represent, but not 
the straightforward connection implied by the representationalist model.  
  
Unfolding, Broadening, Blossoming 
While McEwan’s depiction of vision in his later fiction can be taken to imply that 
language is secondary, this does not signify a broad acceptance of the ideas he has 
taken from Pinker. His depiction of a split between nature and culture emphasises that 
both play a role within consciousness. His use of this split is evident in The Child in 
Time. As Stephen immerses himself in nature and its modes of thought, he is 
eventually led to a strange new interpretation of his own experiences. 
Damasio’s argument in Descartes’ Error contradicts Pinker in The Language 
Instinct on one important point. Pinker argues that language and culture can be 
understood as functions of human nature, following the logic of evolutionary 
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psychology. Damasio points out that ‘although culture and civilization arise from the 
behaviour of biological individuals, the behaviour was generated in collectives of 
individuals interacting in specific environments’703. Cultures and civilizations ‘could 
not have arisen from single individuals and thus cannot be reduced to biological 
mechanisms and, even less, can they be reduced to a subset of genetic 
specifications.’704 Towards the end of Enduring Love, Joe seems to side with Damasio. 
In conversation with an acquaintance, Joe acknowledges that at ‘another time [he] 
might have been drawn to elaborate the evolutionary perspective, drawn from game 
theory’, but now just feels sick705. Walking through a forest, he finds that he ‘could 
not believe in the primary significance of these grand cycles’:  
Just beyond the oxygen-exhaling trees stood my poison-exuding vehicle, 
inside which was my gun, and thirty-five miles down teeming roads was the 
enormous city […] What, in this description, was necessary to the carbon 
cycle, or the fixing of nitrogen? We were no longer in the great chain.706  
The distinction between nature and culture explored here is also made in The Child in 
Time, and linked to its distinction between two kinds of consciousness. During 
sequences in which Stephen’s immersion in nature is depicted through a visual, 
impressionistic prose style, the novel emphasises the impossibility of fully 
distinguishing between linguistic and visual thought. 
David James identifies recurring shifts from ‘perception’ to ‘description’ in 
The Child in Time707. The effect is similar to the delayed shifts between ‘diegesis’ and 
‘mimesis’ identified by Hayes and Groes in McEwan’s screenplays708. One such 
pronounced shift occurs when Stephen first mistakes his adult friend Charles for a 
child. Their encounter is situated within visual description of the forest he goes out to 
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find him in, and the memories it prompts. As James points out, Stephen finds Charles 
‘by chance – by a snapshot, a scan in the successiveness of impressions, arresting and 
modulating McEwan’s free-indirect-discourse from perception to description’709. 
James argues that a ‘continual slide from logical and realistic action to the 
impressionistic ‘urgency of contracting time’ complements McEwan’s refusal to allow 
the reader recourse to any sort of distanced, metadiegetic voice’710. The narration 
follows on from recognition in shifting immediately from ‘the boy’ to ‘Charles’711 
once the latter identifies himself in dialogue. 
The space in which Stephen encounters Charles – a ‘chaos of vegetation’ in 
which Stephen’s ‘ignorance of the names of trees and plants heightened his impression 
of their profusion’712 – prompts the impressionistic mode through which Stephen first 
sees Charles as boy, as well as representing a mode of thought separate from language 
and from authority: ‘The last time he had walked in these woods, when Charles was 
still a government minister, everything had been skeletal and pure’713. Earlier on, 
Stephen travels through ‘planted rows of conifers’, a ‘geometrical forest 
uncomplicated by undergrowth or birdsong’, finding that ‘its single-mindedness 
pleased him’714. A field of wheat ‘cut neatly in two by an access track’ is described as 
‘an obsessive landscape – it thought only about wheat’715. The ‘single-mindedness’ of 
these landscapes is reflected in the more descriptive mode of this section. When 
Stephen then moves into ‘new surroundings’, in which the ‘trees around him were 
unfolding, broadening, blossoming’716, the style shifts to one that develops on his 
earlier daydreaming, split between impressionistic visual description and 
interrogation, as he tries to understand the place’s familiarity: ‘He had never been here 
before, not as a child, not as an adult. But this certainty was confused by the knowledge 
that he had imagined it just like this. And he had no memory of imagining it at all.’717 
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As in the earlier sequence, the interrogative tone seems to correspond to Stephen 
analysing his memory of the event. The shift is signalled in a passage again 
emphasising the role of memory, and marking the sequence as narrated from a point 
in the future: ‘Afterwards, Stephen tried to recall what was on his mind […] But it was 
to remain inaccessible, a time of mental white noise’718. Stephen – as present subject 
and as implied narrator – is both experiencing this for the first time and remembering 
it. McEwan references Freud in his account of experiencing something like this mode 
of consciousness in ‘An Only Childhood’ (1982), when pretending to be describing 
his present experience as a child to an imagined judge: ‘I saw my present self from the 
future and made it into a past. If I was walking into a street I would hear the judge say 
‘And what did you do when you reached the corner?”719 Present experience becomes 
memory to be questioned: ‘This became a means for me of self-observation and 
exploration […] If this was a protean super-ego, I took it on board without 
discomfort.’720  
 Seeking ‘a connection which might begin a process of explanation and allay 
his fear’, Stephen attempts ‘to connect the place and its day with a memory, a dream, 
a film’721. Stephen feels that a ‘sudden movement could dispel this delicate 
reconstruction of another time […] If he shook his head heard, he would be back 
among the orderly pines.’722 Stephen ‘sees’ something that he knows not to be there, 
becoming ‘a dreamer who knows his dream for what it is and, though fearful, lets it 
unfold out of curiosity’723. This mode of perception does represent a mirroring of 
environment in consciousness, in the sense that it corresponds to the ‘tumbling 
chaos’724 around him. Watching a couple through a window in the building, he is 
‘immobile with the tension of inarticulated recognition’725. This tension can be read 
as a delaying of the shift identified by James from perception to description. When 
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this shift occurs, description’s basis within perception leads to a counter-intuitive 
moment of recognition: ‘There was no response from the young woman who he knew, 
beyond question, was his mother’726. 
The sequence ends in the same way as the opening chapter. Firstly, by 
emphasising the subjective nature of memory: ‘Perhaps he was crying as he backed 
away from the window, perhaps he was wailing like a baby waking in the night; to an 
observer he may have appeared silent and resigned. […] He did not see himself walk 
back along the road.’727 As in the earlier sequence, Stephen defines objective 
knowledge in terms of ‘seeing’. In contrast to the earlier sequence, gaps in memory 
and perception do not suggest failure but different possibilities. Secondly, the 
sequence also becomes fantasy: ‘He fell back down, dropped helplessly through a void 
[…] hurled through dank muscular sluices. His eyes grew large and round and lidless 
with desperate, protesting innocence.’728 While his perception of the environment 
seems to emerge from the same interplay of vision and narration as his memories in 
the earlier chapter, the narrative has clearly been altered by a sustained delaying of 
articulation, building to an image of rebirth. This is not to say that the interpretation at 
which Stephen arrives at is fully reflective of experience beyond language. The shift 
to the description of the woman as his mother is all the more obvious for its 
strangeness, and the scene repeatedly signals that Stephen’s experience is determined 
by his own understanding, and that the narration of the scene may take place after a 
conversation with his mother later on, in which she recalls a similar experience. 
 Damasio argues that in human societies there are ‘social conventions and 
ethical rules over and above those that biology already provides. These additional 
layers of control shape instinctual behaviour so that it can be adapted flexibly to a 
complex and rapidly changing environment.’729 As he acknowledges, this point was 
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made by Freud in Civilization and its Discontents in his description of the ‘creation of 
a superego which would accommodate instincts to social dictates’730. Human nature 
and culture interact within consciousness. Both are extended. Their oscillation 
produces strange results: counter-intuitive interpretations of conscious experience, 
fantasies prompted by those interpretations, further interpretations of those fantasies.  
 
The Sheer Insistence of Machinery 
In contrast to McEwan, McCarthy pointedly rejects any division between nature and 
culture. Instead, he draws on Freud’s influence to characterise natural and cultural 
processes as machinic. Both are conceptualised according to the figure of the 
prosthetic. What Serge sees and how he interprets it are both determined by the actions 
of various prostheses.  
 From its first page, C depicts nature and technology as fundamentally the same. 
The first paragraph describes trees which ‘rise straight and inert as columns’ and birds 
which ‘whirr silently beneath a concave vault of sky’731. On the next few pages, the 
novel depicts the ‘buzzing’ of a telegraph and of beehives, and mingles ‘copper wire’ 
with vines732. The sequence in which Serge’s mind integrates with a projector, which 
I discussed in the metaphors chapter, complements this dynamic.  Nature, technology, 
the human body, and the mind are all continuous. 
 In an article on the work of David Lynch published before C in 2010, 
McCarthy describes ‘a whole prosthetic order, a world of which prosthesis is not just 
a feature, but a fundamental term, an ontological condition’733. His use of the term 
‘prosthetic’ here derives directly from Civilization and its Discontents734. He points 
out that prosthesis can also be understood as ‘a form of puppetry’, an interpretation 
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which Lynch dramatises through his depiction of ‘networks of control’735. Serge’s 
work in Egypt for the Ministry of Communications draws on these ideas while 
questioning their premise. The way in which Macauley, Serge’s superior, describes 
his work recalls McCarthy’s reading of Lynch’s films: 
With the other parties all spying on us, if we appear to take something 
seriously, well, they take it seriously too. We call it ‘feedback’ – no, hang on 
a second … ‘bleedback’: that’s it. Lots of those sequences you saw being 
written out across the blackboards in the other room get bled back too, mutated 
but still recognizable, in telegrams, transmissions, new acrostics … Make sure 
they’re as confused as we are, eh? Plus, who knows? We might actually hit 
some nerve, activate something…736 
Macauley aims at replicating one of Lynch’s ‘problems’ films, which, ‘lacking a stable 
reality field, are fraught with ontological discrepancies’, as does his near-namesake 
author737. This characterisation of his work also acts as an admission that no-one is in 
control of this situation; all that the ostensible puppet-masters can do is hope that they 
might hit a nerve. In a series of hallucinations, Serge locates the source of control 
elsewhere. At his radio, he has ‘vague impressions of bodies hovering just beyond the 
threshold of the visible, and corresponding signals not quite separable from the noise 
around them – important ones, their recalcitrance all the more frustrating for that 
reason. He sees these things’.738 Later, he ‘closes his eyes for a moment, and sees, 
behind the static, an operator: a female one, sitting at some kind of switchboard shaped 
like an outlandish loom’739. This ties the novel back to Freud’s work in hinting at a 
reading wherein Serge’s psychology is determined by his unconscious relation to his 
dead sister, Sophie, transmitting messages from beyond the grave. McCarthy 
implicitly critiques this reading. What Serge ‘sees’ is determined by his integration 
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within extended technological networks. This includes his unconscious relation to 
Sophie. Freud’s analysis of the Wolf-Man can be read on those terms as well. We 
come up against the limitations of the interpretative mode here in tracing the 
implications of Freud’s work, and his reflections on the prosthetic in particular.  
 A later section develops this point. Sitting an exam, Serge reads a question on 
railway tracks. He angles his arms on his desk, running an imaginary train across it 
before ‘[d]ismantling train and track to hold his paper down’740. He sets up the ‘track’ 
again to answer the second part of the question but is unable to prevent an imagined 
derailment, the catastrophe ‘hatched within the network, from among its nodes and 
relays, in its miles and miles of track, splitting and expanding as they run on beyond 
the scope of any one controlling vision’741. The exam hall fades ‘for a while, and Serge 
finds himself carried on the buffer of his mind into a storm of steel rods, axels, 
crankshafts and combustion chambers, all impacting […] the sheer insistence of 
machinery breaking its bonds as it comes into its own…’742 As in the RX-sequence, 
McCarthy emphasises the overall structure at work through self-parody. When Serge 
engages with technology in any way, the effect is always of an integration of his body 
and mind with machinery, leading to mental images expressing his place within 
complex networks, eventually interpreted as a transmission whose message is death. 
Here, the technology is both the imagined train and the exam papers. Those taking the 
exams are described at the start as turning the pages of the paper like ‘so many 
extensions of spring, fuse and escapement’743. The sequence as a whole depicts what 
should be the most straightforward instance of cognition in the novel. Serge reads an 
exam paper and solves several problems. This act of cognition, however, takes place 
within a broader structure recurring throughout: Serge’s broader integration within 
technological networks determines what he thinks, expressed through visual images.  
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These images exert their own effect on his mind. This is similar to Remainder’s 
narrator’s visualisations. Where in Remainder the images supported the narrator’s 
project, in C these images are interpreted as transmissions from a space beyond the 
material, forming the basis of a spatial structure determined by the conduit metaphor.  
 This dynamic raises the question of the relation of consciousness to cognition. 
What Serge imagines here is a product of the mode of extended cognition he employs 
in trying to solve the exam problem, combined with his characteristic interpretative 
mode, but it ends up literally derailing this train of thought. This can be understood 
through reference to Lacan. Theo Tait points out that Tom McCarthy studied English 
at Oxford in the late 80’s, a time at which ‘works of French post-structuralists such as 
Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault and Jacques Lacan filtered into the humanities 
departments of British universities, with often alarming results’744. The Seminar of 
Jacques Lacan Book II: The Ego in Freud’s Theory and in the Technique of 
Psychoanalysis 1954-1995, which applies cybernetic concepts to Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle, first appeared in English translation in 1988. McCarthy’s references to 
Lacan suggest a certain familiarity with this particular text; the renewed engagement 
with psychoanalysis and media theory in the lead up to the writing of C and Satin 
Island may have prompted a re-reading. In conversation with the artist Margarita 
Gluzberg in 2012, McCarthy describes Lacanian psychoanalysis as ‘all about circuits 
and loops’745. Lacan’s model of perception in The Ego in Freud’s Theory fits 
McCarthy’s depiction of consciousness in C. 
Lacan describes ‘pure perception’, without ego, through a ‘myth of 
consciousness’ defining it as ‘the reflection of the mountain in a lake’746. The subject 
‘would be strictly identical to this perception if there weren’t this ego which, if one 
may put it, makes it emerge from out of its very perception in a relationship of 
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tension’747. The phrasing here expresses the model of causality at work: the ego and 
the image are each determined by the other. Pure perception of this kind is ‘essentially 
a phenomenon of consciousness, which won’t have been perceived by any ego, which 
won’t have been reflected upon in an ego-like experience’748. Lacan’s ‘materialist’ 
definition of consciousness is of something occurring each time ‘there’s surface such 
that it can produce what is called an image […] the effects of energy starting from a 
given point of the real’749. This ‘image’, within the context of the ‘intersubjective 
relation’, is the grounds for an assumed unity of the subject’s disparate sensations, that 
is, the ego. The ego is what separates the human from the ‘animal machine’, ‘strictly 
riveted to the conditions of the external environment’750. The human ‘has a special 
relation with his own image – a relation of gap, of alienating tension. This is where 
the possibility of the order of presence and absence, that is of the symbolic order, 
comes in’751. The human being is, in Lacan’s work, both a ‘writing machine’ and a 
camera. Extended cognition produces an image, which forms the basis of the subject’s 
assumed unity. This assumed unity then acts on the extended cognition. This explains 
how the images that Serge ‘sees’ play a role in his relation to his environment.  
 Another sequence relates this point directly to Freud’s ‘prosthetic god’.  As 
Serge flies for the first time, the landscape below him ‘flattens, voids itself of depth’752. 
Features of the landscape ‘turn into marks across a map’, becoming ‘artificial and 
provisional’, re-aligning themselves ‘like parts of a machine […] cogs and arms 
swivelling around an axis at whose centre Serge’s own head sits’753. Everything 
around him becomes ‘static’ as though ‘no independent movement were permitted of 
the landscape anymore: all displacement and acceleration must proceed from the 
machine’754. The sequence follows the same pattern as the other moments of 
integration. The landscape ‘prints itself across Serge’s mind’755. As it develops, the 
172 
 
   
 
sequence introduces the same blurring of distinct senses. Serge ‘gets into the habit of 
firing in certain rhythms, ones that carry with them first words, then whole phrases 
[…] words fly from his gun’756. In translating sensation into words, the sequence 
allows for intertextual reference; one such rhythm reminds Serge of ‘a line that’s 
struck in his head’ from childhood757. The machinery is anthropomorphised. A plane 
drags for a while ‘as though still connected psychologically if not physically to the 
ground’758. When his plane briefly flies alongside a shell, the latter ‘seems so placid, 
so companiable’ that ‘it and they are both just bodies in space, harmless blocks of 
matter […] it seems to Serge that the shell and the plane are interchangeable – and that 
the shell and he are interchangeable’759. This reversal accompanies a sense of 
everything being connected: ‘disparate locations twitch and burst into activity like 
limbs reacting to impulses sent from elsewhere in the body, booms and jibs obeying 
levers at the far end of a complex set of ropes and cogs and relays’760. The sense of 
total connection established through these techniques builds towards a level of 
abstraction that provides its own detached perspective: ‘Within the reaches of this 
space become pure geometry, the shell’s a pencil drawing a perfect arc across a sheet 
of graph paper; he’s the clamp that holds the pencil to the compass, moving as one 
with the lead; he is the lead’761. This perspective is ‘godlike’; Serge feels ‘elevated by 
machinery and signal code to a higher post within the overall structure of things, a 
vantage point from which the vectors and control lines linking earth and heaven, the 
hermetic language of its invocation, its very letterings and script, have become visible, 
tangible even’762. The sense of being at the centre of the world positions Serge as ‘the 
gate, bulb, aperture and general projection point that’s brought it about’763. Serge’s 
sense of god-like agency here is a function of his becoming a camera, and of the world 
around him abstracting into text. What he sees is determined by technology in the 
173 
 
   
 
sense that he is in a plane. Through describing the landscape in terms of a text, 
McCarthy links this technological perspective with that of language. What Serge sees 
is further determined by his status as a writing machine. While flying, he is completely 
integrated with technology. The altered form of perception this leads to however 
provides the basis for a sense of detachment, and an illusory feeling of power and 
omniscience. 
In defining all aspects of the individual’s relation to the world, whether visual 
or linguistic, as functions of machinic prostheses, McCarthy arrives at a model similar 
to that used by McEwan. Both vision and interpretation are extended. They also 
constitute each other. McCarthy uses the distinction between vision and interpretation 
to emphasise the role of multiple prostheses in constituting both aspects of this 
relation.  The image is a condensation of various extended processes rather than a 
discrete representation of objects in the world. As an image, however, it forms the 
basis of the ego.  To put it in my terms, as a discrete object, the image serves as a 
reference point for the spatial structures of the mind, whether computational or 
grounded in the conduit metaphor. These structures partly determine the image, but 
they are also altered by that image. The individual agency of the ego, as opposed to 
the animal machine, is grounded in a feedback loop.  
McCarthy’s collaborator Critchley defines trauma as ‘something that comes 
from outside the self, the irruption of a heteronomous fact’764.  He goes on to describe 
Lacan’s thesis that ethics ‘is articulated in relation to the order of the real’, that ‘the 
moral law […] insofar as it is structured by the symbolic, is that through which the 
real is actualized’765. The real is embodied in the Thing, ‘the excluded interior to my 
interiority is exterior to me’766. As I discussed in the last chapter, in Remainder 
McCarthy depicts nouns and visual impressions as Things in this sense: discrete 
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objects formed through the actions of extended processes. In C, the visual impression, 
or transmission is formed in the same way and provides the basis of the ego as a 
defined structure. 
 
Truth That is Not Otherwise Available 
While McEwan establishes a dichotomy of nature and culture, he does not privilege 
one over the other. Stephen’s recovery from trauma relies not only on responding to 
the multiplicity of the natural, as conveyed through vision, but on identifying and 
accepting a corresponding multiplicity within interpretation and culture. This 
adaptation of a Freudian process of mourning draws on McEwan’s reading of Bohm, 
who, like McCarthy, argues that all aspects of thought derive from the same material 
basis. 
Through a sustained engagement with the visual aspects of his experience, 
Stephen arrives at a new interpretation, that he has somehow witnessed a conversation 
between his two parents prior to his own birth, and affected the outcome by his 
presence. Emily Horton’s reading of the novel situates this interpretation within the 
novel’s references to quantum physics767. Drawing on other readings of the novel 
defining Stephen’s engagement with quantum physics as delusion768, she notes that 
the sequence in which Stephen mistakes another girl for Kate suggests a ‘fantastic 
displacement’, invoking a Freudian ‘critical reading of science as a psychological 
response to traumatic experience’769. Countering this reading, Horton argues that 
Stephen’s ‘unexpected encounters with a subjective time-world challenge his initially 
traumatised conception, replacing this with a more conciliatory model of physical 
wholeness’, situating science as ‘a vehicle for psychological rehabilitation, expanding 
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Stephen’s repressed emotional vision.’770 The influence of Bohm’s work on McEwan 
is felt in his use of visual impressions. Stephen reflects that ‘he never really thought 
about his situation at all, for thought implied active and controlled; instead images and 
arguments paraded in front of him, a mocking, malicious, paranoid, contradictory, 
self-pitying crowd.’771 The passage reflects the influence of Bohm, whose Wholeness 
and the Implicate Order (1980) McEwan mentions being ‘indebted’ to772 in the 
acknowledgements, and who Thelma mentions as one of her colleagues773. Bohm 
introduces the book with a discussion of thought:  
Whenever one thinks of anything, it seems to be apprehended either as static, 
or as a series of static images. Yet, in the actual experience of movement, one 
senses an unbroken, undivided process of flow, to which the series of static 
images in thought is related as a series of ‘still’ photographs might be related 
to the actuality of a speeding car.774  
The individual’s perception of reality in the form of a series of static images is related 
to ‘the notion that the one who thinks (the Ego) is at least in principle completely 
separate from and independent of the reality that he thinks about’, which is ‘firmly 
embedded in our entire tradition’775, along with ‘a function of thought tending to 
divide things into separate entities, such entities being conceived of as essentially fixed 
and static in their natures’776. From an entirely different perspective, Bohm formulates 
a model close to that of Lacan, according to which the fixity and separation from the 
material of the ego determines the use of discrete image in perception. The grounding 
of Bohm’s model in the discoveries of quantum physics introduces a similar level of 
complexity to the model of causality at work: both the ego and the image are aspects 
of an indissoluble whole, effectively creating each as discrete entitities. 
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In the introduction to ‘or Shall We Die?’ McEwan characterises the Newtonian 
world-view and that of the new physics as ‘representing a male and female 
principle’777, an argument echoed by Thelma in The Child in Time when discussing 
Stephen’s vision778. Stephen himself phrases the distinction between masculine and 
feminine in terms relevant to McEwan’s use of language and visual impression. 
Remembering a conversation with Thelma, he reflects that while men ‘froze into 
place, they tended to believe that they were somehow at one with their fates’, that they 
‘were who they thought they were’, women ‘upheld some other principle of selfhood 
in which being surpassed doing’, and could not ‘believe that you were entirely the 
thing you did’779. The distinction is embodied by Stephen’s parents, Douglas and 
Claire.  A conversation with his father is preceded by a description of ‘the orderliness 
of cleaned, sharpened garden tools stowed in their proper place […] details which had 
oppressed him as an adolescent now cleared the mind and left it uncluttered for more 
essential things’780. This description of the mind recalls both the ‘single-minded’ 
countryside, altered by technology, and Stephen’s obsessive, traumatised 
consciousness during the first daydreaming sequence, searching for relevant details. 
Again, there is an irony to those details: ‘The mind was freed to talk about the 
weather’781. Stephen has come to discuss his vision, but his father will not allow him 
to pursue the subject. Later on, his mother addresses this when the two meet alone: 
‘Your father has his own reasons for wanting to forget about those.[…] It’s the Air 
Force training. If it’s untidy or it doesn’t fit, throw it out.’782 Though he meets with 
his mother in the same ordered space, there is an allusion to his vision, as his mother 
apologises ‘for the chaos there visible only to herself.’783 Claire describes seeing a 
child while arguing with Douglas. At this point, both have decided to abort Stephen, 
without having put it into words. The vision changes her mind:   
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Thinking about it over the years, I realise it was probably the landlord’s body, 
or some kid off one of the local farms. But as far as I was concerned then, I 
was convinced, I just knew that I was looking at my own child” […] How 
extraordinary that she could think of destroying this child simply because she 
felt piqued by her fiancé. The baby, her baby, was suddenly flesh […] it was 
not an abstraction, not a bargaining point.784  
It is this realisation, rather than rational argument, that allows her to resolve the 
conflict with her husband, in considering the roots of his ‘devious speech’: ‘It was not 
duplicity or cowardice she was witnessing here. This was a man summoning all his 
manly powers of reason and logic, all his considerable knowledge of current affairs 
because he was in a deep panic.’785 The shift from her subjective account of the vision 
in dialogue to the its interpretation in third-person narration seen above corresponds 
to the shifts from mimesis to diegesis seen throughout the novel, as well as 
accompanying Claire’s articulation of her feelings in her conversation with Douglas. 
It also reflects the implications of this conversation for Stephen, who is able to 
interpret his own subjective vision through his engagement with Claire’s. 
 Lynn Wells’s reading of the scene situates it within Stephen’s ongoing 
engagement with the points of view of others, arguing that the ‘shift in focalization 
throughout [Claire’s] narrative away from Stephen’s perspective for the first and only 
time in the text underscores the increasing importance of imagining different points of 
view’786. Wells points out that despite the ‘coincidence between the two stories’, the 
‘two versions are not identical’ - as Claire suggests787 - noting that the ‘partiality of 
her vision in this scene’788 is signalled by Claire’s loss of sight due to illness789. Serpell 
and Laura Marcus’s readings of the first section of Atonement (2001) shows how the 
aligning of perceptual restrictions and the shaping of thought by language has persisted 
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in McEwan’s later fiction790. As James points out, the depiction of a speeding car in 
The Child in Time, leading up to a crash, similarly emphasises ‘perceptual restrictions, 
conveying spectacular events by accreting successive details’ rather than narrative 
intervention791. In its depiction of a speeding car in this way, the scene links McEwan’s 
use of such restriction to Bohm’s model of visual impressions and the ego, as well as 
presaging the cinematic perspective described by Pleske. Wells goes on to establish 
how Stephen’s ‘growing ability to recognize others as individuals beyond the scope 
of his desire is also couched in visual terms’792. Claire’s visual impression here is 
central in allowing her to alter the conversation between her and her husband, as well 
as altering gender roles, and in understanding how her husband’s subjective 
experience determines his speech. It expresses what cannot be acknowledged by the 
terms of the preceding conversation in the form of a discrete image. It clearly emerges 
from this conversation, in embodying what it cannot acknowledge, but in this 
embodiment alters the terms of the conversation. Similarly, Stephen’s vision of his 
mother occupies a similar role within his self-narrative, embodying the trauma of his 
recent experience as well as allowing for the possibility of change. Claire’s vision 
allows her to recognise that Douglas’s own experience does not correspond to what he 
is saying, allowing her to alter the conversation, and reconcile their points of view. 
Stephen’s acceptance of his mother’s subjective vision allows for a narrative structure 
appropriate to both, modelled on Bohm’s ideas about time. Whether or not this 
narrative corresponds to reality – that is, whether or not Stephen has somehow 
travelled back in time to prevent his own abortion – is beside the point. In its 
reconciliation of two intensely personal experiences, it allows for a more positive 
narrative, leading towards Stephen’s eventual reconciliation with his wife.  
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 Bohm defines thought as ‘the active response of memory in every phase of life 
[…] to each actual situation, which response in turn leads to a further contribution to 
memory, thus conditioning the next thought’793. There is ‘in this mechanical process 
no inherent reason why the thoughts that arise should be relevant or fitting to the actual 
situation that evokes them’794 The perception of ‘whether or not any particular 
thoughts are relevant or fitting requires the operation of an energy that is not 
mechanical, an energy that we shall call intelligence’795. This consists of ‘perception 
through the mind of abstract orders and relationships such as identity and difference, 
separation and connection, necessity and contingency, cause and effect, etc.’796 
Thoughts are presented to the conscious subject in the form of visual images, static 
representations of the flow of thought. The subject must then structure these images, 
or identify the correct structure to apply to them. Bohm directly challenges the 
Freudian model of an ego characterised by fixed structures of response to experience. 
This critique can be extended to the computational model. However, the process that 
Bohm calls intelligence can also be understood as mechanical. McCarthy and McEwan 
both characterise structures of interpretation as adapted from a broader cultural space, 
rather than as arising spontaneously within the individual mind. Serge adopts a 
variation of the conduit metaphor to structure his experiences, leading him to believe 
that he is receiving transmissions from the dead. Stephen, on the other hand, develops 
a structure in collaboration with his mother, based on a recognition of the subjectivity 
of their visual images. In mediating between two extended processes, individual 
consciousness is able to exert a shaping effect on those processes. The way in which 
Serge’s consciousness does so acts as a cautionary example, entrenching a mistaken 
structure of interpretation. This structure feeds into an obsession with his dead sister. 
Because he mistakes the conduit metaphor for reality, Serge interprets what his 
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experience as a transmission. Stephen, on the other hand, is able to mourn by 
recognising their extended nature of his thought.
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Chapter Four - Other Selves: Intentionality in The Book of Dave and The 
Accidental 
Then he could hear It – the still, small, powdery voice of SmithKline 
Beecham… There is no god but you Dave, It whispered, and you can be your 
own prophet […] Peepul, they gotta be kept in line … there hasta be orforitë 
… It stands to reason, dunnit … There hasta be a Book of Rules … A set of 
instructions you can follow to the letter … Like the Knowledge … 
- Will Self, The Book of Dave (2006) 
Is that it? Amber said. Is that the highpoint, the true-blue, the secret can’t be 
told everything-must-go ultimate all-singing all-dancing story-of-you? […] 
Jesus fucking wept, all these endless endless fucking endless selfish fucking 
histories, she was saying. 
- Ali Smith, The Accidental (2005) 
 
In the last chapter, I showed that two contemporary writers have built on Freud’s 
distinction between consciousness and unconsciousness, developing it into a loose 
framework for distinguishing between aspects of consciousness. Consciousness is 
aligned with interpretation and language, while the unconscious is aligned with visual 
aspects of experience. Both aspects partially determine the other, and both are  
integrated with prosthetics that extend beyond the individual body. What the 
individual sees is determined by the actions of various extended material processes.  
 In the introduction I noted a link between Dennett and Freud: the ‘intentional 
object’. This is the object as it exists in the mind, distinct from but partially determined 
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by the actual object. If, as both Dennett and Freud argue, the intentional object emerges 
from the interactions of the actual object and a manifold of beliefs, it follows that the 
actual object can alter the mind through its effect on those beliefs, which relate not 
only to the intentional object in question but to various other objects. There are 
potentially as many prosthetics determining individual consciousness as there are 
objects in the world available to perception. The same applies to language. The 
individual’s interpretation of their experience breaks down into individual words and 
phrases, and their combinations, each of which can be applied to various objects. 
Dennett calls these intentional states. As one of several theoretical supports for his 
adaptation of theory of mind, the intentional stance, memes form the basis of his 
validation of folk psychology. However, taken on their own terms, they can also be 
used to argue against it.  
Susan Blackmore reads Dennett as arguing that ‘[i]n our normal state of 
consciousness the whole experience is dominated by the selfplex which uses words 
and other useful memetic constructs to weave a very fine tale’, setting ‘everything in 
the context of a self who is doing things.’797 She diverges from Dennett in her claim 
that when, for example ‘gazing in awe at the view from a mountain top, or engrossed 
in a creative task, the selfplex does not dominate and other states of consciousness are 
possible. Then there can be consciousness without self-consciousness.’798 In this 
chapter, I argue that a formal technique employed by Smith and Self – the use of 
italicised phrases set within ordinary text to represent discrete words or phrases within 
consciousness – can be read as following on from the broad cultural influence of 
Dennett’s formulation of memes, and therefore as a representation of memes within 
the novel. Both writers use this technique, along with a close attention to the 
subjectivity of visual perception, to depict intentional objects determined by these 
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memes, but also to depict the action of actual objects on the selfplex. Both depict the 
narrative self as a locus of external control, hinting at other possible forms of 
subjectivity through the representation of other forms of consciousness. I begin by 
looking at the use of italics by both writers to depict memes. I then show how both 
writers use a different instance of mistaken interpretation to question the distinction 
between the inside and outside, and the subject and object, and a linear model of 
causality. Finally, I show how both have developed a critique of narrativity in their 
short stories, which they build on to situate their depiction of memes in opposition to 
the intentional stance.  
 
I’ve Said My Piece 
Dennett claims that one ‘can discover multiple selves in a person’ when the most 
appropriate story to be told about them ‘doesn’t cohere around one self, one imaginary 
point, but coheres (and coheres much better, in any case) around two different 
imaginary points’799. He reiterates that we ‘sometimes encounter psychological 
disorders, or surgically created disunities, where the only way to interpret them or 
make sense of them is to posit in effect two centers of gravity, two selves’800. This is 
the case in The Book of Dave. Discussing the breakdown which has caused Dave to 
write the titular ‘revelatory text’, his doctors make a distinction between Dave ‘the 
patient’ and Dave ‘the god’, the latter of whom has ‘revealed this text’ to the former801. 
This distinction is represented formally through an adaptation of indirect free style, 
incorporating third-person and italicised first-person prose, established from the start 
of the first chapter: 
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Hunched low over the wheel, foglamps piercing the miasma, Dave Rudman 
powered his cab through the chicane at the bottom of Park Lane. The cabbie’s 
furious thoughts shot through the wind-screen and ricocheted off the unfeeling 
world. Achilles was up on his plinth with his tiny bronze cock, his black shield 
fending off the hair-styling wand of the Hilton, where all my heartaches began. 
Solid clouds hung overhead lunging up fresh blood.802 
The italicised portions of the text are marked as Dave’s subjective perception of what 
he sees, his ‘furious thoughts’. Self introduces this split between third-person narration 
and italicised first-person in The Book of Dave, and has made use of it throughout his 
fiction since. In his copy editing rules for Umbrella Self formalises the technique, 
marking italics as used for ‘“ejaculatory” thought – that is, thought that seems to pop 
out from the ordinary, either because of its figurative qualities, or because of its 
heightened emotional qualities, or both’803. The Book of Dave reveals the subjective 
perspective represented in italics to be an expression of psychosis. These thoughts 
establish themselves first as tied to the perspective of a stereotypically misanthropic 
and prejudiced cabbie casting his eye on ‘Tatty coaches full of carrot-crunchers up for 
the Xmas wallet-fuck […] boogaloo bruvvers in Seven Series BMWs, throw-cushion 
specialists in skateboard-sized Smart cars, Conan-the-fucking Barbarian motorcycle 
couriers’ and so on804. Self has described the mixed text in this novel as representing 
a deliberate mixing of neutral and demotic registers, used to express a contemporary 
loosening of class divisions805. The lower-middle-class Dave, son of a teacher and a 
small business owner, has become a cab-driver and adopted a working-class accent 
and lifestyle. The split between third-person and first-person narration can be read in 
terms of a split between aspects of Dave himself, rather than between character and 
narrator. This is emphasised as the italicised thoughts move on from such prejudiced 
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observations to a related stream of self-justification and self-aggrandisement. This 
builds to a veiled reference to the titular book: ‘I’ve done it now, I’ve said my piece, 
an’ I’ll tell you what the real knowledge is fer nuffing!’806 The text then shifts back to 
the third-person narration, as Dave distances himself from the author of the book 
through a passage which dwells on what he ‘sees’:  
In a rare moment of clarity – an oblique glance through the quarterlight of his 
mind – Dave Rudman remembered the long shifts in his Gospel Oak flat. The 
tapping and the transcribing, the laying down of His Law. Then his eyes 
tracked back to the misty windscreen, and the figure hunched over the 
keyboard hadn’t been him at all – only some other monk or monkey.807 
Dave dissociates himself from the italicised voice. The chapter begins by implying 
that this split in the text represents Dave’s perspective within an objective third-person 
mode, then situates this split within Dave’s consciousness, and, finally, posits two 
separate selves. Dave’s last fare, Jane Bernal, a psychiatric consultant, confirms 
Dave’s pathology, as the text shifts to her perspective to reveal that Dave’s italicised 
ramblings are being muttered out loud to himself808. In shifting to her perspective, 
however, the text maintains a split between italicised first-person and free indirect 
style third-person.  
 The technique Self introduces here employs first-person narration as an 
embodiment of another self, an alien presence within the psyche. Dave as subject, 
speaking through the italicised voice, is contrasted with Dave as object, depicted in 
third-person narration. Self’s interest in this contrast goes back to his first novella, 
Cock and Bull (1992). M. Hunter Hayes notes that ‘Cock’, the first of its sections, 
‘contains a double-tier perspective in which the supposed third-person narrative that 
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forms the majority of the novella appears in roman type and the first-person narrative 
by an unnamed male speaker appears in italics’809. It transpires by the end that the 
italicised narrator is the protagonist of the third-person narrative, having shifted from 
woman to man: ‘She/he appears dissociated from his/her previous identity as Carol, 
justifying the use of a third-person masculine point of view and its covertly biased 
perspective’810.  This idea is developed in My Idea of Fun (1993). The novel is split 
into two sections, ‘The First Person’ and ‘The Third Person’, each narrated 
accordingly, separated by a short intermission. Over the course of this intermission, 
the protagonist Ian Wharton’s monologue is gradually taken over by another self. The 
shift is represented as a loss of innocence, or its recognition: ‘I’ve gone looking for 
the child inside myself […] I’ve pursued him down the disappearing paths of my own 
psyche […] I’m looking deep into my own eyes. Ian, is that you, my significant other? 
I can see you now for what you are, Ian Wharton.’811 The intermission ends with the 
narrative voice disassociating itself from Ian as object: ‘And now, Ian Wharton, now 
that you are no longer the subject of this cautionary tale, merely itself, now that you 
are just another unproductive atom staring out from the windows of a branded object, 
now that I’ve got you where I want you.’812 Like Smith, Self argues that adult 
consciousness is inherently narrational.  
The epilogue to Dorian: An Imitation (2002) can be read as a bridge between 
My Idea of Fun and The Book of Dave. It reveals the preceding novella to have been 
authored by one of its characters, Henry Wotton, shifting focus to a version of Dorian 
distinct from that depicted by Wotton. As Dorian reflects on what he sees as Wotton’s 
distorted and self-serving interpretation of events, another voice starts to emerge 
within his own consciousness. As the narrative voice closes in on Dorian, he begins to 
articulate a measured sympathy for Wotton and his work: ‘Dorian ambled along the 
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pavement deep in thought […] Certainly, despite his poetic licence Henry had 
displayed a powerful turn of phrase in his writing. It would be amusing to show Fergus 
Rokeby his portrayal’813. There is then a shift back to a more removed mode, and a 
shift back to Dorian’s initial response: ‘No – Dorian pulled himself up – on second 
thoughts, he wouldn’t be showing the Ferret or anyone else this travesty’814. At a 
planning dinner for an exhibition, Wotton’s influence makes itself felt as an ‘internal 
voice […] so close to [Dorian’s] inner ear he felt the breath tickling him from within’, 
sneering in the first-person815. The ‘Voice’, as it is then marked, distorts Dorian’s 
perspective: ‘everyone around the table began to look different, and all they were 
saying to sound different’816. Dorian and the Voice begin to talk to each other, the 
former recognising the latter as ‘Henry’s narrative voice in that stupid book of his’817. 
The enduring presence of the typescript, which Dorian decides to destroy before 
changing his mind, influenced by the Voice818, allows Wotton to take over the first-
person depiction of Dorian’s consciousness, altering his perception and shifting the 
third-person narration back to Wotton’s interpretation.  
 In an essay on Oscar Wilde, published in 1998, Self asks if it is ‘fanciful to 
observe of’ the author, ‘whose epigrams, tropes, witticisms and apophthegms are still 
retold every minute throughout the great metropolis, that in a way we do hallucinate 
him, imagine his orotund tones in our mind’s ear?’819 This seems to be what happens 
to Self’s version of Wilde’s character. This line of thought is drawn from Julian 
Jaynes’s The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind 
(1976). Self compares his idea to Jaynes’s suggestion that the Natufian people heard 
the voice of their dead king as vocal commands within consciousness820. In expanding 
and developing the technique employed in the epilogue to Dorian, The Book of Dave 
also implicitly refers to Jaynes’s overall argument that full self-consciousness was 
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preceded by periods in which people interpreted internal voices as commands from 
their gods. In the passage Self describes, Jaynes depicts these hallucinated commands 
in terms of a feedback loop between language and an individual’s relation to their 
society. The Natufians were not conscious, in the sense that they were instead ‘signal-
bound, that is, responding each minute to cues in a stimulus-response manner, and 
controlled by those cues’821. The auditory hallucinations Jaynes describes ‘may have 
evolved as a side effect of language and operated to keep individuals persisting at the 
longer tasks of tribal life. Such hallucinations began in the individual’s hearing a 
command from himself or from his chief.’822 These commands, once implanted within 
the psyche, ‘could with time improvise and ‘say’ things that the king himself had never 
said’ as responses to social cues823. The Voice in The Book of Dave can also be 
understood in this way. The Voice originates in Dave’s identification with his 
professional role, and with his learning of the Knowledge. The runs and points of the 
Knowledge appear in italics as Dave’s response to his place within the environment: 
Bear left Meadway Crescent. Bear left Meadway. Right Hampstead 
Way … Driving by the Heath extension, looking over the mock 
meadows, Dave remembered childhood forays up there with his 
brother, Noel […] Right Wildwood Road. Left North End Way. Comply 
Jack Straws Castle … Comply … comply with your fucking restraining 
order, you dickhead! If you do it again and they catch you, you’ll be in 
a fucking sweat box! Dave’s headlights washed over a gaggle of seven-
year olds who were tumbling out of the new-old coaching inn.824 
The non-italicised third-person narration shows Dave thinking of children, prompted 
by his surroundings, a line of thought which might lead him back to thinking of his 
son. The Voice, in italics, imposes its own mapping of these surroundings – the 
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Knowledge, which Dave has memorised – before shifting to a vocalisation of a more 
generalised authority. In writing the book, the Voice assumes an agency beyond its 
origins in seeking to apply the reductive dynamic of the Knowledge to all of 
experience and all social relations. 
 
Do You Believe Me? 
The first chapter of The Accidental focused on Eve uses a similar technique. Eve asks 
herself questions, in italics, followed by answers. The form is based on the 
‘autobiotruficinterview’ books that Eve writes825. The chapter follows the same 
pattern as the chapter from The Book of Dave discussed above, widening the gap 
between two aspects of Eve’s mind before hinting at the extended basis of the italicised 
voice. The chapter opens by considering the concept of the beginning; Eve prefers ‘the 
edit, the end, where the work in the dark was over and you could cut and cut until you 
saw the true shape of things emerge.’826 The questions attempt to interpret Amber’s 
actions, which resist understanding: ‘Why had she shaken Eve like that? For no reason 
at all. For no reason Eve could think. Eve had absolutely no idea.’827 This 
indeterminacy introduces a split between the questioning and answering Eve. Eve 
assumes that Amber is one of her husband Michael’s students, leading to questions 
related to Michael’s affairs, which the answering Eve deflects, leading to a repetition 
of ‘Eve chose not to answer that question’828. The questioning voice responds by 
asserting a separate agency of its own, suggesting actions refused by the answers: 
‘Why didn’t Eve just go for a run […] Don’t be ridiculous. Eve never ‘went for a run’, 
anywhere, at any time […] Why didn’t she try it, go for a run, right now, in the dark, 
in the middle of nowhere, where no-one would have seen her?’829 Following more 
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refusals from the answering Eve, the questioning voice returns to the subject of Amber. 
The chapter ends with Eve going out to talk to her. In the last line of the chapter, 
Amber’s question to Eve is rendered in italics: ‘Well? she said. Do you believe me?’830 
Eve’s questioning voice incorporates the words of other people. 
 Stephen M. Levin characterises Smith’s fiction in terms of a ‘pervasive sense 
that our lives do not entirely belong to us. Subjects are lost in webs of intersubjectivity 
and caught in invisible links to an array of social determinants.’831 The questions Eve 
asks of herself about her experience are altered by Amber; in the last line, a question 
spoken by Amber is incorporated within Eve’s consciousness. If the edit, the 
questioning and interpretation of experience, defines the self and its truth, then this 
incorporation indicates that dialogue with others has the potential to alter the self. As 
with Self’s technique in The Book of Dave, Smith’s use of an italicised voice to 
represent one aspect of the subject builds on concerns established in her early work. 
‘Free Love’, the opening short story in Smith’s Free Love and Other Stories (1995), 
is structured around a series of moments in which two or more characters see 
something, before one of the characters articulates their own perspective, altering that 
of another832. By the end of the story, the narrator has achieved a degree of 
independence from the interpretations of others by acknowledging the relativity of 
perspective833. Interpretation alters consciousness. The narrator prefaces observations 
with ‘I think’ or ‘I thought’ throughout and describes having ‘a story ready in my head 
in case I wanted to get away’834 at one point. In Hotel World (2001), Smith develops 
a formal technique that shows how this dynamic functions through a split between 
subject and object within the conscious self. The first chapter, ‘Past’, is narrated in the 
first person by a ghost, represented as a disembodied consciousness. The narrator goes 
down into her grave to slip ‘our old shape’, but ‘she was broken and rotting, so I lay 
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half-in, half-out of her’835. The narrator questions her body, who agrees to provide a 
story ‘since you’re so desperate for one’836. The story concerns her attraction to 
another girl, told with the same emphasis on theory of mind and social pressures as in 
‘Free Love’837. Later on in the novel, the distinction between subject and object is 
rendered in a style similar to Eve’s first chapter in The Accidental. A later chapter, 
focused on Lise, is structured around her responses to the questions used on an 
‘Incapacity for Work’ form, in italics, beginning with ‘Tell us about yourself’838. 
Italics are also used for Lise’s mother’s poetry and questions from her doctor, forms 
of language used to define her internalised as voices within consciousness: ‘write 
down the things you can remember for me, the poet-mother was saying. Write down 
your symptoms, the lady doctor was saying. Fill me in, the government form in her 
hand demanded.’839 The consciousness of Penny, a journalist, is represented through 
a question and answer format at one point, as she refines her account of her experience 
to fit the format of her planned article, prompted by a questioning voice representing 
an imagined audience840.  
 Eve’s first chapter in The Accidental uses a distinction between an italicised 
questioning voice and an answering voice. While first depicted as representing two 
aspects of the conscious self, these voices are then revealed as representing an 
internalisation of external voices. The form developed is similar to the interrogative 
mode used in The Child in Time, influenced by Freud, and Dennett’s model of the 
conscious self as a result of the subject assuming the intentional stance in relation to 
their own experience. Smith’s style in The Accidental builds on her early interest in 
how verbal interpretations of visual experience can transfer from one person to 
another, altering the latter’s interpretation. As Dennett puts it as language users 
humans ‘can be plunked down at a desk and given lengthy questionnaires to answer’; 
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this ‘seriously distorts our profiles as intentional systems, by producing illusions of 
much more definition in our operative systems of mental representation than we 
actually have’841. ‘Word-presentations’, and the questions the subject asks themselves, 
are not bound to individual minds; they can transfer between different subjects.  
Consciousness emerges from the interrelation of language and the individual’s 
awareness of their relation to society within the mind. Self and Smith use italics to 
signal the incorporation of external words and phrases within the mind, and to show 
how this alters conscious experience as a whole. Self depicts the influence of language 
in terms of a controlling entity within the mind. Smith acknowledges this, but also 
shows how dialogue with others allows for the possibility of other selves emerging 
from the incorporation of alternative perspectives.  
 
No Plain Cloth Word-Map 
Bakhtin argues that language, ‘for the individual consciousness, lies on the borderline 
between oneself and the other. The word in language is half someone else’s.’842 It 
becomes ‘“one’s own” only when the speaker populates it with his own intention, his 
own accent, when he appropriates the word, adapting it to his own semantic and 
expressive intention.’843 Both Dave and Eve begin to do so, but in doing so repress its 
origins outside them, identifying with an agency which is still partly someone else’s. 
Understanding the self as localised within the individual brain or body, distinct from 
others, depends on the operation of a particular set of cultural memes. The Book of 
Dave and The Accidental explore this idea. Both build on the idea of particular words 
and phrases as markers of the influence of external forces or entities within 
consciousness by hinting at a form of extended mind. Furthermore, they question the 
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interpretation of the mind as localised within the body of the individual through a 
significant act of mistaken interpretation by their characters. 
 The blurring of the distinction between the mind, its environment and its 
prostheses complements the fact that, as Self references in the novel, learning the 
Knowledge has a physical effect on the brains of cab drivers, an enlargement of the 
hippocampus844. Self describes this research finding as the ‘phenomenal, astonishing 
thing’ that initially attracted him to the subject matter of the novel845. Hugo Spiers, 
who has run related experiments on spatial knowledge and the brain, points out that in 
the years since The Book of Dave was published ‘research has shown that it is not 
driving the streets of London per se, or the learning of large volumes of knowledge’ 
that lies behind this change, but that it ‘appears to be the acquisition and daily usage 
of the spatial knowledge’ that is responsible’846. As Spiers also points out, when Jane 
Bernal cites this research to support her interpretation that the book Dave talks about 
is ‘buried’ within his brain, she is wrong847. The book is in fact a physical one, literally 
buried in the garden of his wife’s house, as Dave eventually remembers848. Dave’s 
other doctors make the same mistake: Busner describes Dave as ‘someone who could 
do with a great deal more looking into himself’, while Bohm wants to ‘somehow dig 
[the book] up from’ his subconscious’849. All three characters draw on spatial 
metaphors for the mind. In telling them that he has buried the book, Dave is telling 
them the literal truth. His psychiatrists are misled by metaphor. While the discovery 
of the enlargement of cabbies’ hippocampi can be interpreted in terms of a 
contemporary tendency to understand cognition in terms of brain function, it can also 
be understood in terms of a feedback loop between the brain and the urban 
environment. The latter interpretation is supported by the further research cited by 
Spiers, which emphasises the role of an active and continuous engagement with the 
194 
 
   
 
environment in changing the brain. The psychologist Richard Bentall discusses these 
findings alongside other studies showing a reduction in the hippocampus in people 
who have experienced post-traumatic stress following war or sexual assault. As he 
points out, ‘these findings do not imply that post-traumatic stress can be adequately 
understood as a disorder in the brain’; rather, it is ‘better thought of as a psychological 
reaction to adverse events that manifests itself, at the biological level, as changes in 
brain structure’850. 
 One response to this, implicitly supported in the metaphors that run through 
the novel, is to treat the city as a form of extended mind, continuous with the brain, 
and with an equal role in the determination of consciousness. Technology also plays a 
role here. Self’s ‘Walking is Political’ (2012) opens with a ‘lightly poeticised account 
of the mental state of an average young woman negotiating her way through the urban 
environment’; Self claims that, ‘like a sufferer from psychosis, our young woman’s 
conception of reality radically diverges from her environment’ due to her dependence 
‘on systems external to her own mind that, for all their technical efficacy, are as opaque 
to her as the magical rituals of a shaman’851. Self refers here, consciously or not, to 
Jaynes’s characterisation of such rituals as exopsychic forms of thought, while 
characterising their effect on consciousness in terms of a pathological distortion of the 
individual’s relation to their environment. In a review of a book on GPS navigation by 
Greg Milner, published in 2016, Self claims that this technology ‘seems to leech us of 
all the “thick data” of being in place – our sensory apprehensions, including visual, 
sonic and haptic cues − even as it gifts us such phenomenally accurate directions’852. 
The combined effect of these aspects is to provide, in Milner’s terms, ‘the possibility 
of omniscience’; Self’s response is that no ‘wonder some of us develop the delusion 
that we are gods’853. As I discussed in the metaphor chapter, the novel’s use of screen 
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as a metaphor relates to the way in which the mediation of Dave’s relation to his 
environment through the car feeds into this delusion. The use of ‘screen’ here also 
links this to Serge’s feelings of omniscience while flying: the car and the airplane both 
determine a particular mode of perception characterised by a simultaneous integration 
with technology and a feeling of detachment. As the examples above show, the Voice 
responds to what Dave ‘sees’, another set of discontinuous visual images. 
The Book of Dave links these various strands of Self’s thought: urban 
consciousness, consciousness as narrative and Jaynes’s ideas about consciousness. It 
does so through a technique in which aspects of consciousness are depicted as external, 
controlling agents within the psyche, and through a blurring of the mind, the 
environment and material objects accomplished through metaphor. A third significant 
technique complements these two, in depicting the shaping influence of memes on the 
material. The novel repeats various words and phrases throughout, applying them to 
the experience of different characters in separate time-periods854. When Carl sees 
Dave outside his house he slips into terms shared by the present and future, spoken by 
his own Voice – ‘Carl saw some chav or fucking pikey’ – before using a term so far 
only used in the future sections: ‘‘Dad! Dad! There’s a beastly man in the back 
garden!’ Even as he taunted one man and conferred a title on the other, he thought, 
Beastly – beastly? Where the fuck does that come from?’855 In mistaking Dave for an 
unknown ‘beastly man’, Carl is presaging the revelation that the ‘Beastlyman’ is the 
father of Carl in the future. The passage however also implies a causal role and agency 
for language. Carl’s words alter his relationship to Dave and Cal, the stepfather he 
calls ‘Dad’ here for the first time, without him being able to ground this shift in any 
thought process. ‘Beastly’ seems to have been the cause of this shift, emerging across 
time from the future. 
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In another sequence, Dave dreams of flying above London with a ‘human 
bird’, who comes ‘flapping out of the greenish aviary’ of St Pancras, ‘his white beard 
and black robe giving him a vulturine appearance’856. The fare speaks in ‘the broadest 
of cockney’, rendered in the phonetic Mokni of the future sections857. This voice, and 
the physical description, identify the fare as the Driver of Ham, who dreams of flying 
with Dave above London858. Again, this introduces an ambiguity within the temporal 
and causal structure of the novel, as the past and future interact. At the same time, this 
ambiguity is used to assert the agency of language and metaphor. The description of 
the Driver as a bird originates in a fowling ritual undertaken by the Hamsters, in which 
they risk being attacked by ‘blackwings’ (gannets)859. When Carl returns from 
climbing the stack, he is confronted by ‘the hooked beak and mad yellow eyes of the 
Driver’, the ‘old crow’860. The story Carl tells of climbing the stack is ‘a vital addition 
to the story the community told of itself, one of humans spitting in the indifferent face 
of Nature’861. The bird metaphor links individual humans to the impersonal forces of 
power and language of which the Driver is the representative on Ham. Dave’s dream 
links this anthropomorphisation to the Voice, an embodiment of those forces within 
consciousness. 
The writing of Dave’s book is described in terms recalling Self’s model of the 
individual understanding the city through narrative. Dave begins with the points and 
runs of the Knowledge, but in ‘transcribing’ it he also ‘embroiders; it: ‘This was no 
plain cloth word-map, but a rich brocade of parable, chiasmus and homily […] the 
map, the territory and the prophecy became as one’862. The Knowledge begins as an 
interpretation, but assumes its own agency in becoming a narrative, defining not only 
the space being interpreted through a distortion of perception, but acting as a plan for 
a future London. In becoming a narrative, it becomes a defined entity within Dave’s 
197 
 
   
 
psyche. Language as an entity is spread out over the text through repeated words or 
phrases which can be understood as memes. 
There is correspondence between Self’s model of consciousness here and 
Dennett’s work. Memes are discussed at several points in Self’s non-fiction prior to 
his essay on London and The Book of Dave in terms which imply an influence on his 
fiction863. The Book of Dave can be read as developing a form which complements 
Dennett’s model of consciousness while emphasising its extended aspects in two 
ways: by grounding consciousness in an extended mind incorporating both brain and 
urban environment, and by defining language as an active agent spread out between 
minds, embodied in recurring memes. Language and narrative are a form of mapping, 
but their structure creates connections not present in the environment, granting 
language its own agency. 
 
Id Est 
The use of recurring phrases and the idea of language as a feature of the extended mind 
is emphasised in a passage toward the end of the novel: ‘The past has become our 
future and in the future lie all our yesterdays … Was it a stale aphorism freshly baked, 
or an ancient pop song dimly recalled? Dave could not have said.’864 Fragments of pop 
songs recurring in consciousness, or earworms, are useful examples of memes, as 
forms of language tied to forms of action and perception which embed themselves 
within the mind, and prompt repetition in consciousness865. Self’s short story, 
‘Leberknödel’ from Liver (2008), is in many ways a reprise and further refinement of 
the techniques and themes of The Book of Dave; it develops on the novel through an 
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emphasis on musical phrases spoken by the italicised voice866. This emphasis is also 
used to structure the narrative of Umbrella867.  
Smith also picks up on earworms as a way of talking about causality and the 
relationship between mind and environment. One chapter in The Accidental ends with 
a list of questions: ‘What is it you could possibly want to know about yourself? Dream 
or reality? War es nun schon alles? Are you really Eve? How’s the new Genuine? 
What child? What accident?’868 The questions are drawn from thoughout the 
preceding chapter; one is first spoke by Eve, one is a line from a song, while others 
are spoken by other characters. Where the first chapter ended by hinting at the 
extended basic of the italicised, questioning voice, the second returns to the style, 
having established that the ‘self’ embodied in this voice is, as Magnus puts it in his 
second chapter, describing his family, ‘broken […] in broken pieces which won’t go 
together, pieces which are nothing to do with each other, like they all come from 
different jigsaws, all muddled together into the one box’869. Magnus describes Amber 
as ‘several pieces of blue sky still joined up. Maybe she is a whole surviving connected 
sky.’870 The last two questions in the quote above come from Amber’s response to Eve 
when she brings up the story Amber tells at the end of Eve’s first chapter871. In refusing 
to be defined by narrative, and by Eve’s questions, Amber posits indeterminacy as the 
only truth available outside of narrative. Peter Boxall describes Amber as ‘a composite 
character made […] out of snippets of film and scraps of cultural debris’872. After 
Eve’s first chapter, she narrates a section in which she seems to be made up of the 
fragments of the plots of films, including snatches of song lyrics873. After Eve’s second 
chapter, she narrates a section in which the speaking ‘I’ is cinema as a medium, as she 
describes its technological development and its shifting place within culture and 
society874. For Boxall, Amber links these two ideas in marking ‘the absence of 
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historical material from the spectacular, mediatized narratives of the twenty-first 
century’875. However, the intermissions she narrates subtly hint at her existence 
beyond media narratives and technological mediation in pointing out one of the ways 
in which the Smart family have imposed their own interpretations on her. She 
identifies herself not only with cinema as a cultural force but with a particular cinema, 
the one after which she was named: the Alhambra. 
Amber/Alhambra introduces herself as the latter in the opening section of the 
novel876. Katrina, the Smarts’ cleaner, is the only character to refer to her by her actual 
name. When Eve asks her where Amber is, she says something that Eve ‘couldn’t quite 
make out’: ‘What she’d said had sounded like: her name’s a hammer. […] It meant 
nothing recognizable.’877 The novel’s depiction of each character’s perception of 
Amber/Alhambra puts forward a model of what it means for something to be 
‘recognizable’. Each character’s first impression of her is defined by some prior 
experience878. Michael is the first to call her Amber. His chapter narrates their first 
meeting retrospectively, with her introduction appearing as dialogue: ‘Sorry I’m late. 
I’m Amber. Car broke down.’879 Michael is talking on the phone to a student when 
she says this, and later on we learn that the cleaner has been vacuuming upstairs for 
parts of the preceding conversation880. ‘Sorry I’m late’ relates to his belief that Amber 
is expected in the house by Eve; it is left open as to whether she actually said this, or 
whether he has misheard her, or that he is misremembering. The name Amber also fits 
his initial perception of her – ‘a bit raddled, maybe thirty, maybe older, tanned like a 
hitchhiker, dressed like a road protester, one of those older women still determinedly 
being a girl’ - and the assumption that she is there to see Eve, which fixes her as a type 
which fits the name: ‘all those eighties feministy still-political women were terribly 
interested in what Eve did. Hippie name. Amber. Ridiculous name.’881 This line of 
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thought fits into his conversation on the phone with his student Philippa, and 
associated memories: ‘As he’d answered the door he’d been wondering what to call 
her, Pippa, Pip maybe […] the full name was also more meaningful, more full; these 
other names were child names; pity.’882 He supposedly thinks this before Amber 
introduces herself, although, again, it is narrated in retrospect: his preoccupation with 
his seduction of Philippa may have prompted his mishearing of Amber/Alhambra’s 
name, or his assumptions about the kind of women interested in his wife’s work may 
have influenced his recollection of his thoughts about Phillipa’s name. Another layer 
of memory also acts on his perception. Michael hears ‘an accent that sounded foreign. 
Scandinavian.’883 This relates to a memory of ‘two Swedish girls’ which he recalls at 
length while slicing a pear884. He notes that he ‘hadn’t thought of it for years’, echoing 
an earlier thought, that he hadn’t heard the words used by Amber/Alhambra, ‘hunky-
dory’, for years885. Again, there is no clear causal chain here. While the perception and 
the memory complement each other, there is no way of determining which has caused 
the other. As in The Book of Dave, memes complicate linear models of causality. 
The name Michael gives to Alhambra, ‘Amber’, occupies the centre of a 
complex set of streams of thought. It can, however, be detached from this context and 
incorporated into another, altering it. Eve asks Michael, ‘Who is she? What’s her name 
again?’, to which he responds ‘Amber something, isn’t it?’886 While Michael assumes 
she is there to see Eve, Eve assumes she is one of Michael’s students. Michael’s 
identification of her is based partly on his mistaken presumption of her relation to Eve. 
Eve fits the name within her own set of assumptions. She starts by referring to her as 
‘the girl’, a name related to the assumption that she is one of the students Michael has 
seduced. When Michael makes it clear that he assumed she is here to be interviewed 
by Eve, there is a mental digression on the subject of her books that takes up eight 
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pages, before returning to the subject of Amber/Alhambra887. The questioning voice 
seems to be responding to Michael’s previous statement, weighing up the ‘proof’ of 
whether or not she is one of Michael’s students. At this point, there is a shift. The 
answering voice interrupts a description of Amber/Alhambra as ‘the girl’, pointing out 
that she is ‘only about ten years younger than Eve for God’s sake’, and that she is 
‘older-looking’, ‘rougher-looking’ and ‘certainly more shabby’ than Michael’s usual 
conquest, adding that she ‘didn’t look like a student’888. She looks ‘vaguely familiar, 
like someone you recognize but can’t remember where from, maybe someone who’s 
served you at Dixons or at the chemist, who you see in the street afterwards’889. Eve 
has begun to acknowledge that she is not one of Michael’s students, but is prevented 
from articulating the implications of this realisations by another set of preconceptions. 
The reference to ‘someone who’s served you at Dixons’ relates to her perception of 
Amber as ‘rough’, lower-class, but also relates to her memories of meeting Adam, 
Astrid and Magnus’s father, who worked at Curry’s890. After this, Eve shifts from ‘the 
girl’ to ‘Amber MacDonald’891. Eve takes her accent to be Scottish, although 
Amber/Alhambra doesn’t directly answer the question of where she is from892. This 
assumption is related to Eve’s memories of her Scottish mother, and of her 
childhood893. ‘Amber MacDonald’ is an amalgam of Michael’s initial assumptions 
about Amber/Alhambra, which is passed on in verbal form to Eve, who incorporates 
it within her own set of assumptions, again determined largely by prior experience. 
‘Amber’ carries it with the assumption that the woman has some relation to one 
member of the family, and therefore a reason for being in their house. This assumption 
endures, free from its original context, even when Eve realises that she is not one of 
Michael’s students, and attempts to move beyond her initial preconceptions: ‘what if, 
all night, ever since that hello, and possibly because she had been feeling momentarily 
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betrayed about something else, something completely unrelated […] because of all 
this, Eve had concocted a scenario of which the girl was totally innocent?’894 She 
attempts to address the question ‘if she wasn’t Michael’s, what would that make the 
girl? […] What it made the girl was truthful.’895 
Magnus echoes this description later in the novel: ‘As concerns himself, 
Amber = true […] Amber = everything he didn’t even know he imagined possible for 
himself.’896 Magnus uses this kind of sentence (‘something = something’) throughout 
the novel897. Astrid uses a similar formulation: ‘i.e’, or ‘id est’898. These terms are part 
of what Currie calls Astrid’s ‘general mind style’, including ‘the language that she 
overuses, ‘the repetition of her ideas’, and a ‘set of modern conditions’899. In both 
cases, the typical memes fix interpretation. Magnus and Astrid are all at what Smith 
calls the ‘teenage point where things begin to codify’, moving towards ‘adulthood, 
where things begin to narrativize’900. This happens partly through the repetition of 
memes. In his first chapter, Magnus also internalises an interpretation. A phrase - They 
took her head. They fixed it on the other body. Then they sent it round everybody’s 
email. Then she killed herself’ - asserting his responsibility for the death of a girl at 
school shortens as it repeated, culminating in his suicide attempt at the end of his first 
chapter901. As memes, these interpretations are repeated and incorporated with an 
overall mind style, fixing a character’s perception of an actual object.   
Julia Breitbach notes the attention in Smith’s work to ‘how language is a 
constitutive force, rather than a transparent medium, in the building and shaping of 
contemporary realities and identities’902. In ‘Being Quick’, from The Whole Story and 
Other Stories (2003), the second narrator watches a TV program on consciousness: ‘A 
glowing brain and a voiceover saying, I think there really is no inner conscious self. 
All we are is a machine built by genes. An idea can affect your mind like a germ, a 
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parasite. We are the creation of our minds and our memes.’903 The narrator begins to 
go through the channels again, describing it as ‘like watching thrown-away rubbish 
come bobbing in towards me on a tide, stuff that has floated in from all over the world 
made of substances that will never decompose’904. The image recalls one used by 
Dennett to sum up the consequences of understanding the mind in terms of memes of 
the brain as ‘a sort of dungheap in which the larvae of other people’s ideas renew 
themselves, before sending out copies of themselves in an informational diaspora’905. 
However, the metaphor describes how Smith has represented language as a 
constitutive force throughout her work906. Her use of earworms as a motif throughout 
her fiction also expresses the way in which phrases, as ‘information packets’ shaping 
experience, integrate themselves within the mind, altering it907. Triggering memories 
associated with music, these earworms also evoke the self which experienced those 
memories.  
A sequence in which Eve thinks of various songs emphasises the shaping of 
the self by cultural narratives, while also showing how memory can undermine those 
narratives. Sitting in a church, Eve finds thinks of various songs about ageing. While 
the lyrics of the songs imply that she is ‘past it’, in bringing to mind the context in 
which they were heard they emphasise a dialogue within her mind: ‘Abandon hope, 
all ye who enter here. Eve (15) looked up from her desk in the German class at Eve 
(42) all those desert years later, and winked.’908 Earlier, Amber’s presumed 
Scottishness leads Eve to remember looking through her mother’s Scottish LP’S. Her 
fifteen-year old self, like Amber, resists questioning: ‘As if anyone’s childhood was 
an excuse for anything. […] She took the transistor radio off the table, held it up by 
the handle and smashed it hard on the floor […] Grow up, for fuck’s sake, Eve (15) 
snorted at Eve (42).’909 Here, her memory interrupts and alters the questions being 
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asked of it. Eve first asks ‘When in her life had Eve snorted like that?’, prompting 
more memories associated with this distinct fifteen year old self. When she then 
responds to the question, ‘what was Eve’ with ‘Eve was a house and garden and a four-
square family and a fascinating writer in her own right’, the memory allows her to 
tentatively assert a different self: ‘Eve tried it again, now, across the room from the 
sleeping Michael (she tried it quite quietly) and yes, she could still snort, and exactly 
like that girl in the garden had earlier tonight’910. The question of whether there is a 
genuine similarity between Eve (15) and Amber/Alhambra, whether the former 
snorting has altered Eve’s perception of the latter, or whether the latter snorting has 
altered her memory of the former, is left unresolved. 
Magnus reflects later that a ‘typical human being contains about one hundred 
billion neurones. A human being = a cell which divides into two then four etc.’911 In 
the last chapter, Eve sees her children ‘on separate roads, on separate maps […] 
Hundreds of these junctions and all their possible connections to other junctions 
stretched away ahead of them both like a web of lit synapses.’912 As they ‘came to the 
next clear junction and made the decision about which way to turn, whole huge areas 
of the maps under their feet snapped into darkness’913. Other people in the world are 
part of the mind in being defined by perception and memory. The characters are 
intentional objects for each other. The memes which shape cognition are similarly 
extended, transferring between minds in the form of words and phrases. While this 
can lead to a state of solipsism, in which the self sees others entirely as intentional 
objects defined by reductive cultural narratives, it can also lead to change. The 
intentional object is both a representation and a real person, and the actions of the latter 
can alter the mind as a whole. Several readings of the novel have posited Amber in 
Freudian terms, as both an embodiment of each Smart’s unconscious fantasies, and of 
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a trauma beyond narrativisation914. The apparent contradiction here can be resolved 
by a reading of Freud in terms of the intentional stance functioning through extended 
processes. The word-presentations or intentional states which define the intentional 
objects are memes, which transfer between characters. The intentional object, Amber, 
is also a meme, transferring between psyches, imposing new forms of interpretation 
while drawing on existing ones. Alhambra, as a real person, provides the mental 
content to be interpreted, altering the psyche through her relation to the intentional 
object ‘Amber’ and its connections to a complex of other intentional states and objects 
which make up the self-understanding of each Smart.  
 
Other Voices 
Smith and Self’s use of memes differs from Dennett’s in rejecting the intentional 
stance. Both writers have developed a critique of anthropomorphism in their short 
stories which is reflected in The Book of Dave and The Accidental. As in the novels 
I’ve looked at in previous chapter, this critique relies partly on a distinction between 
interpretation and vision within consciousness. Like Blackmore, Smith and Self use 
visual consciousness to question the notion that consciousness as a whole is 
narrational. 
‘Between the Conceits’, from Grey Area, is narrated by one the self-
proclaimed ‘only eight people in London’, who control all other inhabitants of the 
capital915. The narrator immediately defends himself against the possible charge of 
snobbery, before undermining this with a discussion of the relative social standing of 
the eight ‘real’ people. The narrator interprets all interactions with other people in 
terms of his supposed relation to these seven others. He can ‘feel in the very limits of 
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my seething collectivity of consciousness the peculiar inlets and isolated 
promontories’ of their interaction916. The eight people, most of whom have names and 
are able to be judged in terms of ‘refinement’ by the narrator, also includes ‘The 
Recorder’. The narrator mentions having tried to ‘court’ him, ‘to no avail’, meeting 
with no meaningful response beside receiving more junk mail and a guess: ‘I know 
the recorder thinks well of me, viz the ‘Good mornings’917. The narrator, describing 
his motivation as attempting to ‘make sure that there is a kind of organic unity in 
London, that people have their right position and estate […] I deplore snobbery and it 
constitutes no part of my motivation. I simply believe that there is a natural order of 
people just as there is of things.’918 Along with these others, the narrator’s ability to 
control all other people in London has the sole purpose of changing such social 
standing.  Organic unity is accomplished through a form of the intentional stance 
structured by class919. There are two related, implicit points being made here. Firstly, 
that the Recorder doesn’t exist; they are an intentional object, created through the 
application of a form of the intentional stance. This point emphasizes the subjectivity 
of that intentional stance, its structuring by class rather than by the organic unity of 
what it is applied to. 
Hayes notes that ‘Self’s depiction of class in his early fiction is one of his 
methods for indicating a primary concern: the individual’s relationship to his or her 
surroundings’920. The Book of Dave depicts this process in terms of a series of 
intentional states within consciousness. In the first chapter centred on Dave, the Voice 
is concerned with what Dave’s various fares think, and the class relation between the 
two: ‘He came puffing up to the driver-side window. ‘Sir, sir, excuse me, sir…’ Sir, 
sir?! Is he fucking insane […] He’s going to ask me if I know which theatre the King 
and I is playing at. Stupid cunt.’921 The Voice responds to the fare’s words and actions 
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with such judgements or guesses at what he is thinking, inflected by class: ‘My range, 
what does he think I am, some fucking wild boar?’; ‘He doesn’t expect to hear this 
word out of my lower-class lips, lips he sees flapping in the rearview. He’s putting 
together a photofit of me from lips, chin and the back of my head […] put him still 
more at his ease, this cunt could be an earner.’922 The mirror mediates between the 
two men, acting as another ‘screen’ which defines the relation between subject and 
object in terms of discrete images. These images form the basis of Dave’s 
interpretation, in combination with his class consciousness. When Dave does break up 
the definition of the conversation between the two men in terms of class and money 
by describing Watling Street as ‘a time tunnel, connecting the past with the present’, 
the Voice corrects him, steering their interaction back to a more reductive framework: 
‘The fare was uncomfortable with Dave’s extravagant image, but thass alright, he’s 
paying to feel superior  as well as be driven. Superior in knowledge, superior in 
wealth, he don’t need some hack to tell him he’s neither.’923 Their interaction ends 
through a reassertion of this definition, as Dave is tipped, expressed as a visualisation 
defined partly by an earworm: ‘‘Thank you very much, sir, much obliged to you!’ 
Consider yerself at home! […] In the jaundiced eye of his own self-contempt Dave 
saw himself leaping from the cab to hoe down in the dirty puddles […] tugging the 
peak of his cap in lieu of a forelock.’924 Song lyrics related to Dave’s word interject 
themselves to make him aware of his class position. This dynamic also applies to 
others. When Jane Bernal gets into the car, her internal voice is rendered in italics, 
depicting her initial response to London and her professional relation to Dave925. For 
both characters, the internal voice represents a form of the intentional stance, 
responding to the complexity of their experience, primarily through reference to 
money and class. As in ‘Between the Conceits’, this form of interpretation has an 
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active, shaping role for the central character. In The Book of Dave, interpretation alters 
perception, and social frameworks literally determine what is seen. 
In Smith’s ‘Trachtenbauer’ (2004), the narrator is confronted by the titular 
‘schoolboy’, a ‘free government initiative’ who turns up at her doorstep926. This 
anthropomorphisation of cultural narratives and government policy is, as the narrator 
points out, an unsatisfactory response to current times. The narrator guesses the 
reader’s response - ‘You may at this still quite early stage be feeling cheated and 
amazed, if you, like me, like your short stories to be about real things in the real world’ 
– offering as a brief alternative some ‘contemporary verisimilitude’: ‘A woman is 
standing blindfolded in a communal cell in Abu Grahib and her dead brother’s body 
is brought in and dumped at her feet’927. Later on, they point out the failure of any 
narrative in this context: ‘don’t go thinking that what I’ve been telling you is going to 
transform this uneasy hybrid of fantasy and reality into something resolved in the end’ 
by ‘autobiographical material. Because it won’t. These are Trachtenbauer times we 
live in.’928 At the end of the story this failure of narrative is linked to the times again, 
when the narrator mentions detention without trial: ‘I lived in the kind of country 
where, just like short stories were short stories and behaved appropriately, the law was 
the law and was there to protect people from this kind of thing’929. At the end of the 
story, Trachtenbauer grows, so that the whole country becomes ‘the plaything of a 
giant schoolboy’930. Again, social relations are understood in terms of the intentional 
stance, and the actions of an individual entity. Smith emphasises throughout the way 
in which this approach is inadequate. At the end of The Accidental, Eve attempts the 
sort of engagement with the reality of contemporary life and media narratives as 
referenced by ‘Trachtenbauer’’s narrator, in reflecting on photos of abuse from Abu 
Grahib, she comes to a similar conclusion: ‘There was no answer to it. It was itself the 
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answer. She was living in a time when historically it was permissible to smile like that 
above the face of someone who had died a violent death.’931 The response is not 
narrative interpretation, but a rejection of narrative, and narrative closure in particular. 
The image is a result of technological media as well as the broader social structures 
that led to the existence of Abu Grahib, but it defies interpretation. Eve ends the novel 
by assuming Amber’s role in another household. Looking across the Grand Canyon, 
Eve sees ‘all the selves she could have been […] as if at any point in a life you could 
simply had changed your mind and chosen another self.’932 Visual experience 
undermines singular interpretation, even the kind that forms the basis of the individual 
self.   
In the short story ‘The Ex-Wife’ from Public Library and Other Stories (2015), 
the narrator holds a conversation with a Katherine Mansfield whose dialogue is made 
up of italicised quotes from the author’s work933. The story follows the way in which 
the narrator’s relation to their own ex, a Mansfield obsessive, is altered through these 
conversations. It does so partly through an attention to the relation between what is 
seen and how it is interpreted. One of Mansfield’s descriptions of nature alters the way 
in which the narrator sees what is around them934. The story ends with the narrator 
visiting Mansfield’s house in London, thinking about the relation of her words to the 
place in which she wrote them, and taking a photoraph – a ‘close-up of the brick of 
the whitewashed wall of it, where ivy or some plant with tiny splayed-out roots has 
grown over the place and someone has repeatedly stripped it back’ – to send to their 
ex, ‘without saying where it was of, or telling you anything about it’935. The narrator’s 
ex is an academic, and Smith seems to be sending up her own preoccupations in the 
names of a paper the narrator comes up with to tease them: ‘The Memory Meme and 
Materiology In Katherine Mansfield’s Metaphorical Landscape’ – a ‘grandiose name’ 
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for ‘looking at old bits of rubbish left behind by a dead person’936. Writing and 
memory are memes, which take on a form of agency within consciousness, but they 
are always framed against a material environment to which the individual’s relation is 
primarily visual. Like the Recorder, or the Voice, ‘Katherine Mansfield’ is another 
intentional object, but its relation to the material, mediated through vision, furthers a 
dialogue between real people. 
Smith and Self’s adaptation of the meme links it inextricably with visual 
perception. In the process, they both undermine the claim that the actions of a complex 
of memes add up to a selfplex, a singular narrational self which computers information 
in a linear way. To the extent that this self does emerge, it is as an intrusion, an illusory 
ghost or god within the mind.  Thus, other forms of consciousness are possible. Faced 
with this complexity, the intentional stance is inadequate.
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Chapter Five - The Environment Within: Consciousness and Homeostasis in How 
to Be Both and Umbrella 
What if history, instead, was that shout, that upward spring, that staircase-
ladder thing, and everybody was just used to calling something quite different 
the word history? What if received notions of history were deceptive? […] 
Maybe anything that forced or pushed such a spring back down or blocked the 
upward shout of it was opposed to the making of what history really was. 
- Ali Smith, How to Be Both (2014) 
To incontinently recall these, the lyrical leftovers and junked jingles of past 
decades, would be an affliction … timeitus, he smirks … had Busner not come 
to appreciate, since his retreat here to the first-floor flat on Fortress Road, that 
within the patterns made by their effervescing in the pool of his consciousness 
are encoded wider meanings – he balks at truths – ones not surveyed or even 
guessed at by the mental mapmakers with whom he has spent his working life 
notwithstanding the elegance of their modelling – theoretical, neurological – 
or the crassness of their professionalism. 
- Will Self, Umbrella (2012) 
 
In the last chapter, I read Smith and Self’s work as proposing an alternative model of 
consciousness structured around the role of memes to that formulated by Dennett. 
Smith and Self break up the individual into a complex of selves, defined through the 
interaction of memes and visual experience. Given the use of the novel as a reference 
point in conceptualising narrationism, it could be argued that the form is inherently 
tied to this model of the mind, and that the depiction of alternative forms of 
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consciousness and subjectivity requires a radically new form. In their most recent 
work, both Smith and Self have developed distinctive formal innovations that surpass 
those in their earlier work in their inventiveness. In this chapter, I make two related 
arguments. Firstly, that the forms used by these writers in How to Be Both and 
Umbrella represent refinements of the formal innovations developed in their earlier 
works, partially in response to the influence of Dennett. Secondly, that the model of 
subjectivity they depict occupy the same relation to those of cognitive science as these 
novels do to their authors’ earlier work: a refinement, building on established 
influences, that acts as an alternative. 
 Both writers engage with ways of understanding the mind’s relation to 
technology that have been eclipsed by cognitive science: cybernetics and modernism. 
Both fields fed into the development of narrationism but are very different from it. A 
reconnection with their influence allows for a further shift. This dynamic is reflected 
in the selves these novels depict: rather than the mind altering its narrative moment-
by-moment, here the mind is altered by the past inside the present. I begin by 
describing the formal innovations introduced by both writers, showing how these build 
on aspects of their earlier work relating to the interplay of vision and interpretation, 
relating this to Rowlands’s model of consciousness. I then discuss how each writer 
situates their character in relation to their environment. Finally, I build on Damasio’s 
work to show how both writers implicitly make the case for a form of non-narrative 






   
 
Seen and Understood 
In The New Science of the Mind (2010), Mark Rowlands argues for EMT by 
reconciling Clark’s formulation of it with the experience of consciousness. His 
argument begins with the premise that ‘cognitive activity and coping activity are, at 
least in one sense, fundamentally the same kind of activity that is implemented in 
different ways’937. Coping activity refers to something like the homeostatic response 
to the environment I discussed in the introduction. For coping and cognitive activity 
to be the same kind of activity, ‘there must be a more general characterization of these 
activities: a sortal concept under which coping and cognition can be subsumed’; he 
therefore defines both as ‘forms of revealing or disclosing activity’938. While the 
experience of being conscious of a particular object may represent that object’s 
momentary disruption of the mind’s homeostasis, the form that experience takes is 
determined by a ‘coping’ response that strictly defines the individual’s relation to that 
object, thus restoring homeostasis. Formal innovations introduced in How to Be Both 
and Umbrella advance the idea of coping and disclosing as two sides of the same coin. 
 Smith’s innovation in How to Be Both is using passages of second-person prose 
within free indirect style. This technique is a synthesis of two aspects of Smith’s earlier 
work, the use of a dialogic form in earlier novels and short stories, and her use of italics 
to depict the incorporation of memes939. In the sequence I read in the introduction, 
George’s correction of the novel’s grammar is partly a distinction between her own 
mind and the influence of her mother. Using second-person prose partly collapses this 
distinction, defining consciousness as a dialogue. The first instance comes during a 
memory narrated in present-tense. George asks her mother why she keeps a jar of 
pencil shavings. The next paragraph answers this question through a description of the 
jar: ‘Through the glass you can see the different woods of the different pencils her 
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mother has been using. […] You can see the paint lines, the tiny zigzags of colours 
made in to the shapes like the edges of those scallop shells made by the twist of pencil 
in the sharpener.’940 The speaker here is not George’s mother, but she does something 
similar in pointing out different interpretations of the words used by George: ‘What’s 
the point? [George] says […] Point. Ha ha! Her mother says’; ‘Bit pathetic, George 
says. […] Well, yes, I suppose it is, her mother says. Literally.’941 This prompts 
George to look up the word ‘pathetic’ in the dictionary; the ensuing recognition that 
words have multiple meanings allows her to understand the pun made by her 
mother942. Second-person prose expresses the same kind of multiplicity within 
consciousness in fulfilling several functions at once. Firstly, it can be understood as 
an incorporation of her mother’s implied response to her question within George’s 
consciousness; she is not speaking, but the passage acts as a response to the question 
George puts to her. Secondly, it can be understood as expressing the way in which 
consciousness is disclosing, determined by the object of perception. The detailed 
attention to the object in itself allows her to change her interpretation of it and to 
understand why her mother keeps it. Thirdly, it expresses the mutability of the self, its 
openness to alteration by the object and by others’ perception of the object.  
In a later use of second-person prose, George visits an art gallery. The passage 
is preceded by references to the two conversations between George and her mother 
discussed above943. The description of the painting she looks at dwells at first on its 
difficulty, its resistance to a comprehensive understanding; it is ‘impossible to see it 
all at once’944. The narration lists several details, before fixating on one: ‘it is 
impossible, though, not to keep looking then looking back again at the blue-coloured 
stripe which runs like a frieze round the room […] The blue calls your eyes every 
time.’945 This passage emphasises the ambiguity in the use of second-person prose. 
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The self, ‘you’, is defined here by which part of the painting it focuses on. The self 
determines the categories through which the painting will be understood, but is altered 
by the painting. This is developed in subsequent uses of the second-person, gradually 
emphasising the absorption of the self into the picture while acknowledging the 
possibility of different interpretations946. A later passage, in which the painter 
Francesco describes ‘the thing that happens when the life of the picture steps beyond 
the frame’, develops this ambiguity: 
 it does 2 opposing things at once. 
 The one is, it lets the world be seen and understood. 
The other is, it unchains the eyes and the lives of those who see it and gives 
them a moment of freedom, from its world and from their world both.947 
This passage draws on a reading of Rainer Maria Rilke’s ‘Archaic Torso of Apollo’ 
in Artful. Rilke’s poem describes the experience of looking at the titular sculpture in 
the second-person. In Artful’s reading, the ‘first thing the imagining eye does is supply 
what’s not there, giving the statue not just a head but a legendary one; its missing eyes 
are both seen […] and at the same time never seeable.’948 This head, then, allows to 
statue itself to gaze, which leads to a ‘magical shifting of the position of observer and 
observed’, through which the ‘‘you’ of the poem becomes not just the seen thing 
instead of the art, but something seen so utterly, so wholly, that ‘there is no place that 
does not see you’’949. The contrast between the object as constructed by the subject 
and the object in itself further allows this gaze to be turned onto the perceiving subject, 
resulting in the poem in a ‘pure urgency for transformation: ‘you must change your 
life.’’950 The object’s effect on the interpreting subject is experienced as a demand. 
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In Artful and How to be Both a formal relation to vision is articulated through 
reference to Calvino’s Six Memos for the Next Millennium 951. Over the course of this 
work, Calvino develops an argument for a form of literature grounded in visual 
images, distinct from interpretation952. A significant reference point for this argument 
is Hofstadter’s Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid (1979), from which 
Calvino takes the idea that human cognition is grounded in mental images, distinct 
from language, as well as several of its implications for our understanding of the mind 
and the self953. Hofstadter uses a discussion of art to describe the limitations of 
consciousness in responding to this multiplicity; the art work cannot be apprehended 
as it is, but is always framed in some way954. He proposes that consciousness, free will 
and meaning are the product of a ‘strange loop’: ‘an interaction between levels in 
which the top level reaches back down towards the bottom level and influences it, 
while at the same time being itself determined by the bottom level’955. Smith has 
developed these ideas, combining Calvino’s reading of them with her own 
longstanding themes and techniques, arriving at a style partly embodying the actions 
of this loop. 
 
To See Her Properly 
In a piece on style versus content, published the same year as Artful, Smith describes 
style as ‘an aesthetic means of containing something for us and allowing us both 
distance from and proximity to it’956. Distance and proximity; coping and disclosing, 
each determining the other in a strange loop. The same process is depicted in 
Umbrella. Busner’s initial response to seeing Audrey is a form of associative thought 
which seems to impose a literal, spatial distance between the two: ‘At once, he thinks 
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of twitchers he has seen on his chronic ward, screwing their heads into the angle 
between the headrest and the back of their allotted armchair […] She is at once a long 
way off and close enough for him to manhandle.’957 Busner’s diagnosis is also 
rendered using an interrelated set of of visual and spatial terms in this sequence: ‘To 
see her, to see her properly, Busner has to wade through a Brown Windsor of 
assumptions about the elderly insane’958. This leads Busner into a memory of one of 
his lecturers, ‘the worn-out pile of whose fustian mind would be bared – as he 
wandered from lectern to steam radiator and back – by his inadvertent references to 
[…] obsolete terms that meant far less than the vernacular’959. The rendering of 
thought in spatial terms through metaphor complements the effect of Busner’s own 
train of thought, which distances him from Audrey and his present location in time 
and space. The ‘assumptions about the elderly insane’ are also embodied in the 
physical structuring of the hospital, and in the forms of treatment at work. When 
Audrey is ‘swept away on the brown tide’ after this encounter, the reference is both to 
the ‘Brown Windsor’ of assumptions and to the medication Busner assumes her to be 
taking: ‘it is unthinkable that she shouldn’t be dosed with some form of 
chlorpromazine – everyone is.’960 Busner observes the ‘chloreography’ of the patients 
– the effects of the drug and of its dispensing determining their movement through 
space – and becomes aware of a ‘steady background pulse of involuntary movement 
[…] They are possessed, he thinks, by ancient subpersonalities, the neural building-
blocks of the psyche…’961 Busner’s consciousness occupies the intersection of another 
strange loop, through which the mind and its environment affect each other, each 
taking on the other’s properties. 
Umbrella depicts this loop as ongoing through the use of the present-tense. 
Italicised thoughts respond directly to present experience, establishing a distance 
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between the subject and object by determining how the object is to be understood. For 
Busner, medical diagnosis is an involuntary response, not only to his patients, but to 
himself and those he sees around him, occurring throughout and taking the form of 
italicised medical terms interjecting themselves into the prose. The first element of 
Busner’s emerging diagnosis of Audrey, ‘festination’, ‘pops into his mind’, an 
‘uncalled for Latinism’962.  As he reflects later on, watching Audrey, this is a form of 
coping: 
Busner senses the acid churn in her engorged spleen, he envisions ulceration. 
To counteract these stark facts I have jargon – for he has been doing his 
reading. It is far easier to look upon her Unknown Pauper Lunatic face if he 
puts it in these terms: profound facial masking. It is far less uncanny to describe 
these half-shuttered and unseeing eyes as exhibiting lid clonus.963  
Busner seeks to counteract the affect prompted by Audrey that he ‘senses’ or 
‘envisions’. In doing so he must become more like the statue he describes, his eyes 
‘half-shuttered’, ‘unseeing’. His diagnosis acts as an involuntary form of coping, 
through which elements of a particular discourse attach themselves to visual elements 
of conscious experience. On a general formal level, the link between particular forms 
of language and characters in the novel differentiates between individuals. 
 Busner’s treatment of post-encephalitic patients with L-Dopa is based partly 
on Oliver Sacks’s account of his own experience in Awakenings (1973). The style Self 
develops in Umbrella can also be read as influenced by Self’s engagement with 
Sacks’s ideas.The role of the environment is central to Sacks’s reflections on his 
experience with the post-encephalitics in Awakenings. He notes that in accounts of 
patients in the 1930s it seemed ‘as if the ‘quality’ of the individual – his ‘strengths’ 
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and ‘weaknesses’, resistances and pliancies, motives and experiences, etc. – played a 
large part in determining the severity, course and form of his illness’964. Thus ‘at a 
time of almost exclusive emphasis on specific mechanisms in physiology and 
pathology, the strange evolutions of illness in these post-encephalitic patients recalled 
Claude Bernard’s concept of the terrain and the milieu interne’965. Equally clear were 
‘the effects of the external environment, the circumstances of each patient’s life’; the 
illness could be understood as, ‘like neurosis or psychosis, a coming-to-terms of the 
sensitized individual with his total environment’966. This total environment includes 
the hospital; in making this point, Sacks implies something like an extended mind: 
‘We have seen that Parkinsonism and neurosis are innately coercive, and share a 
similar coercive structure. Rigorous institutions are also coercive, being, in effect, 
external neuroses.’967 The influence of this idea can be seen in the passage from 
Umbrella discussed above, combined with Self’s established use of memes. 
 How to Be Both and Umbrella each situate the origins of the narrative model 
of identity in the individual’s response to conscious experience. The individual 
incorporates particular linguistic and cultural prostheses so as to achieve individual 
homeostasis. While the individual may look back at these responses and subsume them 
within an overall narrative, again in the hopes of using narrative as a prosthesis to 
achieve homeostasis, Smith and Self both use present-tense narration to imply that this 
is not how the process works moment by moment. The individual’s response to their 
environment is not that of a pre-determined self, but a series of defensive and largely 
involuntary reactions to the encroachment of that environment within consciousness. 
In his tribute to Sacks, Self mentions an essay by Sacks on consciousness which had 
struck him ‘as pointing a very straight path towards cracking its ineffable 
mysteries’968. In the essay, ‘In the River of Consciousness’ (2004), Sacks discusses 
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the idea of consciousness as a series of discrete moments, a view originating in David 
Hume’s work969. In the same essay mentioning this article, Self remembers discussing 
exactly this Humean view at his first meeting with Sacks in the 70s970. Sacks notes 
that instead ‘of seeing the brain as rigid, fixed in mode, programmed like a computer, 
there is now a much more biological and powerful notion of “experiential selection,” 
of experience literally shaping the connectivity and function of the brain’, a point 
which Self brings up, and which was central to The Book of Dave971. At the same time, 
we ‘deceive ourselves if we imagine that we can ever be passive, impartial observers. 
Every perception, every scene, is shaped by us, whether we intend it, know it, or not. 
We are the directors of the film we are making—but we are, equally, its subjects 
too.’972  
 
City of Trees 
George corrects herself again when describing the damp on the wall of her bedroom: 
Over the weeks since it’s been happening the posters have started to peel off it 
because the Blu-tack won’t hold to some of the wall. Under them a light brown 
set of stains, like the map of a tree-root network, or a thousand-times magnified 
mould, or the veins that get visible in the whites of your eyes when you’re tired 
– no, not like any of these things, because thinking these things is just a stupid 
game. Damp is coming in and staining the wall and that’s all there is to it.973  
The passage refers back to the use of natural imagery in Smith’s earlier fiction. 
Descriptions of natural objects, such as trees, directly or as metaphor, recur in 
connection to moments of heightened engagement by Smith’s characters with the 
world outside themselves, often prompted by love or desire974. We learn that George 
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is hiding the mould in the hopes that it will rot the roofbeam and that the ceiling will 
fall in: ‘She will have the pleasure of watching it happen […] She will lie in bed with 
all the covers thrown off and the stars will be directly above her, nothing between her 
and their long-ago burnt out eyes.’975 She repeats this hope two pages later, when an 
advert prompts her to think of her mother:  
How can that advert exist and her mother not exist in the world? 
She didn’t say it out loud, though, because there wasn’t a point. 
It isn’t about saying. 
It is about the hole which will form in the roof through which the cold will 
intensify and after which the structure of the house will begin to shift, like it 
ought, and through which George will be able to lie every night in bed 
watching the black sky976. 
In the next paragraph, ‘[i]t is last August. Her mother is at the dining-room table 
reading out loud off the internet.’977 The metaphor of the sky seen without obstructions 
corresponds to memory unmediated by tense and narration.  
Hofstadter defines cognition as ‘recognition’; for ‘“seeing as” as the essential 
cognitive act: you see some lines as “an A,” you see a hunk of wood as a “table,” you 
see a meeting as “an emperor-has-no-clothes situation” […] That’s what it means to 
understand.’978 The example of art’s inherent ‘framing’ in Gödel, Escher, Bach also 
makes this point. The particular framing of a work of art emerges from an interaction 
of the properties of the art work in itself, and the cultural meanings attached to it. 
Smith references Hofstadter’s argument, via Calvino, in Artful979.  After George sees 
one of Francesco’s paintings, the narration notes that the gallery ‘knows more about 
the man in the picture than it does about the painter who painted it. About.’980 The 
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repetition of ‘about’ calls attention to the way in which gallery is being 
anthropomorphised in this description. The gallery’s relation to the paintings is 
granted intentionality, or ‘aboutness’. In Rowlands’s model, ‘perceptual experiences’ 
are ‘intentional because they are a revealing or disclosing of the world’; they are 
conscious ‘because they are a revealing or disclosing of the world to someone – their 
subjects’981. There are, in this model, ‘many ways of causally disclosing the world’, 
that is ‘many vehicles through which the world may be causally disclosed to 
subjects’982. The core of Rowlands’s argument for EMT is that ‘the vehicles of causal 
disclosure do not stop at the boundaries of the brain, but extend out into the activity 
we perform in the world, activity that is both bodily and incorporates wider 
environmental performances’983. The gallery forms part of the self in the sense that it 
acts as a vehicle of causal disclosure in relation to the paintings it contains. The 
paintings themselves can also be understood as parts of the self as revealed in core 
consciousness. The self in a gallery, seeing a painting, is extended in two opposing 
ways, each characterised according to the metaphor of architecture or nature. Smith’s 
use of this metaphorical register expresses how this opposition functions within 
consciousness.  
Where nature initially stands for this unmediated mode of perception, 
architecture is associated with language and articulation. Houses and other buildings 
stand for mediation in general, for anything, in Rowland’s terms, through which the 
object is disclosed to the subject. George variously uses metaphors in which she 
describes parts of herself in terms of architecture, and feels that parts of actual 
buildings are parts of her. Again, this is something that Smith has developed in her 
earlier fiction, particularly in Hotel World984. This complements references throughout 
which link nature to visual perception. There are also references to a mingling of the 
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two, to plants taking root within buildings. In one passage, in which George describes 
walking through a town in Italy with her mother, architecture is gradually altered as 
the narration dwells on visual experience: 
It is a place of walls […] But things change in a moment here, light to dark, 
dark to light, and although it is so stony it is also bright green and red and 
yellow too; all the walls and buildings go red-golden in the sun. […] There are 
the long straight avenues of really beautiful trees, as if it’s not a city of walls 
at all, it’s a city of trees. In fact, all the buildings and walls have bits of tree 
and bush and grass sprouting out of them at the tops and up the sides of their 
bright walls.985 
George’s mother adds that ‘[i]t’s as if that map they gave us is nothing to do with the 
actual experience of being here’986. Emily Horton identifies a similar process at work 
in the depiction of urban spaces in Smith’s short stories. Horton argues that ‘against 
the ‘supermodern’ idea of space as necessarily restrictive and disempowering […] 
Smith instead calls up the hidden psychic and affective possibilities latent within urban 
spaces’987. Horton identifies several moments in the short stories in which affect shifts 
a character’s relation to and perception of the urban spaces around them. In one short 
story, ‘The Definite Article’, from The First Person and Other Stories (2008) affect is 
embodied both in an insect which literally flies into the narrator’s eye, ‘prompting a 
change of thought and subject matter’, and in the word ‘ow’, which ‘disrupts the 
sentence itself, reframing its focus’988. Throughout How to Be Both, George seems to 
think in terms of an opposition between perception and interpretation, or between 
vision and language, tied metaphorically to nature and architecture. She alternates 
between correcting perception by reference to language, and hoping that nature will 
lead to a total collapse of architecture, allowing for unmediated perception. As 
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George’s half of the novel unfolds, the opposition is broken down, the two sides 
revealed as mutually constitutive of themselves and of George’s experience. 
 Several critics have pointed out that Smith’s work consistently rejects such 
oppositions, particularly those related to nature and culture989. Artful reconciles the 
opposition between nature and architecture with a metaphor borrowed from Keats’s 
‘Ode to Psyche’: ‘the wreathed trellis of a working brain’990. Elsewhere, Smith takes 
another such description of thought from Cézanne, via John Berger: ‘The landscape 
thinks itself in me, and I am its consciousness’991. In the same essay, Smith claims that 
‘she could say that everything [she’s] ever written or aspired to write has been in one 
way or another an appreciation of the work of John Berger’992. While Smith’s 
depiction of thought in How to Be Both is influenced by her reading of Calvino and 
Hofstadter in Artful, it also draws on aspects of her earlier fiction that may have been 
influenced by Berger993. Berger’s Ways of Seeing (1972) sets out a model of visual 
thought: 
Seeing comes before words. The child looks and recognizes before it can 
speak. 
But there is also another sense in which seeing comes before words. It is seeing 
which establishes our place in the surrounding world; we explain that world 
with words, but words can never undo the fact that we are surrounded by it.994 
He adds that we ‘never look at just one thing; we are always looking at the relation 
between things and ourselves’995. Our relation to what we see is determined partly by 
culture, as Berger argues by reference to the art work: ‘when an image is presented as 
a work of art, the way people look at it is affected by a whole series of learnt 
assumptions about art’996. In Bento’s Sketchbook (2011), Berger reflects on drawing, 
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which he experiences as ‘something like a visceral function, such as digestion or 
sweating, a function that is independent of the conscious will’, something that 
‘touches, or is touched by, something prototypical or anterior to logical reasoning’997. 
He quotes Damasio: ‘The entire fabric of a conscious mind is created from the same 
cloth – images generated by the brain’s map-making abilities […] conscious minds 
arise from establishing a relationship between the organism and an object-to-be-
known.’998 Berger’s writing on seeing complements Damasio’s model of 
consciousness, as well as putting forward a concise expression of the way in which 
extended material and cultural structures interact with the object being seen. Smith’s 
work responds to his influence through a metaphorical register which expresses this 
interaction. 
 
Plasterwork of Her Skull 
The point about the opposition between architecture and nature in Smith’s work is that 
it can be reconciled. Self’s focus on technology rather than nature indicates a different 
understanding of the extent to which extended structures determine the subject’s 
relation to the object. Umbrella develops on his previous work’s concern with the 
ways in which technology and the urban environment determine individual 
consciousness and perception. Self’s short story ‘Architectural Salvage’ (2015) 
exemplifies the metaphorical register in his recent work. The title phrase is used as a 
metaphor for ageing bodies, first by the protagonist, Jane Molloy, and then within the 
delusion of a young woman who comes to warn her of machinses which link brains 
through the internet into a ‘worldwide bio-cybernetic server farm’, keeping the 
humans, now ‘surplus to requirements’, as decoration, ‘one of the Earth’s original 
226 
 
   
 
features’999. The protagonist’s italicised descriptions of her body and those around her 
complement the depiction of her consciousness as determined by her engagement with 
technology: she is shown ‘clicking through a carousel of images as she struggle[s] to 
sleep’, powers-down and up in the evening and morning, and finds her morning routine 
acquiring ‘the quality of an algorithm: a set of instructions commanding her to shower, 
dress, eat and defecate, all without bothering about …the whys and wherefores.’1000 
The opposition here reinforces that sense of passivity. The contents of consciousness, 
as mediated by technology, cannot alter and renew the architecture of the self. In 
Umbrella, Self depicts a form of core consciousness, determined by technology, which 
fundamentally alters the dynamic relationship between the subject and object.   
 The breakdown of the boundary between mind, body and environment is 
formulated as a vision of imprisonment in a dream of Audrey’s: 
In the depths of her sopor she had dreamed this: the hospital growing out of 
her mortal shell, its whitewashed and bare walls stretching … creasing … 
folding into nacre. Always she remained on the inside … trapped, the heavy 
girders arched within her bent back, their rivets my vertebrae … Cut through 
the dimpled plasterwork of her skull, dirty skylight illuminated … nothing. 1001 
The end of this passage refers back to an earlier one in which another patient recalls 
his experience ‘thinking of nothing’, an ‘iteration of identity, its fact, nothing more, 
two-equals-two, I-am’1002. He goes on to describe himself before his treatment and 
partial recovery as ‘a sort of picture frame […] the framing of nothing’1003. In How to 
Be Both, the metaphorical linking of self and building is used mostly to illustrate the 
potential for change and mutability implicit in a variation of EMT: the object of 
perception alters extended structures of mediation and interpretation through their 
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interplay within consciousness. Umbrella follows the same logic: when those 
structures are fixed, and the individual cannot alter their relation to them, their relation 
to experience becomes passive. This links the literal disability of the post-encephalitic 
patients with the coercive effects of their environment, with technological screens, and 
with computational representations.  
The novel also links Audrey’s condition to the experience of watching 
television. In 1971, Audrey watches a gameshow on TV, seeing a procession of objects 
going past, accompanied by the ‘disembodied voice – sweetly covetous – naming these 
things as they are shuffled before her’1004. Television is further linked to transportation 
through the preceding sequence, set around 1918: 
Her hands are back in her lap and they tap-tap-tap with the clack of wheel on 
wheel, but Audrey remains detached […] her head clamped in the eyepiece of 
the window, she is compelled to see through her own diaphanous self to the 
electrified fsssch-chk-fssschk-chk as the platform pulls away again, this time 
its display more various.1005 
The objects seen in display gradually shift from those on the platform in 1918 to those 
on the TV in 1971. The subject’s sense of detachment is what links the two 
technologies. This detachment is reflected in shifts in the prose. Audrey cannot situate 
herself in time or in space and cannot respond to what she sees. Audrey’s pathology 
is depicted as a mode of consciousness corresponding to the experience of watching 
TV or riding in a train. The subject is presented with a set of discontinuous images and 
cannot alter their relation to them. The idea is developed at length when Busner takes 
a bus in 2010. Busner sets off aimlessly and finds that the bus’s route determines his 
thought processes and memories. He ‘fervently wills the bus’ not to go in a particular 
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direction; the ‘last thing he wishes the bus to do is revisit any of these secret 
compartments in which the insane slosh about’; he ‘prays that the bus won’t go up 
Highgate Hill’1006. An awareness of his ultimate destination, the site of the former 
hospital, comes on like a realisation rather than a decision: 
He had set off from Kentish Town with no plan or preconceived route, yet at 
each point where the way divided, memory, that ever-present helpmeet, had 
showed him the right one. Truth to tell no matter how random his transit, 
Busner’s conscience could’ve reeled me in – my spore, my coprolites, my 
coiled mess, is scattered that widely.1007 
The decision to revisit the site seems to issue from what might be understood the 
unconscious. This unconscious blurs memory and conscience with the bus he is on 
and the city itself. Accordingly, this sequence revisits the metaphorical blurring of car 
and human seen in The Book of Dave, depicting the birth of a new hybrid of the two1008. 
As Busner reflects on this, he becomes aware that he too is passive in the face of 
objects and processes beyond himself: 
He feels the talismanic shape of his Freedom Pass through the soft stuff of his 
tracksuit bottoms – Freedom in what sense? Only a monetary one, for, far from 
allowing him to do whatever the hell I want, its sharp corner spurs me on … 
to train, to tube or bus, where he must sit: conscious but completely powerless 
to influence the route taken by the vehicle – as powerless as … its driver.1009 
A reference during this sequence to the mind ‘that believes without any evidence that 
it’s inside a head’ is telling1010. These sequences align a particular form of framed 
perception with a determination of the individual’s position in space by technology, 
culture, pathology, or an ambiguous combination of all three. They build on a similar 
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sequence in Walking to Hollywood (2010). During the middle section of the novel, the 
narrator (a fictionalised version of Self) mentions a reverie concerning ‘Extended 
Mind Theory as it related to video games and the driving of cars – cars, which are the 
true superheroes of the modern era, powerful demiurges that canter across cities on 
their rubbery pseudo-pods […] the servant has become our master’1011. A long 
sequence shortly after this passage depicts an altered form of consciousness in which 
Self relates to his environment as if in a video game1012. The novel includes various 
references to EMT, as well as variations on the idea that contemporary consciousness 
sees the world as if through screen1013. Umbrella develops a link between the post-
encephalitic condition and contemporary consciousness based on the pessimistic 
reading of EMT made explicit in Walking to Hollywood.  
In Walking to Hollywood the narrator claims that his life ‘has had no narrative 
– which implies a linear arrangement of events – but only spiralled either out of 
control, or into a vicious centrifuge of repetition and coincidence’1014. In the context 
of that novel, this mode of being follows on from the intensification of the extended 
mind through technology and the urban environment. Walking to Hollywood and 
Umbrella depict pathologies in which technology determines the individual’s relation 
to their environment and to the object of perception in such a way that these moments 
of consciousness cannot be reconciled in narrative form. This can be understood using 
Damasio’s model. In Andrew Gaedtke’s reading of Umbrella, the sense of existing 
purely as frame around nothing, a simple restatement of the fact of being a self, is a 
depiction of a state in which individuals can only experience ‘core consciousness’, 
rather than the ‘extended consciousness’ Damasio takes to be the basis of self1015. This 
is not because of their inability to formulate a coherent narrative, but rather with the 
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way in which their environment determines both their position in space and what they 
see.  
 
A Kind of New 
There are several points of contrast between Smith and Self’s understanding of core 
consciousness, but it is significant that neither propose narrative as a solution to the 
problems faced by their characters. While George reconciles her immediate conscious 
experience with form, she does so by overcoming her dependence on perfect tense and 
the linear structuring of existence.  
One of the consequences of incorporating structures external to the body 
within the core self is that the core self may be remade in radically different forms 
from moment to moment. As Self argues, the effect of technology may also be such 
as to prevent the individual from orienting themselves within space, further breaking 
up a possible foundation of continuity in extended consciousness. Smith and Self 
propose an alternative model of extended consciousness, through which the subject’s 
awareness of a disjunction between the selves at each moment of core consciousness 
acts as the foundation of agency and understanding. 
 The opposition between nature and the self in Smith’s work acts as one basis 
for a reading of her novels and short stories in terms of cyclical rather than linear 
models of time and memory. Celina Sánchez García reads The Whole Story and Other 
(2003) in terms of ‘a nostalgic retrieval of natural rhythms as a unifying force which 
escapes any possibility linguistic reduction’ and describes the use of ‘a subtle cyclic 
structure’ in certain stories which acts as ‘a reflection of the endless process of reading 
and interpreting a story’1016. Currie’s reading of The Accidental picks up on its 
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suggestion that Amber (or Alhambra) ‘is in some way external to time’, a point which 
takes on a ‘graphic dimension’ in the placing of Amber’s word before the ‘beginning’ 
section of the book1017. Patrick O’Donnell points out that the Alhambra building, as 
described by Amber in one of her sections, ‘stands as the symbol of a transient cultural 
temporality’1018. This contrasts with the timeless Amber, who ‘implies that she has 
been escaping this event [running over a child] and the ‘self’ associated with it ever 
since, as she roams without direction from place to place, a nomadic entity born of 
accident, her life a skein of contingent relations with strangers’1019. The Accidental 
depicts the various selves that Amber assumes within the perception of the individual 
Smarts. It also shows how Amber’s status as a reference point outside of time splits 
Eve into two selves at various points. As I discussed in the last chapter, Smith has 
depicted the action of the outside world within consciousness and memory in terms of 
a splitting of the self into several selves. This is further complemented by her use of 
memes. In Hotel World, italicised phrases drawn from conversations and reading are 
depicted as ghosts. In her work since The Accidental, Smith has linked these two 
techniques, depicting consciousness in terms of a conversation between many selves, 
some of which are made up of memories of other people.  
 At the start of How to Be Both, George seems to be attempting to transition 
from what Smith understands to be a child’s form of consciousness, grounded in the 
present tense and with an implicit lack of distinction between self and other, and an 
adult form, based in narrative and grammar. Her memories of her mother complicate 
this shift. George’s grief over her mother’s death has caused her to partly abandon her 
grammar pedantry, even as she attempts to impose a narrative through tense. 
Conflicting impulses in her response to a website are depicted through a split in the 
self, a brief, literal dialogue between the ‘George from before her mother died’ and 
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the ‘George from after’1020.These conflicting impulses are also at work in George’s 
relation to her therapist, Mrs Rock, and the psychiatric model of mourning as a linear 
working through of stages: ‘that before and after thing is about mourning, is what 
people keep saying. They keep talking about how grief has stages.’1021 In the first 
conversation with Mrs Rock, George describes feeling ‘at a distance’, like ‘always 
having the sound of someone drilling a hole in a wall, not your wall, but a wall like 
very close to you […] you feel it in your own house, though it’s actually happening 
several houses away’1022. Asked to be more precise, she says that it’s ‘at a distance 
and it’s like the drilling thing’, and that she doesn’t ‘care any more about syntax’1023. 
Her inability to articulate leads her back to her hope that the hole in her wall will shift 
the structure of the house1024. This rejection of interpretation and narrative then leads 
to a memory of her mother, in present tense1025. When George again corrects her own 
grammar, there is a description of her mother’s obituary, written in italics1026. The 
early parts of George’s half of the novel are structured around this kind of oscillation 
between immediate embodied experience, in memory and in perception, and its 
narration through established cultural models and written texts. Technology, in this 
context, is as much an aspect of the self as anything else mediating between the subject 
and object, whether grammar or time. When George describes a piece of Super 8 
footage of her mother dancing, which she has transferred to her laptop and phone, it is 
in present tense1027. After this, George describes listening to ‘one of the records that 
her mother loved when she was small’ as like ‘being able to experience past like you 
have literally entered it and it is a whole other place, completely new to you, where 
people really did sing songs like this, a past so alien that it is a kind of shock’1028. 
These two experiences of immediate, present tense experience, mediated by 
technology, overpower George’s attempt to re-impose tense: 
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 Shock of the new and the old both at once, her mother says. 
 Said. 
One afternoon George’s father brings home the new turntable […] A boy 
called Tommy loves a girl called Laura. He wants to give her ‘everything’ (this 
is funny in itself, apparently, from the way her parents fall about, though this 
is back when George is too young to understand why.)1029 
The use of the present tense persists in the narration, even as it acknowledges that it is 
set in the past. This complements rather than contradicts the way in which this 
experience is altered by the older George’s different understanding. The implied 
disruption of causality is developed: 
 Why did you even keep this record? George asks her mother. It’s so bad. 
I didn’t know till today but obviously I was keeping it precisely so that you, 
me and your father would all end up listening today, her mother says and they 
all fall about laughing again. 
Thinking about that today back then in this new today right now, and in 
whichever stages of mourning she’s in, doesn’t make George feel sad or feel 
anything in particular.1030 
This memory has apparently caused her to move past the stage of mourning she 
describes earlier: ‘Stage nine (or twenty three or a hundred and twenty three or ad 
infinitum, because nothing will ever not be like this again): in this stage you will no 
longer be bothered with whether songwords mean anything. In fact, you will hate 
almost all songs.’1031 She has not done so by re-imposing tense, but by ignoring it, 
experiencing memory as immediate perception.  
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 Francesco’s half of the novel uses a similar dynamic. At the beginning, 
Francesco can ‘hardly remember [his] own name, can hardly remember anyth [sic]‘, 
and starts to regain a sense of identity by listing visual memories1032. They regain 
memories when seeing their own paintings, again applying the interpretative mode, 
supplemented by italicised memes: 
 But what about the old Christ at the top of it? 
 Old 
 Christ? 
like he made it after all to old man when everyone knows Christ’s never to be 
anything other than unwrinkled eyes shining hair the colour of ripe nut from 
the hazel tree […] old man Christ, why would I paint an old (blaspheming)?1033  
Francesco begins to remember by focusing on another detail of the painting: ‘Wait – 
cause – think I remember : something : yes, I put some hands 2 hands below his (I 
mean His) feet : something you’d only see if you really looked.’1034 Like George, 
Francesco corrects themselves here to fit the orthodoxy of their own time – ‘(I mean 
His)’ - as embodied in language. The hands in the painting look like ‘they’re corroded 
with gold, gold all over them like sores turned into gold, a velvet soup of gold lentils 
[…] as if blisters of the body can become precious metals’1035. Towards the end of this 
half of the novel, Francesco remembers encountering a dying man in a bush, seeing 
first ‘hands in the air as if attached to no body : they were covered in pustules like 
coated in a deep soup paste made of lentils but lentils attached to no body’1036. 
Francesco questions the man as to who he is; he cannot remember, or doesn’t know. 
This sequence hints at the disease from which Francesco dies, as well as referring back 
to the earlier scene, in which Francesco questions the painting that will turn out to 
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have been based on this man. Just before this point at the end, the memory answers 
the question of why Christ is old in the painting: the model for this figure is 
Francesco’s father1037. 
 The second-person tense in George’s half of the novel can be read, in 
Damasio’s terms, as a depiction of core consciousness. The object and the immediate 
circumstances of the subject determine the core self in the act of seeing. Because these 
selves determine how the object is perceived, they remain attached to the memory of 
each perception. Remembering allows for an awareness of a contrast between the 
remembering self and the self at the moment of original perception. Smith depicts this 
through moments of heightened perception, which lead to vivid memories and a 
splitting of the self. Significant visual experiences in consciousness alter the perceiver, 
and grant them an awareness that they were literally a different self at different points 
in the past. For George, memory allows her to begin to move past her grief. The 
autobiographical self is made up of such cultural narratives, as Smith has emphasised 
through her characters’ gradual incorporation of particular ways of understanding 
experience. George’s engagement with visual experience, art, and memory alters her 
understanding of herself as a whole. This is expressed partly through the gradual shift 
in the spatial metaphors used in the novel. Where at first there is a straightforward 
opposition between the self (architecture) and perception (nature), by the end they 
become intertwined. Francesco’s half of the novel depicts a similar process. At the 
beginning, Francesco is the same kind of ghost as the one depicted at the start of Hotel 
World: disembodied, made up of intentional states, full of questions. The dominant 
elements of Francesco’s autobiographical self are the established rules and techniques 
of painting, which include religious orthodoxy. These are not enough to understand 
their own paintings, which contain other, contradictory elements. The paintings 
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themselves are revealed by the end to have been shaped by a tension between pre-
determined rules of painting and Francesco’s own experiences. The way in which 
these two forms of seeing interact is extended to the viewers of this painting. This 
tension changes how the viewers interact with the space in which the painting is 
kept1038. 
 Smith’s exploration of visual consciousness, and the interaction of different 
selves, draws on her reading of Walter Benjamin. Smith takes a quote from Hannah 
Arendt’s introduction to Illuminations (1968), an edited collection of essays by 
Benjamin, as an epigraph. Arendt describes a mode of thought developed by 
Benjamin, through which the thinker works with ‘thought fragments’, separated from 
their original context in the past and brought back, ‘not in order to resuscitate it the 
way it was and to contribute to the renewal of extinct ages’, but to develop new ideas 
through the contrast between then and now it makes possible1039. How to Be Both 
intersperses implicit references to the essays in Illuminations throughout1040. Among 
these are references to ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’ (1940), in which 
Benjamin distinguishes between ‘historicism’ and ‘historical materialism’1041. The 
former ‘gives the “eternal” image of the past’, while the latter ‘supplies a unique 
experience with the past’1042. Historical materialism consists of a recognition of the 
mutually constitutive relation of the past and the present, in opposition to the 
‘universal history’ in which historicism culminates. Benjamin describes this 
recognition as an arrest in the flow of thought, in which thinking stops ‘in a 
configuration pregnant with tensions’, and ‘gives that configuration a shock, by which 
it crystallizes into a monad’1043. By responding to this essay and others, Smiths 
develops Benjamin’s proposed understanding of time and history as they operate 
within thought.  
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In the metaphors chapter, I discussed George’s response to a text from H. 
George goes on to sense ‘like something blurred and moving glimpsed through a 
partition whose glass is clouded, both that loving was coming for her and the nothing 
she could do about it.’1044 Her response takes the form of a dialogue: ‘The cloud of 
unknowing, her mother said in her ear […] Meets the cloud of knowing, George 
thought back.1045 George’s acceptance of the nothing she can do about her love for H 
complements her acceptance of her mother’s presence in the present, within 
consciousness. Along with the voices of other selves, Smith has depicted the voices of 
other characters within the mind, particularly parents, throughout her fiction. As I 
discussed in the previous chapter, these voices are depicted as memes, floating and 
recurring intentional states similar to earworms. George’s acceptance of her mother in 
the present builds on a previous dialogue between George and H. H sends her the lyrics 
of songs, ‘the kind that play everywhere’: it’s like ‘H is trying to find a language that 
will make personal sense to George’s ears. […] The newness of it has a sort of power 
that can make the old things […] a kind of new.’1046 There is an implicit link here 
between the recognition of her mother’s voice as relevant in the present and the 
renewal of song lyrics. Earworms, and the voices of others, are traces left in the mind 
by embodied experiences. In this, they can be understood as forming parts of the self 
that accompanies the moment of core consciousness in the original experience. In 
Smith’s model of consciousness, patterned after Benjamin’s work on historical 
materialism, these previous selves are not subsumed within an autobiographical 
narrative, but renewed through the contrasting of them with the present self that occurs 
in response to heightened experiences of core consciousness linking the two. In the 
passage above, this moment is depicted as a literal dialogue between George and her 
mother. George’s memory of her mother is renewed by its relevance to her response 
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to the immediacy of her experience. It also forms part of a dialogue between George 
and H. Writing her response, George notices that ‘she’d used, in its first sentence, the 
future tense, like there might be such a thing as a future’1047. Currie defines the future 
anterior as ‘not the actual future, but an envisaged, virtual future which is part of the 
present, experiencing the present moment as one that will have been, as something 
that will have happened’1048. George is able to redefine her understanding of the future 
by including the past within the present, and by foregoing the distinction between self 
and other. Like Stephen in The Child in Time, she is able to mourn. 
 
Cultivation of Memory 
In the metaphors chapter, I discussed how Benjamin’s discussion of technology 
complements the modernist form of consciousness identified by Duffy whereby a 
sense of integration with technology accompanies a detached visual perspective. Self 
also depicts this state of mind in his novels. He summarises this paradoxical state in 
Walking to Hollywood when the narrator asks, in the midst of his video game reverie, 
‘Was I in the world anymore? Or was the world in me?’1049 Benjamin describes 
‘[r]eception in a state of distraction’, a state ‘symptomatic of profound changes in 
apperception’ as finding in film ‘its true means of exercise’1050. This accompanies 
what Benjamin elsewhere calls the ‘decline of the aura’, the aura designating the 
associations which ‘tend to cluster around the object of a perception’ in involuntary 
memory1051. The subject is unable to relate images to other images if they have no 
aura, that is if the subject is unaware of the distance and relation between themselves 
and the object, and unaware of what mediates that relation. An awareness of this 
relation can however be grasped through parallax, the contrasting of multiple 
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perspectives on the same object. The use of multiple perspectives in Umbrella allows 
for this kind of awareness. 
  As I’ve said, one of the post-encephalitic patients in Umbrella defines the 
condition in terms similar to core consciousness. Another patient describes his 
experience as ‘a continuous present, an awful and unchanging Now’1052. Busner 
responds by proposing that ‘it’s movement that’s essential for the formation of 
memories – that memory is a somatic phenomenon, and so if a mind can no longer 
manipulate its body in space, it loses the capacity to orientate within time’1053. Earlier 
on, Busner reflects on memory as form of structuring: ‘and what was the cultivation 
of memory – through solitude, through reverie – if not the erection of a scaffolding in 
order to facilitate the construction of current behaviours’1054. The inability to move 
beyond the unchanging now of core consciousness is not due to a failure to establish 
a coherent narrative, but rather to a situation in which consciousness cannot alter and 
modify this scaffolding, discarding and incorporating different prostheses.  
Busner compares the ‘behavioural aid’ of memory to ‘the wearing of a loudly 
ticking watch so as to supply a tempo by which to recalibrate the complex motor 
sequences needed to stand up, that should be automatic, but that needed to be 
relearned … every time’1055. Earlier still, when Busner first meets Audrey, his watch 
acts as a marker in the text, showing the relative positions of both perspectives. As he 
touches her for the first time, the ‘fancy new quartz watch on his own plump wrist 
turns its shiny black face to his as her malaise resonates through him […] he wonders: 
Am I blurring? Ashwushushwa, she slurs.’1056 After the shift to the perspective of the 
young Audrey, a shift back to the present is signalled by a reference to the same watch: 
‘Samuel death holds the timepiece up by its gold-plated bracelet, its face a lozenge of 
jet eclipsing the present […] red illumined figures, 08.54, each digit composed with 
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straight bars, bevelled at their ends.’1057 Audrey is apparently seeing Busner’s watch 
in 1971. This leads to the child Audrey responding to and interpreting older self’s 
situation in 1971: ‘Gaol numbers … I’m in gaol … in the spike – the booby-hatch, ha-
ha-hoo – help me, helpme, hellellellellpme, Stan, Bert’s torturing me! Ashuway-
ashuwa…’1058 This is similar to the dynamic used by Smith: a moment of heightened 
perception, to which a younger self, separate from the present self, responds, allowing 
the present self some understanding of what is seen. The same watch plays a part in 
the next shift. As Audrey walks away in 1971, Busner looks for an action to ‘fracture 
this reverie’, finding it in the ‘automatism of consulting his watch […] the digits are 
illuminated redly, futuristically: 08.54…’1059 As he does so, he ‘sees and feels himself 
to be a colossal white canister spinning slowly end over end and illumined against the 
infinity of blackness’, before awakening ‘to discover himself an old man who lies 
pinching the slack flesh on the back of his left wrist with the fingers of his right hand, 
fingers that prickle with arthritis’1060. As in The Book of Dave, memes and other forms 
of scaffolding establish links across time and space.  
 As the older Busner reflects shortly after, the ‘automatism’ described here 
forms a connection between the patients and their doctors: 
When he had stopped wearing ties that was when I stopped fidgeting with them, 
obviously … the pill-rolling tremor we called it: tremor at rest, the patient’s 
gaze forced upwards […] and the shrink? He sat there watching them, rolling 
the end of his tie up and down: tremor at rest. Nothing, Busner thinks, comes 
of nothing – although, LCD digits come of pinching.1061 
The watch is not just a physical marker. It also implies its own structuring of action, a 
scaffolding which persists even without the object itself. For the older Busner, these 
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actions prompt the recall of memes from the time in which he did have the watch: ‘As 
he pinches the slack flesh on the back of his left wrist with the fingers of his right 
hand, it comes in an old mannish drizzle: D- E- C- I-M-A-L-I-ZAYSHUN, then a gush: 
DECIMALIZAYSHUN! Soon it’s gonna change the money round’1062. The form of 
scaffolding associated with the watch is distinct from that of other objects. Busner 
makes this point when reflecting on the umbrella: 
Propped up against the boxes is a brolly he has no recollection of having 
bought, borrowed, or taken up. But that, he thinks, is the way of it: umbrellas 
are never contracted for, only mysteriously acquired, to be fleetingly useful, 
then annoying and cumbersome before eventually being lost. And this losing 
is itself unrecalled, so that what usually impinges is only the umbrella-shaped 
hole where one used to be.1063 
Later on, Busner connects this to mechanical reproduction: 
When … he pauses, musing … did the umbrella first become an article to be 
routinely forgotten rather than assiduously remembered? Surely, to begin with, 
they would’ve been expensive items, invested with strong affect and not to be 
casually abandoned … as nowadays, given their cheapness and ubiquity.1064 
These passages are significant in linking the post-encephalitics’ state of core 
consciousness to a more general condition. The cheapness and ubiquity of the umbrella 
means that it supposedly leaves no lasting impression in memory beyond the fact of 
its presence or absence. As the example of Busner’s watch shows, however, the 
‘reception in a state of distraction’ which characterises the contemporary subject’s 
response to such objects is accompanied by a structuring effect, as actions associated 
with the object become engrained in habit. Every intentional object has its scaffolding. 
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 This scaffolding is part of what fixes the intentional object as a visual image 
within consciousness. Busner’s realisation that he has forgotten his umbrella is 
expressed by his seeing the object ‘with superfluous clarity’1065. The illusory 
objectivity brought on by mechanisation, noted by both Benjamin and Self, extends to 
consciousness. In his introduction to a 2013 edition Debord’s The Society of the 
Spectacle, Self describes a variation of the urban consciousness developed in his essay 
on London: ‘From ground level, and at walking pace – which Rousseau considered 
the speed at which we cogitate best – the slow shuffling of hoardings, buildings and 
vehicles allows the camera ‘I’ to flatter itself with the spontaneous creation of 
montages’1066. This is complemented by the ‘presence of so much text’, which ‘insists 
that what is quite unreadable should nonetheless be legible’1067. Debord calls the 
spectacle ‘a social relation among people, mediated by images […] a Weltanschauung 
which has become actual, materially translated’1068. The world ‘at once present and 
absent which the spectacle makes visible is the world of the commodity dominating 
all that is lived’1069. The environment creates the commodity, and its equivalent in 
consciousness, the discrete visual image. This image is an intentional object, formed 
through the interaction of an extended form of scaffolding (the aura) and of an actual 
object. Ordinarily, this scaffolding is not available to consciousness. When the actual 
object is either absent, or present in an incongruous context, the scaffolding can be 
perceived. This scaffolding includes automatic physical reactions, memes, and even 
different selves.  
In ‘Medicating the Masses’ (2015), Self argues that ‘humans have a 
predisposition to believe things – such as facts and ideas – presented to them in ritual 
contexts and supported by institutions’1070. Medical psychiatry functions through such 
ritual contexts, and has the further function of denying their importance through its 
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focus on the mind as located entirely within the brain. Busner articulates a similar 
critique of psychiatry, its methods and institutions at various points in the novel. His 
critiques are interspersed with earworms1071. At the end of the novel Busner becomes 
aware of a new form of significance in the ‘pop ditties that had infested his mind’, 
seeing them as ‘continuous reminders not only of this unfinished and abandoned 
travail, but of all the crimes of forgetting he had committed’1072. He adds that ‘simply 
because they were truisms, it didn’t mean they weren’t … true’1073. As in Smith’s 
fiction, such earworms can be understood as the incorporation of intentional states 
from outside the self. Earlier, Busner incorporates Audrey’s voice within his own 
mind. Looking at a pile of disparate objects that Audrey has made, the italicised text 
supplies information Audrey has that Busner does not: ‘The two men peer – one from 
the foot, the other from the side – at this what? Shrine – or grotto’1074. Only gradually 
does Busner becomes aware of what has happened: ‘For quite a while Busner takes 
the little voice Pliz remembah ve gro’o, onlee wunce a year for thought - a colleague? 
recalled droning on in a case meeting […] next he thinks it comes from the over-
tranquilised patient on the far side of the ward […] finally he realises it is right in his 
ear, but micro-phonic’1075. Hearing her voice during their first encounter, Busner 
wonders whether the two are blurring into each other. There are references throughout 
the novel to his blurring with other characters, occupying their perspective or reading 
their mind1076.  While intentional states embodied in language are linked to habit, to a 
form of structuring of experience, they can also be free-floating, passing between one 
individual and another, or persisting in memory through years, in both cases 
establishing a contrast between different perspectives. While Busner’s integration with 
technology gives him the illusion of objectivity, the incorporation of the intentional 
states of others within consciousness allows him to grasp the subjectivity of 
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perspective, allowing him some measure of agency in his dawning critique of his 
profession and his own actions, culminating in his apprehension of an unfulfilled 
responsibility at the end of the novel.  
In his piece on modernism’s influence on his work, published in the same year 
as Umbrella, Self alludes to Caspar David Friedrich’s painting, Wanderer Above the 
Sea of Fog. Self brings up the image of a ‘solitary wanderer in a sea of fog’ who 
‘observes, horrified, as its dank clouds and sinister volutes are inexorably modelled 
by the soughing winds into a likeness of his own anguished face’1077. Self is drawing 
on Joseph Koerner’s reading of the painting, which Gabriel Josipovici refers to in 
What Ever Happened to Modernism? (2010), a book Self mentions later on in the 
essay. The focal point of the painting is a Rückenfigur, ‘who is and is not the painter, 
who is and is not the viewer, who stands at the limit of the picture, with his back to us, 
so that what we see is not what he sees, but him seeing’1078. The figure ‘reminds us 
that vision is always at a particular moment, from a particular place, and that though 
vision may be the goal it does not subsume life but is only one moment, one 
experience, within life’1079. I take this discussion as a counterpoint to Smith’s 
reflections on consciousness as an expression of the landscape within the mind. The 
environment and the mind alter each other through the medium of consciousness.  
In his essay, ‘Kafka’s Wound’, also published in 2012, Self quotes Arendt, 
describing Benjamin’s basic approach as ‘not to investigate the utilitarian or 
communicative functions of linguistic creations, but to understand them in their 
crystallised and thus ultimately fragmentary form as intentionless and 
noncommunicative utterances of a “world essence”’1080. He cites this as a counter-
example, contrasting Benjamin’s approach with that of literary academics, who zip 
their ‘off-the-peg’ symbolic orders into Kafka’s1081. I’ll conclude by briefly 
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questioning my own symbolic order. I have read my primary texts in terms of the 
influence of cognitive science via third culture texts, and of an adaptation of various 
aspects of contemporary cognitive science. Umbrella and How to Be Both each 
provide evidence of this influence. However, these novels also show how these 
influences are bound up with others. They draw on the influence of cognitive science, 
but also of Arendt, Benjamin, Berger, Debord and Kafka. All of these writers 
responded to the relation between humans and technology. The project of reading the 
depiction of thought in the contemporary novel must model itself on the mode of 
consciousness depicted by them and by Smith and Self. In responding to the world 
essence, they must recognise the subjectivity of their interpretative frameworks, and 
acknowledge the whole range of influences at work. Consciousness, thought and the 
mind are determined by extended processes, and so are the terms and concepts through 
which we understand them. The simple narrative whereby the representation of 
consciousness in the novel can be traced back to a handful of scientific texts breaks 
down into a multiplicity of streams of influences, a dialogue. As Bakhtin argues, the 
novel as a form is ideally suited to exploring the operations of this broader context. In 
the conclusion, I will be addressing this point, while summarising my findings and 












Our present sense of self is thus only a shrunken residue of a far more 
comprehensive, indeed all-embracing feeling, which corresponded to a more 
intimate bond between the ego and the world around it. If we assume that this 
primary sense of self has survived, to a greater or lesser extent, in the mental 
life of many people, it would coexist, as a kind of counterpart, with the 
narrower, more sharply defined sense of self belonging to the years of 
maturity, and the ideational content appropriate to it would be precisely those 
notions of limitlessness and oneness with the universe – the very notions 
used by my friend to elucidate the ‘oceanic’ feeling. But have we any right to 
assume that what was originally present has survived beside what later 
evolved from it? 
- Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents (1930) 
 
[A]ll languages of heteroglossia, whatever the principle underlying them and 
making each unique, are specific points of view on the world, forms for 
conceptualizing the world in words, specific world views, each characterized 
by its own objects, meanings and values. As such they all may be juxtaposed 
to one another, mutually supplement one another, contradict one another and 
be interrelated dialogically. As such they encounter one another and co-exist 
in the consciousness of real people – first and foremost, in the creative 
consciousness of people who write novels. 
- M.M. Bakhtin, ‘Discourse in the Novel’ (1935) 
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In the introduction, I surveyed ways in which Freud’s work has provided means 
through which contemporary writers have begun to articulate a new model of the 
relation between technology and the human mind. These assemblages stabilize by 
resituating cognition at the level of the individual. The computational model of the 
mind works by first establishing a fundamental continuity between the human mind 
and material technologies, before positing a level at which the boundaries it has 
erased can be redrawn. Early work in cognitive science used the computer as a 
model for the mind, but the operations of the ‘computational paradox’ have made 
this untenable. Dennett, the philosopher who has done the most to develop a 
comprehensive model of human subjectivity tying together cognitive science, 
neuroscience, philosophy of the mind, and neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory, has 
responded by arguing that the mind is a narrative. Thinkers such as Clark and 
Damasio, who have built on the basic premises of cognitive science in developing 
models with more radical implications for the boundaries of subjectivity, have to 
some extent accepted Dennett’s formulation of ‘narrationism’. Each assumes that 
while cognition might be embodied and extended, the limitations of consciousness 
prevent us from becoming aware of it on those terms. Instead, we create a narrative 
through which cognition can be understood in reference to an individual self. This 
position simultaneously defines the conscious self as a ‘fiction’, unreflective of the 
true operations of cognition, and validates a conventional model of subjectivity by 
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defining the function of consciousness in the cognitive model as producing this 
‘fiction’.  
 The success of this model depends on a particular understanding of 
consciousness. Consciousness is defined as distinct from and secondary to the 
unconscious, or nonconscious. It is further defined according to the psychological 
and ethical narrativity theses. This understanding of consciousness characterizes 
Freud’s model. This is only one possible way of understanding consciousness among 
many. Freud begins Civilization and its Discontents by considering one such 
alternative to his own view relayed to him by his friend Romain Rolland. Rolland 
had become aware of ‘a particular feeling of which he himself was never free, which 
he found confirmed by many others and which he assumed was shared by millions, a 
feeling that he was inclined to call a sense of ‘eternity’, a feeling of something 
limitless, unbounded – as it were ‘oceanic’’1082. This is a feeling of ‘being 
indissolubly bound up with and belonging to the world outside oneself’1083. Freud 
notes that he can discover no trace of the feeling in himself, but that this does not 
entitle him to ‘dispute its actual occurrence in others’1084. He goes on to say that the 
idea ‘sounds so bizarre, and fits so badly into the fabric of our psychology, that we 
are justified in looking for a psychanalytic – that is to say a genetic – derivation of 
such a feeling’1085. Freud acknowledges the possibility of becoming consciously 
aware of oneself as connected to the world outside oneself. Engaging with aspects of 
consciousness which we might have overlooked, or might not have experienced 
ourselves, alters our model of the mind. 
As Hayles argues, the distinction between consciousness and the unconscious 
is determined by attention: 
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On the level of conscious thought, attention comes into play as a focusing 
action that codetermines what we call materiality. That is, attention selects 
from the vast (essentially infinite) repertoire of physical attributes some 
characteristics for notice, and they in turn constitute an object’s materiality. 
Materiality, like the object itself, is not a pre-given entity but rather a 
dynamic process that changes as the focus of attention shifts. Perceptions 
exist unconsciously as well as consciously, and research emerging from 
contemporary neuroscience, psychology and other fields about the “new 
unconscious” (or “adaptive unconscious”) plays a critical role in 
understanding this phenomenon. In these views, the unconscious does not 
exist primarily as repressed or suppressed material but rather as a perceptive 
capacity that catches the abundant overflow too varied, rich, and deep to 
make it through the bottleneck of attention.1086   
 
I have argued, following Rowlands, that the mechanisms of perception are extended, 
in that they include anything through which the object is revealed to the subject. 
Materiality and the extended machinery of attention are linked in feedback loop 
intersecting within individual consciousness. This process is the basis of the 
technological assemblage. It also provides a grounding for narrationism. The 
contemporary technological environment and the present formulations of the 
psychological and narrativity theses have shaped each other to the extent that the 
contemporary subject experiences their life as a form of narrative. No perfect 
balance is possible, however. The system is characterized by what Damasio calls an 
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oscillation. The machinery of attention and materiality do not determine each other 
to such an extent that all conscious experience fits into a coherent narrative, or that 
no other aspects of the material are available to attention. The boundary between 
what is conscious and unconscious is also mutable and dynamic.  
 In the introduction, I surveyed the extent to which the work of the authors I 
have chosen as my subjects for this thesis has been guided by a dissatisfaction with 
narrative in general and with the narratological model of the self in particular. The 
subject of my enquiry has been the extent to which this dissatisfaction, and the 
means through which it has been articulated, follows on from the influence of 
contemporary technology and of cognitive science, particularly as disseminated in 
third culture texts. I have also addressed the question of whether the formal 
techniques and innovations developed by these authors as a result of this influence 
can provide the basis for discussing human thought, understanding and behaviour in 
a way which avoids the flaws of narrationism. Rejecting narrationism as relying on 
too narrow a conceptualization of consciousness and the mind, the authors I have 
looked at have attended to particular aspects of the contemporary technological 
environment. They have developed these into formal innovations which alter how 
attention operates within their novels. This alteration is not a passive response to 
changes in our understanding of the mind. As I discussed in the introduction, cultural 
models of the mind are constituted by feedback loops incorporating individual theory 
of mind and literary texts. The meaning of saying that the mind is a form of narrative 
is determined by actual examples of narrative. Altering such examples is an 
intervention within a broader cultural dialogue. In this conclusion, I will be arguing 
that the work of the writers I have looked at should be understood as such. I will 
review my findings, and sketch out the basis for a model of the mind shared by these 
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writers, centred on the active role of consciousness in shaping materiality. I will then 
consider the implications of my work for further dialogue between cognitive science 
and literary studies.  
 
Metaphors 
In the first chapter I identified three interrelated but distinct sets of metaphors for the 
mind in my primary texts. These sets of metaphors act as common thread between 
works with different themes, settings, and forms. I also found that these works 
shared an approach to the use of these metaphors, the effect of which was to imply 
that contemporary technological assemblages could form the basis of a critique of a 
more fundamental understanding of the mind as limited to the individual.  
Technologies alter metaphors for the mind. For example, descriptions of 
thought and memory in terms of the operations of a camera or projector draw on and 
extend the metaphor of the ‘mind’s eye’. The prevalence of screens and cameras in 
the contemporary technological environment alter the experiential basis of this 
metaphor by altering the experience of seeing. The idea that objective knowledge is, 
metaphorically, seeing through a lens correlates with the increasing role of filmed 
images in lived experience. These linked shifts prompted by technology alter our 
understanding of the mind. In altering both our experience and those aspects of our 
experience which we attend to, they also alter the mind itself.  
 My primary texts share an approach through which these metaphors are used 
to question the assumptions they embody. They do this in two ways. Firstly, through 
a focus on what these metaphors leave out. In refining metaphors, the technologies 
also narrow it, for example in the shift from ‘thoughts as discrete impressions’ to 
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‘thoughts as computational representations’. This narrowing prompts an increasing 
awareness that the metaphor is inadequate in fully representing the mind. This calls 
into question not only the technological variation of that metaphor but also the 
fundamental metaphor itself. For example, McCarthy’s repetitive use of a 
deliberately limited set of computational metaphors on the part of the narrator in 
Remainder acts as an implicit critique of the computational model of the mind, and 
as a way of highlighting the limitations of understanding thought and behaviour 
purely in terms of a decontextualized individual. Self’s use of ‘screen’ metaphors for 
perception, memory and abstract thought in The Book of Dave expresses the way in 
which Dave’s way of thinking has been determined by his occupation and 
environment as well as questioning the possibility of objective perception. Secondly, 
these novels also suggest in places that the metaphors at work can be taken literally. 
Describing an aspect of the mind through reference to a technology can be used to 
imply that the technology in question is an aspect of the mind. The Book of Dave and 
Umbrella, for example, mix descriptions of the mind in terms of particular spaces 
with descriptions of those same spaces using mental terms. How to Be Both develops 
an extensive metaphorical register playing on the tension between nature and 
architecture to depict perception as based on a continuity of the subject with its 
environment and with the object of perception. The actual examples of nature and 
architecture which George sees are literally part of her mind, in that they determine 
the metaphors through which she thinks. 
 The overall argument in these authors’ uses of metaphor is that the mind 
extends beyond the individual body. Contemporary technology heightens an 
awareness of this point, partly due to its influence on metaphor, and partly due to its 
effect on the experiential basis of metaphor. That these two effects are linked 
253 
 
   
 
suggests that Lakoff and Johnson’s model of embodied metaphorical thought can be 
revised to include extended metaphorical thought. The use of metaphors in these 
novels, then, allows for the depiction of extended cognition, while also providing 
evidence for it. 
 
The Narrational Paradox 
As I mentioned at the end of the first chapter, narrative can be understood as a form 
of spatial metaphor for the structuring of experience, supported by such technologies 
as language and the novel. The positioning of narrative in the novels I have looked at 
follows a similar pattern to the use of metaphor. Narrationism represents a narrowing 
of a more fundamental metaphor, supported by various technologies. These novels 
depict different forms of narrationism, emphasising that which is excluded by the 
narratives their characters construct. In showing that their characters’ narratives do 
not adequately explain all forms of cognition at work, they situate thought within a 
broader environment. 
 In the second chapter, ‘Thinking and Thought’, I showed how the definitions 
of the most basic terms for describing the mind have been altered by the influence of 
technology. In Saturday and Remainder ‘thinking’ and ‘thought’ are consistently 
associated with a computational model of cognition. This complements an emphasis 
on the ways in which technology and the broader environment shapes the thought 
processes of the protagonists. McEwan and McCarthy use repetition to create an 
awareness of the restrictions imposed by these definitions, and by the computational 
model. What the protagonists understand as ‘thinking’ is no narrow, particularly 
given the complexity of their experience, that we are forced to look beyond it.  
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 This dynamic builds on a basic distinction between consciousness and the 
unconscious, and in the third chapter, I built on this point by looking at how 
McEwan and McCarthy have engaged with the ongoing influence of Freud. Despite 
McEwan’s deliberate rejection of Freud, beginning with The Child in Time, I found 
that he has maintained a distinction between language and vision shaped by the 
influence of Freud on his early work. McCarthy, on the other hand, based C on one 
Freud’s case-studies. However, the resulting novel is similar to The Child in Time in 
its depiction of consciousness in relation to the prosthetics of language and 
technology. In both novels, language takes the place of consciousness as defined by 
Freud, while vision takes the place of the unconscious. As I’ve shown, this fits 
Freud’s association of consciousness with language in his later work, which presages 
contemporary narrationism. This narrowing of the definition of consciousness 
undermines the distinction between consciousness and the unconscious by excluding 
non-linguistic aspects of conscious experience.  
 In the fourth chapter, ‘Other Selves’, I read The Book of Dave and The 
Accidental in relation to Dennett’s work. I found that Smith and Self both used of 
italicized text within free indirect style prose to represent the intrusion of memes 
within consciousness. This technique complements the revision of the distinction 
between consciousness and the unconscious identified above in marking certain 
aspects of consciousness as aspects. Both writers also split the individual self into 
several selves in a way that develops the implications of the intentional stance. 
Dennett acknowledges that in some pathological cases it is valid to posit the 
existence of several agencies operating with the psyche of one individual. The Book 
of Dave and The Accidental depict characters made up of multiple selves without 
defining them as aberrations.  
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In the fifth chapter, ‘The Environment Within’, I used Umbrella and How to 
Be Both to reflect on the extent to which such alternatives to narrationism could be 
embodied in literary form. I showed how the more experimental and ‘modernist’ 
forms used in those novels could be seen as progressions from various aspects of 
their authors’ earlier work. While narrationism justifies itself using literary narrative 
and the novel as reference points, these works show that the novel form is not limited 
to the depiction of narratological forms of consciousness, and that works focused on 
other aspects of consciousness and on a critique of narrativity maintain a continuity 
with other novels. Both novels complement Damasio’s model of consciousness, 
which situates non-narrative forms of consciousness as primary.  
As I argued in the introduction, contemporary narrationism is inherently 
linked with technology. The novel functions as a technology. As such, it plays the 
same role as the other technologies I have discussed in relation to the narrationist 
metaphor. The way in which the novel is conceptualized according to this metaphor 
is shown to be reductive in the context of an actual novel through an emphasis on 
flaws in characters’ narratives interpretations of their situations and through the 
development and use of non-narrative formal techniques.  
 
Third Culture 
Each writer’s rejection of narrativity has a different motivation and is accomplished 
through a different set of means, but they all complement a dynamic arising from 
contemporary metaphors for thought, whereby a correspondence between a 
technological metaphor and its experiential basis breaks down, allowing for the 
questioning of more fundamental assumptions about the mind. I have also noted that 
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the dominant contemporary framework for understanding the mind, cognitive 
science, can be understood in the same way. Thinking of the mind as in some sense a 
computer has led more recently to a focus on the ways in which the mind is not like a 
computer, particularly within 4E cognitive models. The use of metaphor identified 
above fulfils the basic premise of Gardner’s ‘computational paradox’.  
The findings of cognitive science have been disseminated within culture as a 
whole through the third culture. I have found that the formal innovations through 
which the authors in my research corpus have articulated alternatives to narrationism 
have their origin at least partly in those authors’ engagement with third culture texts. 
I have broadened the definition of third culture to include work in the humanities that 
reflects a direct engagement with the premises and findings of cognitive science. I 
also include texts which draw on Freud’s work, following Dennett’s positing of 
Freud as a forerunner of cognitive science. 
In the second chapter, I showed that McEwan’s use of the terms ‘thinking’ 
and ‘thought’ in Saturday has been directly influenced by his earlier reading of 
Turing. The way in which he depicts Henry’s use of theory of mind is further 
influenced by Pinker. I also found that McCarthy’s use of a parodic computational 
register, emphasized through repetition and embedded within a looping narrative 
structure, draws on his research into contemporary psychiatry and his reading of 
Freud, as well as anticipating his use of Lévi-Strauss in Satin Island.  
In the third chapter, I showed that various formal techniques McEwan first 
used in The Child in Time, which recur in Saturday, derive directly from his reading 
of Bohm, including his depiction of a tension between vision and interpretation. 
These techniques also develop on his earlier use of a distinction between 
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consciousness and the unconscious influenced by his reading of Freud. I also showed 
how McCarthy’s depiction of vision in C respond to aspects of Lacan’s work, which 
arose through the latter’s engagement with cybernetics. 
In the fourth chapter, I showed how an engagement with Dennett’s 
formulation of the meme by Smith and Self over the course of their careers has led to 
their development of similar formal techniques. Both writers have also used 
references to neuroplasticity in developing this technique. Self has also drawn on the 
work of Jaynes, an influence he shares with Dennett. I also looked at how Dennett’s 
work on memes relates to the concept of ‘intentionality’. Dennett has argued that 
current perspectives on intentionality accept Brentano’s definition of the term. I 
discussed Brentano’s influence on Freud, and the relevance of their use of 
intentionality to Smith’s work.  
In the fifth chapter, I looked at how Self’s engagement with Sacks and EMT 
is reflected in the model of consciousness he develops in Umbrella. I also showed 
how Smith has responded to the influence of Hofstadter, a collaborator of Dennett’s, 
via Calvino. These influences have allowed Smith and Self to develop the aspects of 
their work I identified in the fourth chapter. 
In these cases, the writers have accepted some of the premises and findings of 
cognitive science, and developed formal innovations that express them, without 
accepting any of the overall meta-structures of narrationism or computationalism. 
Rather, these formal innovations complement and develop their critique of 
narrativity. There are several possible interpretations of these findings. On one 
reading, the influence of the third culture on these novels has operated along the 
lines of the computational paradox; the appeal of several ideas, developed further 
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and allowed to interact with others within the novel, has undermined the structuring 
framework of narrationism. On another reading, a general dissatisfaction with 
narrativity has led to a particular approach to third culture texts on the part of the 
authors, who have selected and emphasized certain aspects with a view to bolstering 
their existing critique. Each reading applies to various extents to each writer, and I 
have not found evidence that would lead me to favour one decisively. Further 
research into the chronology of these authors’ development might favour one or the 
other. However, while I found various instances of direct influence from one text to 
another, as a whole these findings undermine any structuring according to a linear 
model of development. The way in which literary texts absorb the influence of other 
forms does not proceed straightforwardly. I see this as one of the strengths of 
literature, justifying its place within the kind of dialogue which the third culture 
seeks to bypass.  
 
Characteristics of Consciousness in the Twenty-First Century 
The way in which we define consciousness is significant, both for our understanding 
of the mind and for the operations of actual individual minds. The narrationist model 
relies on a particular understanding of consciousness. The depiction of consciousness 
in the novels I have looked at, as a whole, diverges from this understanding in 
several important respects. While the depictions of consciousness in individual 
novels contrast, I have identified several characteristics that apply to all the novels I 
have looked at. 
1. Consciousness is not cognition 
259 
 
   
 
The term ‘cognition’ has taken on a central importance in contemporary discussion 
of the mind. Cognitive science began as a specialized discipline, formed out of a 
dialogue between practitioners in several fields, using the computer as a shared 
reference point. The term ‘cognitive science’ is now taken to refer simply to the 
study of the mind. This obscures the extent to which the origins of cognitive science 
continue to determine what is meant by ‘cognition’. My primary texts have 
responded to this point by depicting aspects of conscious thought excluded from 
various reductive contemporary models of cognition. This is particularly evident in 
McEwan’s use of ‘thinking’ and ‘thought’ to denote opposed categories, neither of 
which apply to all conscious experience. It is also exemplified by Smith’s use of 
second-person prose in How to Be Both to depict the self as shaped partly in 
response to visual experience. In distinguishing consciousness from cognition, these 
authors place the two on an equal footing. 
2. There is no clear distinction between consciousness and the unconscious 
According to Hayles, the distinction between consciousness and the unconscious or 
nonconscious distinction relies on attention. It follows that at least some aspects of 
the unconscious could be made conscious, and vice versa. The way in which this 
distinction is understood is still determined to a large extent by the work of Freud. In 
his later work, Freud defined consciousness in terms of the association of language 
with mental impressions. One of the most significant implications of Damasio’s 
model is his positing of core consciousness, comprised of what he calls ‘images’, 
which precedes linguistic consciousness. My primary texts demonstrate how this 
argument functions given the ongoing influence of Freud’s model: visual conscious 
experience acts as the unconscious does in Freud’s work. Smith’s depiction of seeing 
in How to Be Both, influenced by Calvino’s model of literary meaning as based on 
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visual images, is one example. Her work shares a dynamic with Self’s whereby an 
interpretative response to what is seen is marked as distinct from the initial 
experience of seeing. Both seeing and interpreting are aspects of consciousness, but 
where the latter is associated with the conscious self, the former is understood in 
terms of a separate agency within the mind which recalls the Freudian unconscious.  
3. Narrative is one aspect of consciousness, among others 
In arguing that neither the mind or consciousness are structured by an overall 
narrative, I am not claiming that narrative plays no role in consciousness. Neither am 
I arguing that my primary texts have no narrative structure. Narrative and theory of 
mind are aspects of conscious experience, which exist alongside other forms of 
experience. The writers I have looked at explore the tension between narrative 
structuring and other forms of expression that is fundamental to the novel form. This 
is most evident in C’s use of a deliberately limited, parodic ‘realist’ prose style and 
structure as a way of emphasizing the limitations of our understanding of the relation 
between humans and technology. The novel places limitations on what can be 
understood or articulated by its characters, while making what remains unstated 
fairly self-evident. The Accidental achieves something similar through its 
juxtaposition of several limited perspectives on the same events. It goes further in 
positing a similar dynamic of multiple subjective perspectives operating within the 
same individual mind. Even if we accept that narrative does structure conscious 
experience from moment to moment, a focus on other aspects of consciousness 
allows us to be aware of several narratives and of inconsistencies between these 
narratives.  
4. Consciousness begins with the other 
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Damasio contends that consciousness originates in the individual’s mapping of their 
internal homeostasis and of their relation to their environment. The self that emerges 
in each moment of consciousness is formed in relation to the object of 
consciousness, and vice versa. Smith’s use of second-person prose in How to be Both 
embodies this point. These passages are used sparingly throughout the novel, but 
their occurrence structures the plot. Similarly, Saturday is structured around several 
short but significant passages in which Henry’s eyes meet with those of another, and 
he finds himself altered by the encounter. Consciousness is not just a function of the 
brain, as he posits later on, or even just of the individual mind, but of the mind’s 
encounter with a reality beyond itself.  
5. Consciousness is a coping and a disclosing mechanism 
If consciousness is primarily a response to the disruption of internal homeostasis, 
then the particular means by which the object of consciousness is disclosed to the 
subject is determined by a coping impulse. This also implies that the nature of the 
conscious self is partly determined by the object of consciousness, and that this 
object therefore determines the way in which it copes. The operations of coping and 
disclosing within consciousness determine each other and cannot be fully 
distinguished. The depiction of trauma in my primary texts supports this point. 
Remainder’s plot structure is determined by a looping interaction between the 
narrator and his environment, each altering the other. The visions experienced by 
Stephen in The Child in Time can be read as attempts to sublimate his grief, but they 
have an active role in the plot.  
6. Consciousness binds the subject and the self 
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The operations of coping and disclosing can only be distinguished, to an extent, by 
positing two entities present in consciousness: the subject and the self. I have 
adopted this distinction from Lakoff, defining the former as the locus of 
consciousness – the one to whom the object is disclosed – and the latter as the 
narrative entity reconstructed in the act of coping. In terms of Damasio’s model, the 
former is the episodic self emerging at each moment of core consciousness, while the 
latter is the autobiographical self of extended consciousness. Both are spatially 
extended: the subject is inseparable from the object, while the self is formed partly 
through the prosthetic of language according to the pressures of sociocultural 
homeostasis. The novels I have at looked frequently distinguish between two or 
more aspects of the same individual, particularly during moments of heightened 
conscious affect. In The Book of Dave the title character effectively splits into two. 
The formal technique through which this split is depicted is maintained and 
developed in Umbrella, in which various character draw on aspects of their 
environment in their attempts to cope with the affect, forming new selves. These 
selves are subsequently undermined by the emergence of a new subject in response 
to new experience. This cyclical process determines the ethical understanding of the 
protagonist in my primary texts, in a way that complements Critchley’s notion of the 
ethical dividual.  
7. Consciousness is intersubjective 
Several of the aspects of consciousness above are spatially extended, in that they 
incorporate objects and processes outside of the individual body. In some cases, they 
also include other people, and can therefore be understood as intersubjective. This is 
particularly true of language, for it serves as an extended prosthesis in the minds of 
its speakers. Several of my primary texts end by depicting individuals revising their 
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previous self-narratives in collaboration with others. The Book of Dave ends with 
Dave writing a new book with his partner. The Child in Time allows Stephen to 
make sense of his vision by relating it to a complementary vision experienced by his 
mother. Smith in particular relates this process to the formation of the mind. The 
Accidental ends with each of its characters embracing different forms of communal 
experience; Eve is able to overcome the solipsism at work in her treatment of Amber 
as a screen for fantasy by becoming her to an extent. George’s half of How to be 
Both ends with her acknowledging the enduring presence of her mother within her 
consciousness and simultaneously recognizing her relation to H as a breach in the 
boundary between herself and the world outside. Rather than continuing to seek to 
achieve an objective perspective through the use of technology these characters 
recognize the inherently partial nature of their perspective, and begin to incorporate 
those of others. 
8. Consciousness is outside of time 
Consciousness is determined by the operations of a feedback loop incorporating the 
object, the environment, perception, and memory. Memories alter what is being seen 
at the same time as what is seen alters memory. I have argued that consciousness 
involves the interaction of mutually determining processes incorporating the object 
of consciousness and the extended machinery of perception. Memory complicates 
this process: objects existing in the past determine the actions of perception in the 
present, objects in the present alter the way in which memories are disclosed and 
how they affect the process of coping. Memory is not wholly a fiction. Remainder, 
The Child in Time, The Book of Dave, Umbrella and How to Be both all disrupt the 
relation between the different time periods they depict through form and narrative 
structure. Each of them hints that events in the future or past relative to the main 
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setting might be fantasies through the use of anachronism or repetition. Rather than 
developing this, however, they use the resulting ambiguity to establish a continuity 
between those time periods within the consciousness of their protagonist. 
9. Consciousness is not an epiphenomenon 
The above characteristics, taken together, entail the argument that consciousness 
plays an active role within cognition. Aspects of human thought and behaviour can 
only be understood through reference to consciousness. Consciousness also provides 
a basis for agency. According to the computational model, thought is algorithmic, 
applying set routines to new experience. This is true even if we take individual, 
environmental and sociocultural forms of homeostasis into account. The individual is 
passive, shaped by human nature and their environment. Consciousness, on the other 
hand, splits the individual into the subject and the self, allowing each to alter the 
other. Memory creates an awareness of contrasts between the successive selves 
produced by perception, causing further alteration. Extended consciousness is in this 
sense characterized not by an awareness of one’s life as a coherent narrative, but as a 
series of episodes. My primary texts posit conscious experience as the foundation of 
ethical understand and growth. Umbrella and How to Be Both use a contrasting of 
different selves to acknowledge the role of the environment in shaping the 
individual. In both novels, a breakdown in self-narrative makes the protagonist 
aware of this shaping. 
10. Consciousness is the foundation of the individual 
Narrationism argues that the individual is formed through theory of mind. 
Interactions between the individual brain, body and environment are interpreted 
according to a pre-existing model of human subjectivity. The psychological and 
265 
 
   
 
ethical narrativity theses naturalise this model, defining it as both fundamental to the 
human mind and desirable. ‘Narrative’ here is an ambiguous term. It can be used to 
highlight the active role of ascription, the way in which it alters the system it 
interprets, but it can also be used to define selfhood as a fiction. While grounding 
itself in the innovations of cognitive science and neuroscience, narrationism 
perpetuates existing assumptions about the self and the mind. It has been developed 
partly as a response to the contemporary technological environment, but it is 
inadequate for addressing the mutually constitutive relation between humans and 
technology, and the feedback loops operating within the technological nonconscious. 
Consciousness, as I have defined it, is the result of these ongoing processes. It 
registers and resolves the ongoing breakdowns of homeostasis which characterize 
this environment. The influence of narrativity in the contemporary environment is so 
strong that any critique of narrativity raises the question of how the individual is to 
be understood other than through narrative. My primary texts make the case for 
consciousness. As the characteristics above show, an approach centred on 
consciousness allows us to understand the relation between humans and technology.    
 
An Indeterminacy  
I argued earlier that novels have an active role in any broader discussion which refers 
to narrative. Given the importance of theory of mind in cognition, this discussion 
needs to address the way in which the mind is conceptualised in any field or 
discipline. One of the premises of the third culture, that the progress of cognitive 
science has effectively made the humanities obsolete, at least within mainstream 
culture, is therefore mistaken. When writers like Dennett use the novel as a metaphor 
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for the mind, the meaning of their argument depends on the state of the novel in a 
particular context. My findings also give the lie to another assumption of the third 
culture, originating with Snow, that novelists have largely chosen not to engage with 
scientific research. The novels I have looked at all show a high degree of 
engagement with third culture texts. This is not a passive response; it is an active 
intervention which critiques these works even as it draws on them. My thesis has 
shown that in questioning narrationism, and in developing alternatives to it, the 
novel justifies its place within this broader dialogue.  
I want to end by briefly arguing that literary studies also merits a place in this 
dialogue, on its own terms. I have argued that my primary texts undermine the latest 
attempt at developing a meta-structure that would incorporate the various fields 
relating to the human mind and its encounter with technology. Here, I want to briefly 
propose that literary studies could potentially aid in developing new forms of meta-
structure, using the example of the work of M.M. Bakhtin. 
While I disagree with narrationism as Dennett formulates it, I have relied on 
several aspects of his work. His concept of ‘heterophenomenology’ is useful here. 
Heterophenomenology consists of taking a critical perspective on an individual’s 
account of their conscious experience through reference to other levels of 
explanation. Dennett uses a literary analogy to formulate this perspective: ‘We can 
compare the heterophenomenologist’s task of interpreting subjects’ behaviour to the 
reader’s task of interpreting a work of fiction.’1087 I see this as a legitimate approach, 
and one relevant to literary studies. Based on my findings, I would go further, and 
argue that the heterophenomenological approach works better once we abandon 
narrationism. As Dennett describes it, a singular ‘I’ emerges from the multiple 
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operations of the mind through an act of narration. As Bakhtin argues, however, 
first-person narration in fact splits the narrator into at least two entities: 
 
If I relate (or write about) an event that has just happened to me, then I as the 
teller (or writer) of this event am already outside of the time and space in 
which the event occurred. It is just as impossible to forge an identity between 
myself, my own “I,” and that “I” that is the subject of my stories as it is to lift 
myself up by my own hair.1088 
 
Bakhtin’s basic point grounds what I have said about the distinction between the 
subject and self, the tension between the episodic and autobiographical selves in 
Damasio’s model, and the operations of memory in my primary texts. The novel as 
form always includes more than one voice. The formal structure of the novel, then, is 
ideally suited to embodying the operations of a non-narrational consciousness, as I 
have described them. By the same token, it is ideally suited to heterophenomenology 
as Dennett describes it, which relies on the use of all available perspectives on the 
individual’s self-reporting. 
Bakhtin’s model can be also be used to sum up the novel’s role within a 
broader cultural dialogue on the mind. In ‘Proposal for a Critical Neuroscience’ 
(2012) Jan Slaby and Suparna Choudhury advocate ‘assembling’ the ‘collection of 
material from multiple sources and perspectives to enrich scientific 
conceptualizations as well as the broader intellectual horizon in which problems and 
issues are framed for empirical investigation and interpretation’1089. Bakhtin’s 
account of the novel offers a model of how such assembling could work. The novel 
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‘parodies other genres (precisely in their role as genres); it exposes the 
conventionality of their forms and their language; it squeezes out some genres and 
incorporates others into its own peculiar structure, reformulating and re-accentuating 
them’1090. The novel’s contribution to a broader dialogue lies in its effects on the 
languages it makes use of; these become ‘more free and flexible, their language 
renews itself by incorporating extraliterary heteroglossia and the “novelistic” layers 
of literary language, they become dialogized, permeated with laughter, irony, humor, 
elements of self-parody’1091. Finally, the novel ‘inserts into these other genres an 
indeterminacy, a certain semantic openendedness, a living contact with unfinished 
still evolving contemporary reality (the openended present)’1092. I have argued that 
through narrationism, cognitivists have looked to the novel to replace the computer, 
as a model that would provide the basis for a meta-structure. Following Bakhtin, I 
argue that the novel’s role should be precisely to reject any possibility of a meta-
structure, of any unity. Rather than trying to reconcile the various available 
perspectives on consciousness and the mind, we should be looking at how an 
awareness of their contrasts can be productive for all of these perspectives. 
Bakhtin’s work on the equivalence between consciousness and the novel 
offers one way of developing this model. Language, he argues, ‘for the individual 
consciousness, lies on the borderline between oneself and the other. The word in 
language is half someone else’s.’1093 It becomes ‘“one’s own” only when the speaker 
populates it with his own intention, his own accent, when he appropriates the word, 
adapting it to his own semantic and expressive intention.’1094 This process of 




   
 
The importance of struggling with another’s discourse, its influence in the 
history of an individual’s coming to ideological consciousness, is enormous. 
One’s own discourse and one’s own voice, although born of another or 
dynamically stimulated by another, will sooner or later begin to liberate 
themselves from the authority of the other’s discourse. This process is made 
more complex by the fact that a variety of alien voices enter in to the struggle 
for influence within an individual’s consciousness (just as they struggle with 
one another in surrounding social reality). All this creates fertile soil for 
experimentally objectifying another’s discourse. A conversation with an 
internally persuasive word that one has begun to resist may continue, but it 
takes on another character: it is questioned, it is put in a new situation in 
order to expose its weak sides, to get a feel for its boundaries, to experience it 
physically as an object.1095 
 
The depiction of the mind as a struggle between a variety of alien voices recalls 
Dennett’s description of memes. Agency is not a matter of subsuming all of these 
voices within one narrative, but of objectifying them, of contrasting them, and of 
understanding oneself as a dialogue. The novel as a form embodies this process, and 
as such can still be understood as a model for the mind. At the same time, it can 
provide the model for a true dialogue between the two cultures, and for a way of 
talking about the mind and its relation to technology that reflects and expresses the 
diversity and contrasts of all available perspectives.    
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when the Judge shall come, to judge all things strictly’ (Ibid, 150). This description follows 
the dynamic of The Book of Dave, while tying it even more explicitly to the environment, in 
this case to ‘the Swiss’s particular liberalism, whereby the community permitted anything, if 
the individual could overcome his or her own massive internalized constraint’ (Ibid, 152). She 
also feels ‘un-musiced’, in that her ‘thoughts had not been about music – or music itself 
resounding in her mind, note-for-thought, tone-for-feeling, the organic development of mood’, 
a local orchestra providing only a ‘Taylorization of sound’ (Ibid, 168).’Un-musiced’ expresses 
a determination of one’s relationship to the environment entirely by reductive interpretation 
similar to the Knowledge: ‘Drained of melody, what remained of anyone’s life? A narrative 
trajectory as straight and dull, as discordant and crowded, as the M1’ (Ibid, 171). 
867 Umbrella opens with song lyrics rendered as ejaculatory thought, in a subtle reference to 
the last appearance of Busner in Great Apes: ‘I’m an ape man, I’m an ape-ape man … Along 
comes Zachary […] Muswell Hill calypso warms the cold Friern Barnet morning, staying with 
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him, wreathing his head with rapidly condensing pop breath.’ (Self, Umbrella, 1) Busner hears 
the song through a window, the anthropomorphised confluence of culture and environment 
expressed through the metaphor of ‘pop breath’, but the lyrics recur for the next few pages, 
incorporated into his consciousness. At the end of the novel, Busner sees in these songs a 
marker of his failure of interpretation: ‘The pop ditties that had infested his mind had been, he 
now understands, continuous reminders not only of this unfinished and abandoned travail, but 
of all the other crimes of forgetting he had committed: Don’t let it die, Don’t let it die … 
Hurricane Smith had groaned these melodic truisms – but simply because they were truisms, 
it didn’t mean they weren’t … true.’ (Ibid, 396) 
868 Smith, Accidental, 201. 
869 Ibid, 138. 
870 Ibid, 139. 
871 Ibid, 201. 
872 Peter Boxall, Twenty-First Century Fiction: a Critical Introduction (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), 63. 
873 Smith, Accidental, 103-105. 
874 Ibid, 205-211. 
875 Boxall, Twenty-First Century Fiction, 63. 
876 Smith, Accidental, 3. 
877 Ibid, 185. 
878 Astrid’s perception is the least predetermined; as the youngest Smart, she brings the least 
amount of experience to bear. She hears Amber/Alhambra’s ‘way of talking’ as ‘Irish-
sounding, or maybe a kind of American’, noting that her hair is ‘supposed to be blonde but 
Astrid can see much deeper dark in her hair at the roots of her parting’ (Smith, Accidental, 31; 
21). Astrid’s relatively clear perception of Amber/Alhambra emphasises an ambiguity which 
brings the assumptions made by the other Smarts into focus. To Magnus, in the next chapter, 
she has ‘angelic yellow hair’ (Ibid, 55). His perception of her as an angel is determined by the 
context of their encounter. She effectively prevents him from hanging himself, although it is 
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worth noting that she does by the fact of her presence rather than intentionally; she even offers 
to help him do so (Ibid, 55-56). He also sees her as ‘very beautiful, a little rough-looking, like 
a beautiful used girl off an internet site […] all lit up against the wipe-clean wallpaper’ (Ibid, 
55). This references an earlier passage in which Magnus mentions that once you’ve looked at 
porn sites ‘all girls start to look like it’ (Ibid, 55). 
879 Smith, Accidental, 64. 
880 Ibid, 66. 
881 Ibid, 64. 
882 Ibid, 63. 
883 Ibid, 65. 
884 Ibid, 65-66. 
885 Ibid, 65. 
886 Ibid, 61. 
887 Ibid, 80-88. 
888 Ibid, 89. 
889 Ibid, 89. 
890 Ibid, 194-195. 
891 Ibid, 89. 
892 The chapter lists the questions Eve asks her, with the answers given on the next page: 
‘You’re Scottish, aren’t you?’; ‘I’m a MacDonald’; ‘Where are you actually from, 
originally?’; ‘I am directly descended from the MacDonalds of Glencoe’ (Smith, Accidental, 
91-92). 
893 Ibid, 93-94. 
894 Ibid, 98. 
895 Ibid, 98. Eve tries to remember elements of her interaction with Amber, and responds to 
the notion that she may have been mistaken by imaging how she will narrate the incident in 
the future. Mark Currie picks up on this use of tense in a passage from Hotel World: 
‘Something which is only a prospect is being tested here in retrospect, as a memory and a 
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story, to be told many years from now, and what is actually happening in the present seems to 
fall into the space between.’ (Mark Currie, ‘Ali Smith and the Philosophy of Grammar’, in Ali 
Smith: Contemporary Critical Perspectives, ed. Monica Germana and Emily Horton (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2013), 57) As Currie points out, the ‘notion that the anticipation of memory and 
completion might be the thief of presence, and perhaps also the purveyor of presence’ is ‘one 
of the novel’s favourite subjects’; this is also true of The Accidental (Ibid).  
896 Smith, Accidental, 153. 
897 Ibid, 137; 137-138; 138; 140; 141; 142; 143; 145; 147; 153; 156; 158; 236; 238; 246; 250 
898 Ibid, 7; 8; 9; 13; 15; 19; 20; 24 (twice); 25; 26; 28; 30; 31; 35; 109; 111; 112; 113; 115 
(twice); 120; 121; 122; 124; 125; 126; 127; 128; 130; 135; 220; 221; 226;  
899 Currie, About Time, 115. 
900 Quoted in Beer, ‘Gillian Beer Interviews Ali Smith’, 153. 
901 Ibid, 36; 37; 38; 39 (twice); 41; 43; 45; 51; 55. 
902 Julia Breitbach, Analog Fictions for the Digital Age: Literary Realism and Photographic 
Discourse in Novels after 2000 (London: Camden House, 2012), 115. 
903 Ali Smith, The Whole Story and Other Stories (London: Penguin, 2004), 48. 
904 Ibid. 
905 Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, 346. 
906 In ‘Cold Iron’ from Free Love, the narrator walks the streets, feeling ‘like I’m always 
walking against a tide, all sorts of rubbish floating on it, my head full of stuff, packed like a 
junk shop’, later seeing ‘driftwood’ along the beach’, finally ‘hanging on, leaning on the rail 
that overlooks the sea on either side of me […] picking up bits and pieces for my house. I’m 
thinking it out, I’m working out the story.’ (Smith, Free Love, 80; 83; 85) Like (1997) picks 
up this metaphor. The novel’s second narrator, Ash, describes narration as giving ‘a shape to 
things that didn’t actually have a shape at the time, or didn’t seem to […] Making the shape 
up […] Random, meaningless, the things you’re left with surfacing inside your head like 
driftwood.’ (Ali Smith, Like (London: Virago, 2015), 169) One such piece of driftwood is a 
‘greying notice screwed on to the wall with the words No Unauthorised Persons Beyond This 
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Point, shoals of fish flashing blindly past’ (Ibid, 169-170), hinting at the use of italicised 
phrases of official language in Hotel World. The driftwood metaphor is mirrored by that of an 
etching or a scarring into the brain, used by Eve in The Accidental to describe earworms. 
Recalling her first attraction to another girl, Ash remembers having known the rules against 
this ‘innately’, ‘even before I knew what the word meant, the silent mouthed word for it that 
some kind and knowing anonymous seer had scrawled like a scar on my science folder at 
school when I was eleven or twelve, I picked my folder out of the pile and the word branded 
itself inside my head’ (Ibid, 159-160). Her attraction to Amy is described in the same way; 
Amy ‘carved her own name in me like a scar. After that, every time she looked my way, and 
every time she didn’t, though I didn’t know or notice, something was branding her deeper into 
me.’ (Ibid, 228) This scarring affects perception: ‘It’s hard to see what’s really out there past 
the scratches that get left on the retina by what you’ve seen before and the fiddly engraving 
already etched into the surface of your brain. Apparently the new cells of the body will still, 
years after the bite, reproduce the shapes of the teeth that bit you all those years ago.’  (Ibid, 
327). These scars have their own agency within the psyche. Amy describes bodies as ‘the 
places your memories hog the best armchair, flick the television over from what you’re 
watching to the programme they want’, while her attraction to Amy is ‘savage, it was wild, it 
would get out of hand, get me like that in its musky jaws’ (Ibid, 327; 262). The metaphor of 
germs seems to mediate between driftwood and scarring, articulating the potential of memes, 
floating between psyches, to assert their own form of bodily change. When Amy thinks the 
word Scotland a ‘strange thing happens inside her. It must be nostalgia. It must be 
homesickness, this must be what it feels like, she has caught it from Kate. It comes on her like 
a kind of relief, like giving in, like the moment you know a germ has taken hold in your body’ 
(Ibid, 126). Ash’s memories of Amy reference this, as she remembers Amy telling her ‘when 
you’re ill you have a temperature because your body is working so hard to fight off the germs 
that have invaded it. Don’t worry.’ (Ibid, 171) The narrator of ‘The Shortlist Season’, from 
The Whole Story, imagines that she is ‘sensitive’ to ‘several forms of cultural expression’, 
when she gets a temperature after visiting a gallery, and hearing half a sentence spoken by a 
344 
 
   
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
man talking about ‘narrative’ (Smith, Whole Story, 168-175). One of Smith’s narrators also 
reflects on the compelling nature of fragments of narrative, half-stories, in ‘A Story of Love’ 
from Other Stories and Other Stories (1999) (Ali Smith, Other Stories and Other Stories 
(London: Granta, 1999), 173). 
907 Smith calls pop music ‘the way that we hear our times’, suggesting that ‘for most people it 
forms some kind of outlet or background to their lives’ (Quoted in Isobel Murray, Scottish 
Writers Talking 3 (Edinburgh: John Donald, 2006), 201). Like’s Amy describes song lyrics 
which ‘tack themselves round like crockery being smashed […] The needle stuck in her head’ 
(Smith, Like, 12-13). In Hotel World, one of the voices that Lise hears sings a song from an 
old advert ‘in her head’, along with others, throughout her chapter (Smith, Hotel World, 83; 
85; 98; 104; 116). In the last chapter, the ‘ghost of Dusty Springfield, popular singer of the 
nineteen sixties, soars, sure and broken, definite and tentative, through the open window of a 
terraced house on the corner of Short Street’ (Ibid, 229-230). The ‘ghost’ in the novel’s first 
chapter, as I’ve discussed, can be understood as the conscious subject, separate from the  body 
and asking it questions to draw out memories. The last chapter’s listing of various ‘ghosts’ 
then embodies the extended nature of this subject. In Writ (2006), the narrator is confronted, 
like Eve, by her own recalcitrant teenage self, assuming a version of this questioning relation 
to an embodiment of her memory. Talking to her brings a song into the narrator’s head, which 
gives her an idea as to how to engage with her younger self; memory’s alteration of the 
conscious subject is embodied in bringing to mind one of the memes which make up her mind, 
changing the questions to be asked (Ali Smith, Writ (Oundle Festival of Literature Press, 
2006), unpag.). 
908 Smith, Accidental, 91. 
909 Ibid, 95. 
910 Ibid, 96. 
911 Ibid, 147. 




   
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
914 Horton (2012), Tancke (2013), Levin (2013) and Tew (2007) offer comprehensive readings 
of these aspects of the novel. Horton and Tancke are particularly effective in evaluating the 
limitations of a reading of the novel solely in terms of the Freudian unconscious or of 
contemporary models of trauma. Both establish Smith’s own implicit critique of the ethical 
injunction to engage with the real beyond representation. 
915 Self, Grey Area, 3. 
916 Ibid, 13 
917 Ibid, 14 
918 Ibid, 17 
919 This concern was established early on by Self, in ‘Ward 9’ from The Quantity Theory of 
Insanity: ‘The English depend on class, to the extent that whenever two English people meet, 
they spend nanoseconds in high-speed calculations. Every nuance of accent, every detail of 
apparel, every implication of vocabulary, is analysed to produce the final formula. This in turn 
provides the coordinates that will locate the individual and determine the Attitude.’ (Will Self, 
The Quantity Theory of Insanity (London: Penguin, 1994), 28). 
920 Hayes, Understanding Will Self, 95.  
921 Self, Dave, 28. 
922 Ibid, 28; 29. 
923 Ibid, 34-35. 
924 Ibid, 41. 
925 Ibid, 54. 
926 Ali Smith, Ali Smith’s Supersonic 70’s (London: Penguin, 2005), 54. 
927 Ibid, 46. 
928 Ibid, 50. 
929 Ibid, 59. 
930 Ibid. 
931 Smith, Accidental, 286. 
932 Ibid, 293-294. 
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933 Ali Smith, Public Library and Other Stories (London: Penguin, 2015), 106-109. 
934 Ibid, 109. 
935 Ibid, 120-121. 
936 Ibid, 104; 112. 
937 Rowlands, The New Science of the Mind, 161. 
938 Ibid. 
939 I discussed this use of italics in the last chapter. The most pertinent example here is Eve’s 
incorporation of a question posed to her by Amber/Alhambra within her interpretative stance 
in relation to her own experience; in posing this question, Amber/Alhambra alters Eve’s self 
by altering her processing of experience. The dialogic form developed by Smith consists in 
the splitting of novels or short stories in half, each half either narrated by one character or 
narrated in a free indirect style mostly centred on one character, and thematically pre-occupied 
with that character’s relation to the main character in the other half. This form is first used in 
Like, Smith’s first novel. Artful is a variation of it, in that it is split between a narrator reflecting 
on their dead lover while reading their draft lectures, and the text of those lectures, which 
towards the end address the first narrator directly. How to Be Both uses another variation, in 
that the protagonists of each half of the novel often reflect on their relation to the other. Several 
of Smith’s short stories are narrated entirely in the second-person, and a set of short stories 
are split into two, each half narrated by one character addressing the other. 
940 Smith, Both, 29. 
941 Ibid, 30.  
942 Ibid, 30-31.  
943 George remembers asking her mother ‘what’s the point of art’, then asks whether the 
gallery they are in is ‘the place you were talking about in the car […] the moral conundrum’ 
(Smith, Both, 46; 49).  
944 Smith, Both, 49. 
945 Ibid, 51.  
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946 In a later passage, George and her friend H look at paintings. In one, a ‘handsome man with 
brown eyes’ is holding a gold a ring ‘like his hand is coming right out of the picture over the 
edge of the frame and into the real world like he’s literally saying, here, it’s for you, do you 
want it?’ (Smith, Both, 141-142). In another picture, a detail in the background changes the 
meaning of the painting: ‘It is both blatant and invisible […] Once you’ve seen it, you can’t 
not see it […] It can be just rocks and landscape if that’s what you want it to be – but there’s 
always more to see, if you look.’ (Ibid, 142). There is a further ambiguity here, a contradiction 
between the painting’s influence on the self, and the choice it offers to the viewer. A long 
sequence in which George looks at paintings in a gallery develops this idea. The observation 
that one painting ‘admits the whole thing’s a performance’, in contrast to the others 
‘pretending to be real’, is countered by the idea that ‘perhaps it is just that George has spent 
proper time looking at this one painting and that every single experience of looking at 
something would be this good if she devoted time to everything she looked at’ (Ibid, 156). 
The question of whether what is experienced is the effect of the painting on George, and her 
perception of other paintings, or of George’s particular approach to that one painting, is left 
unresolved. The two cannot be distinguished. 
947 Smith, How, 308. 
948 Smith, Artful, 26. 
949 Ibid, 26-27. 
950 Ibid, 27. 
951 Artful’s narrator comes across a quote from Six Memos in the lecture notes: 
Think what it would be like to have a work conceived from outside the self, a work 
that would let us escape the limited perspective of the individual ego, not only to enter 
into selves like our own but to give speech to that which has no language, to the bird 
perching on the edge of the gutter, to the tree in spring and the tree in fall, to stone, to 
cement, to plastic … (Smith, Artful, 86; Italo Calvino, Six Memos for the Next 
Millennium (London: Penguin, 2009), 124). 
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George’s mother recalls this passage: ‘Can we never get to go beyond ourselves? […] Never 
get to be more than ourselves? Will I ever, as far as you’re concerned, be allowed to be 
anything other than your mother?’ (Smith, How, 124). Francesco also describes painting in 
terms echoing Calvino:  
It is a feeling thing, to be a painter of things […] paint a rose or a coin or a duck or a 
brick and you’ll feel it as sure as if a coin had a mouth and told you what it was like 
to be a coin, as if a rose told you first-hand what petals are […] as if a duck told you 
about the combined wet and underdry of its feathers, a brick about the rough kiss of 
its skin. (Ibid, 228) 
The passage from Six Memos above builds on Calvino’s use of ‘images of lightness’ to develop 
‘fresh methods of cognition and verification’; one of the images from science Calvino 
proposes for this purpose is that of DNA (Calvino, Six Memos, 7-8). George’s attention to an 
image of DNA towards the end of her half of the novel acts as a significant turning point in 
her own understanding of thought and truth (Smith, How, 172-173).    
952 At the start, Calvino discusses and then rejects the interpretation of myth in favour of an 
approach to them which reads them ‘without losing touch with their language of images’; the 
myth he discusses ‘is telling us something, something implicit in the images that can’t be 
explained any other way’ (Calvino, Six Memos, 405). 
953 Calvino quotes Hofstadter on the role of mental images in writing: 
Think, for instance, of a writer who is trying to convey certain ideas which to him are 
contained in mental images. He isn’t quite sure how those images fit together in his 
mind, and he experiments around, expressing things first one way and then another, 
and finally settles on some version. But does he know where it all came from? Only 
in a vague sense. Much of the source, like an iceberg, is deep underwater, unseen – 
and he knows that. (Cavino, Six Memos, 87; Hofstadter, Gödel, 713) 
Calvino uses Hofstadter to make the point that the role of mental images in art depends on 
‘processes that, even if they do not originate in the heavens, certainly go beyond our intentions 
and our control – acquiring – with respect to the individual – a kind of transcendence’ 
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(Calvino, Six Memos, 87). He goes on to claim that the ‘poet’s mind, and at a few decisive 
moments the mind of the scientist, works according to a process of association of images that 
is the quickest way to link and to choose between the infinite forms of the possible and the 
impossible’ , adding that the imagination is a ‘kind of electronic machine that takes account 
of all possible combinations and chooses the ones that are appropriate to a particular purpose, 
or are simply the most interesting, pleasing, or amusing’ (Ibid, 91). In this, he echoes the 
introduction to ‘Strange Loops, or Tangled Hierarchies’, the chapter in Gödel, Escher, Bach 
from which he takes the passage above, in which Hofstadter sets out his aim of communicating 
‘some of the images which help me to visualize how consciousness rises out of the jungle of 
neurons; to communicate a set of intangible intuitions’ (Hofstadter, Gödel, 686-687).  
954 Where ‘music and painting, for instance, have traditionally expressed ideas or emotions 
through a vocabulary of “symbols” […] now there is a tendency to explore the capacity of 
music and art to not express anything – just to be’ (Hofstadter, Gödel, 699). Hofstadter points 
out the difficulty of this endeavour: ‘Any time an object is exhibited in a gallery or dubbed a 
“work”, it acquires an aura of deep inner significance […] More and more questions flood into 
the viewer’s mind; he can’t help it. This is the “frame effect” which art – Art – automatically 
creates’ (Ibid, 704).  
955 Hofstadter, Gödel, 709. 
956 Ali Smith, ‘Style vs content? Novelists should approach their art with an eye to what the 
story asks’, The Guardian 18 August 2012, 
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2012/aug/18/ali-smith-novelists-approach-art.  
957 Self, Umbrella, 8. 
958 Ibid, 9. 
959 Ibid. 
960 Ibid, 12. 
961 Ibid, 12-13. 
962 Ibid, 12. 
963 Ibid, 126. 
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964 Sacks, Awakenings, 20. 
965 Ibid. 
966 Ibid, 20-21. 
967 Ibid, 288 n.14.  
968 Self, ‘Tea with Oliver Sacks’.  
969 Oliver Sacks, ‘In the River of Consciousness’, New York Review of Books 15 January 2004, 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2004/01/15/in-the-river-of-consciousness/.  
970 Self, ‘Tea with Oliver Sacks’.  
971 Sacks, ‘In the River of Consciousness’; ‘Oliver said he felt in some ways vindicated by the 
new neuro-imaging techniques that seemed to demonstrate the astonishing plasticity of the 
human brain-mind’ (Self, ‘Tea with Oliver Sacks’).  
972 Sacks, ‘In the River of Consciousness’.  
973 Smith, Both, 11. 
974 One of the unnamed narrators in ‘May’, from The Whole Story and Other Stories (2003), 
falls in love with a tree, which they describe in a passage with the same structure as the one 
from How to be Both: ‘the buds were like the pointed hooves of a herd of tiny deer. The 
blossom was like – no, it was like nothing but blossom. The leaves, when they came would be 
like nothing but leaves. I have never seen a tree more like a tree’ (Ali Smith, The Whole Story 
and Other Stories (London: Penguin, 2004), 57). 
975 Smith, How, 13. 
976 Ibid, 15. 
977 Ibid. 
978 James Somers, ‘The Man Who Would Teach Machines to Think’, The Atlantic November 
2013, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/11/the-man-who-would-teach-
machines-to-think/309529/.  
979 Calvino ends a lecture in Six Memos with a reference to Hofstadter’s use of Escher: ‘In a 
gallery of paintings, a man is looking at the landscape of a city, and this landscape opens up 
to embrace the gallery that contains it and the man who is looking at it’ (Calvino, Six Memos, 
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98). The painting he is describing, ‘Print Gallery’ by M.C. Escher, is reproduced and discussed 
by Hofstadter (Hofstadter, Gödel, 714). Calvino follows this up with an image of his own: 
‘The polymorphic visions of the eyes and the spirit are contained in uniform lines of small or 
capital letters, periods, commas, parentheses – pages of signs, packed as closely together as 
grains of sand, representing the many-colored spectacle of the world on a surface that is always 
the same and always different, like dunes shifted by the desert wind’ (Calvino, Six Memos, 
99). Smith references this passage in Artful (85-86).  
980 Smith, Both, 154. 
981 Rowland, New Science of the Mind, 163.  
982 Ibid, 196. 
983 Ibid, 196. 
984 This is most evident in the section narrated by Else.  She first sees the sky as a ceiling, and 
the buildings as walls, before imagining another inside her, holding her up (Smith Hotel 
World, 40). Later on she describes her body as a city, and sees the front of the hotel as a face 
(Ibid, 49-50; 64-65). 
985 Smith, Both, 62. 
986 Ibid. 
987 Emily Horton, ‘Contemporary Space and Affective Ethics in Ali Smith’s Short Stories’, in 
Ali Smith: Contemporary Critical Perspectives, ed. Monica Germana and Emily Horton 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 23. 
988 Ibid, 32. 
989 Ryle’s reading of The Accidental argues that ‘Smith refuses the binary opposition between 
nature and culture […] which pastoral sometimes inscribes’ (Martin Ryle, ‘Neo-Pastoral Eco-
Didactics: Ali Smith’s The Accidental’, Green Letters: Studies in Ecocriticism 10(1) (2009), 
11). Justyna Kostkowska’s reading of Hotel World argues that the novel establishes a 
community from its separated characters through both ‘the external “world” of the characters’ 
physical environment, of the narrative’, and their shared ‘attention towards the nonhuman 
others that involves caring, thoughtfulness, and respect’; both sides of the nature/architecture 
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binary present in that novel are revealed to function in similar ways, and thus to complement 
each other (Justyna Kostkowska, Ecocritism and Women Writers: Environmentalist Poetics 
of Virginia Woolf, Jeanette Winterson, and Ali Smith (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2013), 107; 111). Fiona Cox and Elena Theodorakopoulus’s reading of Like notes the use of 
‘the contrast between the dry protection of the ‘dim’ libraries and ‘shaded’ lecture halls and 
the noise, wetness, and warmth’ of the natural environment, and argue that while one character 
learning and culture ‘as a form of self-protection, and protection from humanity’, Smith’s use 
of space in that novel is used to make the point that ‘culture can speak of the everyday, and 
can touch us in an immediate and human way if we free it from the trappings of academia 
(Fiona Cox and Elena Theodorakopoulus, ‘Female Voices: The Democratic Turn in Ali 
Smith’s Classical Reception’, in Classics in the Modern World: A ‘Democratic Turn?’, ed. by 
Lora Hardwick and Stephen Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013), 292). Kaye 
Mitchell identifies a variation of this binary in Girl Meets Boy (2007), which contrast water 
with myth and advertising. At one point, a character questions whether myths pring fully 
formed from the imagination and the needs of a society […] as if they emerged from society’s 
unconscious’ or whether they are ‘conscious creations by the various money-making forces’ 
(Ali Smith, Girl Meets Boy (Edinburgh: Cannongate, 2007), 89). When that same character 
claims to have grown up ‘mythless’, another counters that ‘[n]obody grows up mythless […] 
it’s what we do with the myths we grow up with that matters’ (Ibid, 98). Mitchell argues that 
‘[a]gency is here reintroduced in the act of storytelling and this self-reflexive avowal […] 
might stand as a comment on Smith’s own practice of reinvention’ (Kaye Mitchell, ‘Queer 
Metamorphoses: Girl Meets Boy and the Futures of Queer Fiction’, in Ali Smith: 
Contemporary Critical Perspectives, edited by Monica Germana and Emily Horton (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2013), 67). 
990 Smith, Artful, 186. 





   
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
993 In her essay on Berger’s influence on her work, Smith notes that one the things she loves 
‘in Berger’s vision is his insistence on the artist not as a creator, but receiver, as a figure 
crucially open and receptive, since art’s impetus is essentially collaborative and communal’ 
(Smith, ‘John Berger’). This complements Calvino’s discussion of art in Six Memos, as well 
as the structuring of Francesco’s half of How to Be Both, in which unanswered questions about 
the paintings that George looks at are explained by a depiction of things Francesco has seen. 
Berger’s claim that ‘[t]he way we see things is affected by what we know or what we believer’ 
is also relevant, as is his chosen example: ‘In the Middle Ages when men believed in the 
physical existence of Hell the sight of fire must have meant something different from what it 
means today’ (John Berger, Ways of Seeing (London: Penguin, 2008), 19). When discussing 
what Francesco might make of the world today, H says that he would see carts as ‘[l]ittle 
confessionals on wheels. Everything for him would’ve been about God’ (Smith Both, 138). 
This is confirmed in Francesco’s half of the novel, in which phones are described as votive 
tablets, and heaphones are described as having confessional grilles attached (Ibid, 229-230; 
252).  
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https://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/jul/26/will-self-architectural-salvage-short-story.  
1000 Ibid. 
1001 Self, Umbrella, 306-307. 
1002 Ibid, 235. 
1003 Ibid, 236. 
1004 Ibid, 78.  
1005 Ibid, 77-78. 
354 
 
   
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
1006 Ibid, 161-162. 
1007 Ibid, 184. 
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